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HUMANITARIAN INTER VENTION
NATO's 1999 Operation Allied Force, organized to succor
Albanian Kosovars and others (e.g., Roma) indigenous to the Kosovo
province of the former Yugoslavia' ("SFRY") subjected to brutal
actions-including murder, rape and displacement from their homes
by Serbian forces under SFRY President Slobodan Milosevic's
direction-was a legitimate collective action for humanitarian
intervention pursuant to principles of state of necessity under
circumstances known at the time.2 The law of international armed
1. See Ian Fisher, Serbia and Montenegro Sign a Plan for Yugoslavia's
Demise, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2002, at A3 (writing that there would be no
"Yugoslavia" in the future if Serbia and Montenegro, the remnants of pre-1991
Yugoslavia, approved a March 14, 2002 agreement that declared that the area of
the former Yugoslavia would be known as "Serbia and Montenegro"); see also Ian
Fisher, Yugoslavia.- Restructuring Plan Advances, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2002, at
A14 (reporting that the Parliaments of Serbia and Montenegro formally approved
the agreement).
2. What NATO knew, or reasonably should have known at the time of the
decision to launch Allied Force, is important. See infra notes 114-134 and
accompanying text (explaining that to be found liable for violating the rules of
warfare, a decision-maker is judged on what he or she knew or should have known
at the time the decision to attack was made); see also Ian Fisher & Marlise Simons,
Defiant, Milosevic Begins His Defense by Assailing NATO, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15,
2002, at Al (writing that Milosevic raised the issue of the NATO campaign's
lawfulness in his opening statement in his genocide and war crimes trial in The
Hague); Milosevic, at U.N. Court, Trades Atrocity Charges with Kosovar, N.Y.
TIMES, May 7, 2002, at A5 (reporting that Milosevic accused Kosovo Albanians of
committing genocide against Serbians in the province, a claim Ibrahim Rugova,
the Kosovo leader, denied). Milosevic's claims may be predicates for tu quoque
("you also") defenses. In this case, Milosevic's defense would be that because
NATO's Allied Force campaign was unlawful, he cannot be held criminally liable
for humanitarian law and genocide charges against him, or that because Albanian
Kosovars committed atrocities, he cannot be held criminally liable for these
charges. If this is Milosevic's theory, it is unavailing as a complete defense like
some defenses, e.g., not guilty by reason of insanity, might be. Tu quoque, like a
superior orders defense, may go to mitigation of sentence or a finding of no
punishment; it is not a complete defense to liability for war crimes or genocide. Tu
quoque only applies when the offense charged and the other side's actions are the
same or similar. Thus, unless Milosevic proves NATO committed genocide, he
cannot rely on tu quoque as to those charges against him; recent cases suggest the
defense might not be available even under those circumstances. See 58 W.T.
MALLISON, JR., STUDIES IN THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE: SUBMARINES IN
GENERAL AND LIMITED WARS 88 (Naval War C. Int'l L. Stud. 1968); see also
Horace B. Robertson, Jr., Submarine Warfare, JAG J. 3, 8 (1956) (commenting on
2002]
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conflict ("LOAC") applied to NATO operations against the SFRY,
and to SFRY responses to NATO during Allied Force. The law of
non-international armed conflict applied to operations involving
Yugoslav forces and the Kosovo Liberation Army ("KLA").
This Article analyzes the state of necessity doctrine, discussing the
current theory in Part I. Part II offers conditioning factors to
elaborate on International Law Commission ("ILC") State
Admiral Karl Doenitz's sentence in United States v. Goering); United States v.
Goering, I Trials of Major War Crims. Before Int'l Mil. Trib. at Nuremberg 171,
310, 313 (1946) [hereinafter Goering, I I.M.T.] (finding Karl Doenitz not guilty on
the indictment's Count I (common plan, conspiracy) but guilty on Counts 11
(crimes against peace) and Ill (war crimes), the latter including all war crimes of
which he was charged). In Goering, the International Military Tribunal
("Tribunal") considered as a mitigating factor the treatment of Allied prisoners of
war under Goering's jurisdiction in accordance with the Convention Relative to
Treatment of Prisoners of War. See id. at 311-15; see also id., Appendix A:
Statement of Individual Responsibility for Crimes Set Out in Counts One, Two,
Three, and Four 68, 78-79; Convention Relative to Treatment of Prisoners of War,
July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2021, 118 L.N.T.S. 343. Contra H.A. SMITH, THE LAW AND
CUSTOM OF THE SEA 212-13 (3d ed. 1959) ("[A] war crime ceases to be punishable
if the defense can prove that similar action was taken on the victorious side."). If tu
quoque had been a complete defense in Goering, the Tribunal would have so ruled,
as it did on charges of attacks on armed merchantmen, which under the law of
naval warfare then and now, were not immune from attack under the
circumstances. See Goering, I I.M.T. at 312; see also In re Von Weizsaecker
("The Ministries Case"), 14 Trials of War Crims. Before the Nuremberg Mil.
Tribunals Under Control Council L. No. 10, at 314, 322-23 (1949) (holding that tu
quoque was not a complete defense). But see Prosecutor v. Kupre'scki'c (Int'l
Crim. Trib. Yugo. App. Chamber 2001), reprinted in part, 41 I.L.M. 313, 322
(2002) (refraining from expressing a view on the disputed point of whether the
accused individuals raised the tu quoque defense, because it had no bearing on
their convictions and therefore was an inappropriate ground for appeal). See
generally Mark A. Drumbl & Kenneth S. Gallant, Appeals in the Ad Hoc
International Criminal Tribunals: Structure, Procedure, and Recent Cases, 3 J.
App. PRAC. & PROC. 589, 624 (2001); Theodor Meron, The Humanization of
Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 239, 250 (2000); see also Daryl A. Mundis,
Introductory Note to ICTY Appeals Chamber: Prosecutor v. Kupre 'ski 'c, 41 I.L.M.
3 10 (2002). The fact that a crime victim has been engaged in criminal activity is no
defense in municipal common law systems. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
CRIMINAL LAW § 5.1 1(b) (3d ed. 2000); ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N.
BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW ch. 9 § 4 (3d ed. 1982); I WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW §
76 (Charles E. Torcia ed., 15th ed. 1993). This article takes the position that Allied
Force was a lawful operation under state of necessity principles; therefore, tu
quoque is not to be a defense for acquittal or to be used for mitigation.
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Responsibility principles for state of necessity3 in the context of
collective humanitarian intervention4 to succor indigenous nationals
that are not of the same nationality as states acting collectively to
rescue them. Humanitarian intervention for this analysis is defined as
the threat or use of force by a state, group of states, or international
organization primarily for protecting nationals of the affected state
from widespread deprivations of human rights or rights under
humanitarian law.5
3. See Report of the International Law Commission, Fifty-Third Session (23
Apr.-1 June and 2 July - 10 Aug. 2001) to the General Assembly, U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 10) at 194-206, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 & Corr. 1 (2001) [hereinafter 2001
ILC Report] (appearing now before the General Assembly as Agenda Item 162, to
be debated in the Assembly's 59th session, i.e. in 2004, G.A. Res. 56/83, U.N.
GAOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (2002); see also Report of the
International Law Commission to the General Assembly, State Responsibility, U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 10), U.N. Doc. A/35/10 (1980), reprinted in [1980] 2 Y.B.
INT'L L. COMM'N 26, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.l (1981) [hereinafter
State Responsibility]; Report of International Law Commission to the General
Assembly, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10), U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996), reprinted in
[1996] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 1, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.1 (1998).
Compare Jean Raby, The State of Necessity and the Use of Force to Protect
Nationals, [1988] 26 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 253-54 (1989) (arguing that state of
necessity doctrine, not self-defense, should be the basis for humanitarian
intervention, whether an intervening state's nationals or other persons are
involved) with 2001 ILC Report, supra, at 205 ("The question whether measures of
forcible humanitarian intervention, not sanctioned pursuant to Chapters VII or VIII
of the [U.N.] Charter... may be lawful under modem international law is not
covered by Article 25," which states the most current version of the ILC necessity
principles). This Article advocates the view that these principles, even if so limited
by the ILC, may be cited as guides for humanitarian intervention. See 2001 ILC
Report, supra, art. 41, at 277-82, 286-92 (supporting application of ILC principles
in collective humanitarian intervention situations); see also infra notes 135-142
and accompanying text (analyzing collective humanitarian intervention situations).
Using the principles is appropriate also because, among other authorities, the
International Court of Justice ("ICJ") cited them in contexts different from those
discussed in State Responsibility, for the proposition that the 1980 version
represented custom. As such, the principles became a primary source of
international law. See infra notes 6-38, 461-463 and accompanying text (discussing
principles of international law).
4. See Anne Ryniker, The ICRC's Position on "Humanitarian Intervention ',
2001 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 482 (writing that the International Committee of the Red
Cross ("ICRC") views the phrase "humanitarian intervention" as a contradiction in
terms). Because the term has become common in usage, this Article employs it.
5. Cf SEAN D. MURPHY, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE UNITED
NATIONS IN AN EVOLVING WORLD ORDER 11, 13 (1996) (suggesting that
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
Part III comments on two issues arising during the NATO
campaign: lawfulness of ship interdiction against the SFRY and the
status of prisoners of war ("PW's") in the context of state of
necessity. This analysis considers these narrow issues and does not
discuss other problems associated with intervention, e.g., unilateral
or collective intervention with an affected state's consent; unilateral
intervention to rescue a state's own endangered nationals, nationals
of other states, or indigenous peoples; or collective intervention
under circumstances other than that presented in the NATO Kosovo
campaign, i.e., collective humanitarian intervention to rescue
indigenous peoples when the affected state does not consent to the
collective action.
I. STATE OF NECESSITY
What is state of necessity? In 2001 the ILC, a U.N. General
Assembly agency of representative leading international lawyers,6
adopted Article 25 of its State Responsibility principles in its Report
intervention should be carried out by organizations other than NATO, an alliance
organized pursuant to the U.N. Charter Article 51 inherent right of collective and
individual self-defense by states); see also infra notes 135-150 and accompanying
text (analyzing the right of self-defense and other aspects of collective
decisionmaking). My definition substitutes "affected state," a less pejorative term,
for Murphy's "target state," the country against whom humanitarian intervention is
projected or mounted. See MURPHY, supra, at 11-12 (limiting the definition of
target state to human rights deprivations). I expand it to include violations of
humanitarian law, rules governing international or noninternational armed
conflicts. See also NATALINO RONZITTI, RESCUING NATIONALS ABROAD THROUGH
MILITARY COERCION AND INTERVENTION ON GROUNDS OF HUMANITY xiv (1985).
6. The General Assembly elects ILC members from government nominees.
See generally HERBERT W. BRIGGS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION
(1965); SIR IAN SINCLAIR, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION (1987); IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 30 (5th ed. 1998); 1
OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 30 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts
eds., 9th ed. 1992); OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 66-69, 71-72 (1991); 1 SIR ARTHUR WATTS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
COMMISSION, 1949-1998 1-20 (1999); Herbert W. Briggs, Reflections on the
Codification of International Law by the International Law Commission and by
Other Agencies, 126 R.C.A.D.I. 233 (1969); R.Y. Jennings, The Progressive
Development of International Law and Its Codification, 24 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
301, 310-29 (1947); Hersch Lauterpacht, Codification and Development of
International Law, 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 16 (1955); Shabtai Rosenne, The
International Law Commission, 1949-59,36 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 104 (1961).
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of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly,
replacing a similar Article 33 in the 1980 draft. Article 25 reads:
1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the
wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international obligation
of that State unless the act:
(a) Is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a
grave and imminent peril; and
(b) Does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States
towards which the obligation exists, or of the international community as
a whole.
2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for
precluding wrongfulness if:
(a) The international obligation in question excludes the possibility of
invoking necessity; or
(b) The State has contributed to the situation of necessity.
7
Article 21 of the State Responsibility principles state that
"wrongfulness of an act of a State is precluded if the act constitutes a
lawful measure of self-defense taken in conformity with the [U.N.]
Charter."8 Article 26 declares that "[n]othing in this Chapter
precludes the wrongfulness of any act of a State which is not in
conformity with an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of
general international law."9
7. 2001 ILC Report, supra note 3, art. 25, at 194.
8. Id. art. 21, at 177.
9. 2001 ILC Report, supra note 3, art. 26, at 206. Compare id. at 177-83, 194-
209 with State Responsibility, supra note 3, arts. 33-34, Commentary, at 34, 52.
Self-defense is a norm of general international law. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51; see
also LELAND M. GOODRICH ET AL., CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 342-53 (3d
ed. 1969); THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 661-78
(Bruno Simma ed., 1995) [hereinafter SIMMA]; Military and Paramilitary Activities
In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 94, 100-01 (June 27)
[hereinafter Nicaragua Case] (holding a customary norm for U.N. Charter Article
2(4) existed alongside the Charter rule, and that this norm approached jus cogens
status); GOODRICH, ET AL., supra, at 43-55; SIMMA, supra, at 111-18; 74 GEORGE
K. WALKER, THE TANKER WAR, 1980-88: LAW AND POLICY 111-20 (Naval War
2002]
42 AM. U. INT'LL. REV. [18:35
Article 25(1)(a)'s allowance of a state action if it is the only way
for a state to "safeguard an essential interest against a grave and
imminent peril" is reminiscent of the principle of anticipatory self-
C. Int'l L. Stud. 2000) [hereinafter THE TANKER WAR]. Similarly, might customary
or jus cogens principles also apply in self-defense situations? Cf Carin Kahgan,
Jus Cogens and the Inherent Right to Self-Defense, 3 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L.
767, 823-27 (1997). See State Responsibility, supra note 3, art. 34, Commentary, at
52, 54 (arguing forjus cogens status for the inherent right of self-defense; stating
that a parallel right may exist alongside the U.N. Charter Article 5 1 right of self-
defense); see also id., art. 34 (declaring that wrongfulness of a state's act is
"precluded" if in self-defense; i.e., other countries cannot claim a right to act under
state of necessity under that circumstance); 2001 ILC Report, supra note 3, at 177-
83. If a state acts inconsistent with custom or a treaty but in accordance with self-
defense, the result is that Article 103 of the U.N. Charter would trump the treaty
but, by the explicit terms of Article 103, could not trump custom. See U.N.
CHARTER art. 103. Unless Article 103 also represents a customary norm, the result
is that the only way self-defense under customary law could trump another
customary norm is either to say that the customary right of self-defense outweighs
whatever customary norm that has been violated (with similar analysis for the
treaty norm that has been violated) under the usual balancing process for sources
of international law, or that the customary law of self-defense is a jus cogens or
peremptory norm, trumping contrary treaties and custom. See id. Jus cogens, i.e., a
peremptory norm that trumps inconsistent treaty, customary and general principles
rules, is a vague doctrine whose contours are less than certain; it is not cited in
traditional international law sources. See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of
Justice, arts. 38, 59 [hereinafter I.C.J. Statute]; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 102-03 (1987) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]. See generally Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
May 23, 1969, arts. 53, 64, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 345, 347 [hereinafter Vienna
Convention]; BROWNLIE, supra note 6, at 4, 19, 514-17; T.O. ELIAS, THE MODERN
LAW OF TREATIES 177-87 (1974); 2001 ILC Report, supra note 6, at 279, 281-84;
OPPENHEIM, supra note 6, §§ 2, 642, 653; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra §§ 102
r.n.6, 323 cmt. b, 331(2), 338(2); SIMMA, supra, at 1118-19; lAN SINCLAIR, THE
VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 17-18, 85-87, 94-95, 160, 184-85,
218-26, 246 (2d ed. 1984) (stating that the Vienna Convention is progressive
development); GRIGORII I. TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 98 (William
E. Butler trans., 1974); Levan Alexidze, Legal Nature of Jus Cogens in
Contemporary International Law, 172 R.C.A.D.I. 219, 262-63 (1981); John N.
Hazard, Soviet Tactics in International Lawmaking, 7 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
9, 25-29 (1977); Eduardo Jimenez de Arechaga, International Law in the Past
Third of a Century, 159 R.C.A.D.I. I, 64-69 (1978); George K. Walker,
Integration and Disintegration in Europe: Reordering the Treaty Map of the
Continent, 6 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 1, 60, 63 (1993) [hereinafter Walker, Integration];
A. Mark Weisburd, The Emptiness of the Concept of Jus Cogens, As Illustrated by
the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1 (1995). For U.N. CHARTER
art. 103 analysis, see GOODRICH, ET AL., supra, at 614-17. See also SIMMA, supra,
at 1116-25; W. Michael Reisman, The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations,
87 AM. J. INT'L L. 83 (1993).
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defense admitting of no other altemative."' In 1980, the Commission
had declined to give an opinion on whether state of necessity is a
10. See 2001 ILC Report, supra note 3, art. 25, ](a), at 194; see also id., at
196 (citing the Caroline case as "though frequently referred to as an instance of
self-defence, really involved the plea of necessity at a time when the law
concerning the use of force had a quite different basis than it now has."). In 1980,
the ILC had cited the Caroline case in State Responsibility, supra note 3, at 44-45,
but had declined to comment on the issue. Today, many but not all states and
commentators say anticipatory self-defense is lawful in the U.N. Charter
("Charter") era. With general availability of short to long range missiles, and a
possibility of information warfare through computer systems, existence of
anticipatory self-defense as a continuing principle of law seems in the ascendancy.
See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 245
[hereinafter Nuclear Weapons]; see also Nicaragua Case, supra note 9, at 94; id. at
347 (Schwebel, J., dissenting); STANIMAR A. ALEXANDROV, SELF-DEFENSE
AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 296 (1996); D.W. BOWETT,
SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 187-93 (1958); OPPENHEIM, supra note 6,
§ 127; 49 HANS KELSEN, COLLECTIVE SECURITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 27
(Naval War C. Int'l L. Stud. 1957); TIMOTHY L.H. MCCORMACK, SELF-DEFENSE
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE ISRAELI RAID ON THE IRAQI NUCLEAR REACTOR
122-24, 238-39, 253-84, 302 (1996); MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO
FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 232-41 (1961);
SCHACHTER, supra note 6, at 152-55; WALTER GARY SHARP, SR., CYBERSPACE
AND THE USE OF FORCE 33-48 (1999) (suggesting that the real debate is the scope
of anticipatory self-defense right and that use of force responses must be
proportional); JULIUS STONE, OF LAW AND NATIONS: BETWEEN POWER POLITICS
AND HUMAN HOPES 3 (1974); ANN VAN WYNEN THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS, THE
CONCEPT OF AGGRESSION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 127 (1972); Richard W.
Aldrich, How Do You Know You Are At War in the Information Age?, 223, 231,
248 (2000); Louis Rene Beres, After the Scud Attacks: Israel, "Palestine, " and
Anticipatory Self-Defense, 6 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 71, 75-77 (1992); George
Bunn, International Law and the Use of Force in Peacetime: Do U.S. Ships Have
to Take the First Hit?, 39 NAVAL WAR C. REV. 69-70 (May-June 1986); James H.
Doyle, Jr., Computer Networks, Proportionality, and Military Operations, in 76
COMPUTER NETWORK AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 147, 151-54 (Michael N. Schmitt
& Brian T. O'Donnell eds., Naval War C. Int'l L. Stud. 2002); Thomas M. Franck,
When, If Ever, May States Deploy Military Force Without Prior Security Council
Authorization?, 5 WASH. U.J.L. & POL'Y 51, 68 (2001); Christopher J.
Greenwood, Remarks, Neutrality, the Rights of Shipping and the Use of Force in
the Persian Gulf War (Part I), 82 PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 158, 160-61 (1988);
David K. Linnan, Self-Defense, Necessity and U.N. Collective Security: United
States and Other Views, 1991 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 57, 65-84, 122; A.V.
Lowe, The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations and the
Contemporary Law of the Sea, in 64 THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 109, 127-30
(Horace B. Robertson, Jr. ed., Naval War C. Int'l L. Stud. 1991); James McHugh,
Forcible Self-Help in International Law, 25 NAVAL WAR C. REV. 61 (No. 2,
1972); Rein Mullerson & David J. Scheffer, Legal Regulation of the Use of Force,
in BEYOND CONFRONTATION: INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE POST-COLD WAR
2002]
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ERA 93, 109-14 (Lori Fisler Damrosch et al. ed., 1995); John F. Murphy,
Commentary on Intervention to Combat Terrorism and Drug Trafficking, in LORI
FISLER DAMROSCH & DAVID J. SCHEFFER, LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL ORDER 241 (1991) [hereinafter LAW AND FORCE]; W. Michael
Reisman, Allocating Competences to Use Coercion in the Post-Cold War World:
Practices, Conditions, and Prospects, in LAW AND FORCE, supra, at 25, 45; Horace
B. Robertson, Jr., Self-Defense Against Computer Network Attack under
International Law, in Schmitt & O'Donnell, supra, at 121, 140; Michael N.
Schmitt, Bellum Americanum: The U.S. View of Twenty-First Century War and Its
Possible Implications for the Law of Armed Conflict, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1051,
1071, 1080-83 (1998); Abraham D. Sofaer, The Sixth Annual Waldemar A. Solf
Lecture in International Law: Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, 126
MIL. L. REV. 89, 95 (1989); Robert F. Turner, State Sovereignty, International
Law, and the Use of Force in Countering Low-Intensity Aggression in the Modern
World, in 67 LEGAL AND MORAL CONSTRAINTS ON LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT 43,
62-80 (Alberto R. Coil et al. eds., Naval War C. Int'l L. Stud. 1995); Claude
Humphrey Meredith Waldock, The Regulation of Force by Individual States in
International Law, 81 R.C.A.D.I. 451, 496-99 (1952) (stating that anticipatory
self-defense is permissible, as long as principles of necessity, proportionality are
observed); George K. Walker, Information Warfare and Neutrality, 33 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1079, 1122-24 (2000); Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to
Terrorism: The Strikes Against bin Laden, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 559, 566 (1999).
But see IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES
257-61, 275-78, 366-67 (1963); ANTHONY D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW:
PROCESS AND PROSPECT 32 (1995); YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND
SELF-DEFENCE 159-85 (3d ed. 2001); LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW:
POLITICS AND VALUES 121-22 (1995); PHILIP C. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF
NATIONS 166-67 (1948); D.P. O'CONNELL, THE INFLUENCE OF LAW ON SEA
POWER 83, 171 (1979); 2 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 52aa, at 156
(Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952); AHMED M. RIFAAT, INTERNATIONAL
AGGRESSION: A STUDY OF THE LEGAL CONCEPT: ITS DEVELOPMENT AND
DEFINITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 126 (1979); RONZITTI, supra note 5, at 4;
SIMMA, supra note 9, at 675-76; Tom Farer, Law and War, in 3 CYRIL E. BLACK &
RICHARD A. FALK, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 30, 36-37
(197 1); Yuri M. Kolosov, Limiting the Use of Force: Self-Defense, Terrorism, and
Drug Trafficking, in LAW AND FORCE, supra, at 232, 234; Josef L. Kunz,
Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Article 51 of the Charter of the United
Nations, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 872, 878 (1947); Rainer Lagoni, Remarks, in Panel,
supra, at 161, 162; Jules Lobel, The Use of Force to Terrorist Attacks, 24 YALE J.
INT'L L. 537, 541 (1999); Robert W. Tucker, The Interpretation of War Under
Present International Law, 4 INT'L L.Q. 11, 29-30 (1951); Robert W. Tucker,
Reprisals and Self-Defense, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 586 (1972) (asserting that states
may respond only after being attacked). See MURPHY, supra note 5, at 74-75
(recognizing the issue of self-defense but failing to take a position, except to say
that an expansive view of self-defense to include humanitarian intervention to
rectify threats to global stability and expectations might "eviscerate virtually all
normative restraints on the use of force."). The former USSR generally subscribed
to the restrictive view. See Kolosov, supra, at 234; see also Mullerson & Scheffer,
supra, at 107. Other states hold similar views. U.S. and Israeli policy is that states
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defense to a claim of a violation of a state's territorial integrity under
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter ("Charter")." Article 26, paralleling
1980 Article 33(2)(a), recites the jus cogens trumping principle.1 2
Article 25(2)(a) replaces Article 33(2)(b), which would have given
primacy to treaty obligations negating a state of necessity claim, by
declaring that necessity may not be cited if the "international
obligation in question excludes the possibility of invoking
necessity," equally a departure from traditional analysis equating
principles with treaty obligations.13 Article 25(2)(b), following 1980
may respond in anticipatory self-defense, subject to necessity and proportionality
principles, and admitting of no other alternative. See 73 A.R. THOMAS & JAMES C.
DUNCAN, ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS xxxvii-xxxviii, 4.3.2-4.3.2.1 (Naval War C. Int'l
L. Stud. 1999) [hereinafter NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED]; see also Beres, supra, at
76-77. Other states hold similar views. See Nicaragua Case, supra, at 103
(declining to address the issue); see also Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 266
(citing Article 5 1 of the U.N. Charter as a requisite element to the threat or use of
nuclear weapons; failing to decide "whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons
would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence," where a
State's very survival is at stake); Legality of Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in
Armed Conflict, 1996 I.C.J. 66, 84 (declining to rule on a World Health
Organization advisory opinion request on the same subject). Judge Schwebel,
dissenting in Nuclear Weapons, wrote: "[F]ar from justifying the Court's
inconclusiveness, contemporary events rather demonstrate the legality of the threat
or use of nuclear weapons in extraordinary circumstances," and citing inter alia a
1990-91 Gulf War situation). See Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 311, 323. For case
analysis and government reactions, see VED P. NANDA & DAVID KRIEGER,
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE WORLD COURT chs. 6-8 (1998); see also
Symposium, Nuclear Weapons, the World Court, and Global Security, 7
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 313 (1997); Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Taming
Shiva: Applying International Law to Nuclear Operations, 42 A.F.L. REV. 157,
159-64 (1997) (discussing U.S. views); Michael J. Matheson, The Opinions of the
International Court of Justice on the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 91 AM. J.
INT'L L. 417 (1997).
11. In 1980, the Commission stated that this was within other U.N. organs'
competence. See State Responsibility, supra note 3, at 44-45. In 2001, the ILC
omitted this provision but said in Article 59 that the State Responsibility articles
are without prejudice to Charter obligations. See 2001 ILC Report, supra note 3,
art. 59, at 365; see also supra note 9 and accompanying text (explaining self-
defense in customary international law).
12. See Raby, supra note 3, at 268 (stating that the Article 33(2)(a)jus cogens
exception "is not applicable to force used to protect nationals"); see also supra
note 9 and accompanying text (discussingjus cogens principles).
13. Compare 2001 ILC Report, supra note 3, at 194, with State Responsibility,
supra note 3, at 34. See I.C.J. Statute, art. 38(l) (listing general principles as a
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Article 33(2)(c), is reminiscent of Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties limitations on impossibility of performance or fundamental
change of circumstances. 4 A state causing a treaty breach cannot
assert these claims.
5
As of 2002, there had been one state of necessity claim during the
Charter era in the U.N. Security Council.'6 According to the 1980
ILC Report, Belgium invoked it in 1960 when it sent paratroops to
the Congo:
[T]o protect the lives of Belgian nationals and other Europeans who, it
claimed, were being held as hostages by army mutineers and by the
Congolese insurgents... [Belgium told the Council it] had been forced
coequal source of law). Some commentators agree. See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra
note 6, at 1-25; see also OPPENHEIM, supra note 6, §§ 9-14; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
THE AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE PAMPHLET (AFP 110-31), INTERNATIONAL LAW-THE
CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS l-3.a (1976) [hereinafter
AFP 110-31]. Others treat general principles as gap-fillers or do not seem to
recognize them as a primary source. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note
9, § 102(4); GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 20-21 (6th ed. 1992); SCHACHTER, supra note 6, at
50-55; cf NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 10, at xxxvii-xxxviii, 5.4-5.4.2
(recognizing custom and treaties); Raby, supra note 3, at 268.
14. See Vienna Convention, supra note 9, arts. 61, 62 (stating limited grounds
under which a party may invoke an impossibility of performance principle or
fundamental change of circumstances principle).
15. Fundamental change under the Convention is different from the older rebus
sic stantibus doctrine, which the Vienna Convention would supersede. Compare
2001 ILC Report, supra note 3, art. 25(2)(b), at 194, 205, and State Responsibility,
supra note 3, art. 33(b)(3), at 34, with Vienna Convention, supra note 9, arts. 61-
62, at 346-47; see also Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung.
v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 39 (finding that Articles 61 and 62 are customary norms);
Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1973 I.C.J. 3, 18 (holding that Article 62 is a
customary norm); BROWNLIE, supra note 6, at 623-26; ARIE E. DAVID, THE
STRATEGY OF TREATY TERMINATION ch. 1 (1975); ELIAS, supra note 9, at 119-30;
OPPENHEIM, supra note 6, §§ 650-51; Report of the International Law Commission
to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev. 1 (1966), reprinted in [1966(2)]
Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 169, 255-58 [hereinafter ILC Rep.]; RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 9, § 336; SINCLAIR, supra note 9, at 190-96; Gyorgy Haraszti,
Treaties and the Fundamental Change of Circumstances, 146 R.C.A.D.I. 1 (1975);
Oliver J. Lissitzyn, Treaties and Changed Circumstances, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 895
(1967); Walker, Integration, supra note 9, at 65-68; LORD MCNAIR, THE LAW OF
TREATIES 685 (1961) (not recognizing a separate impossibility doctrine; but some
of his examples are impossibility situations and might be cited as such).
16. See 2001 ILC Report, supra note 3, at 205 n.433 (citing the Belgian claim
of necessity with respect to its military intervention in the Congo in 1960).
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"by necessity" to send troops to the Congo, and that the action undertaken
had been "purely humanitarian," had been limited in scope by its
objective, and had been conceived as a purely temporary action, pending
an official intervention by the United Nations. 17
The Congo claimed the intervention was a pretext to detach
Katanga Province from the Congo and was an act of aggression. The
Council was divided on the issue, but the 1980 Report states:
No one took any position of principle with regard to the possible validity
of a "state of necessity" as a circumstance, which, if the conditions for its
existence were fulfilled, could preclude the wrongfulness of an act not in
conformity with an international obligation. Hence all that can be said is
that there was no denial of the principle ofa plea of necessity as such. 18
In 1980, the ILC found that in other interventions the affected state
had consented to intervention or that an intervening state had claimed
self-defense in extracting its own nationals. The 2001 ILC Report
says Belgium's claim relating to its 1960 Congo operations was an
example of citation of state of necessity in a situation involving
military force. 9
17. State Responsibility, supra note 3.
18. Id.
19. See 2001 ILC Report, supra note 3, at 205 n.433; see also State
Responsibility, supra note 3, at 45; ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J. BECK,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE: BEYOND THE UN CHARTER
PARADIGM 115 (1993); RONZITTI, supra note 5, at 30-32; Donald W. McNemar,
The Postindependence War in the Congo, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CIVIL
WAR 244, 253 (Richard A. Falk, ed., 1971); Thomas C. Wingfield, 104 DICK. L.
REV. 439, 448 (2000); Michael Akehurst, Humanitarian Intervention, in
INTERVENTION IN WORLD POLITICS 95, 99 (Hedley Bull ed., 1984) (withholding
discussion of the necessity argument); Raby, supra note 3, at 269 (believing that
"the term 'necessity' was used more in its ordinary meaning than as a legal
concept."). The Netherlands said that the 1976 Israeli Entebbe, Uganda raid to
rescue its own nationals was "a state of emergency" but did not explain further.
See id. at 270; see also Major Steven F. Day, Legal Considerations in
Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, 40 NAVAL L. REV. 45, 49-50 (1992);
Wingfield, supra, at 452. The 1964 Congo intervention is an example of an
affected state's consent to another state's acting to rescue its and other states'
nationals. See generally AREND & BECK, supra, at 116; MYRES S. MCDOUGAL ET
AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 242-43 (1980); MURPHY, supra
note 5, at 92-94; Akehurst, supra, at 100; Thomas E. Behuniak, The Law of
Unilateral Intervention by Armed Force: A Legal Survey, 79 MIL. L. REV. 157,
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Cases support the state of necessity principle, including a recent
International Court of Justice ("ICJ") decision. 0  Not all
commentators agree that a state of necessity principle exists,
however.2 Nevertheless, the ILC collective imprimatur and recent
decisions, including the ICJ Project case, strongly suggest that state
of necessity exists as a general principle of law 2 or as custom.23
171 (1978); Richard B. Lillich, Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human
Rights, 53 IOWA L. REV. 325, 341 (1967); McNemar, supra, at 256, 267, 273.
Some commentators believe that intervention helped the Congo government
capture the rebel capital. See, e.g., Richard A. Falk, Introduction, in THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CIVIL WAR, supra, at 1, 26.
20. See Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.),
1997 I.C.J. 7, 40-44 (recognizing state of necessity as customary law); see also
Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 35; M/V Saiga (St. Vincent v.
Guinea), 38 I.L.M. 1323, 1351-52 (Int'l Trib. L. Sea 1999) (invoking necessity
doctrine as customary international law); Russian Indem. (Russ. v. Turk.), Hague
Ct. Rep. (Scott) 297 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1912); Forests of Central Rhodope (Greece v.
BuIg.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1405 (Arb.), modified by Parties' Statements Before League of
Nations Council, 15 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. II (Part 1), at 1432 (1934); French
Co. of Venez. R.R. (Fr. v. Venez.), 10 R.I.A.A. 285, 353 (Arb. 1902); Oscar Chinn
(U.K. v. BeIg.), 1934 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 63, at 89, 112-14 (dictum) (Anziolotti,
J., sep. opin.). But see Rainbow Warrior (N.Z. v. Fr.), 20 R.I.A.A. 217, 254 (Arb.
1990); see also 2001 ILC Report, supra note 3, at 197-201; State Responsibility,
supra note 3, at 42-43 (discussing S.S. Wimbledon (U.K. v. Ger.)); S.S.
Wimbledon (U.K. v. Ger.), 1923 P.C.I.J. No. 1, at 15.
21. Compare BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW As APPLIED BY
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 31, 69 (1987), with D'AMATO, supra
note 10, at 50-51, and THE TANKER WAR, supra note 9, at 161-63, and Roberto
Ago, Addendum to Eighth Report on State Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/318
& Add. 104 (1979), 2(I) Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 13, 48-49 (1981), and Raby,
supra note 3, at 269-70 (asserting the importance of the principle of necessity in
international law), and Schwarzenberger, The Fundamental Principles of
International Law, 87 R.C.A.D.I. 195, 343 (1955), and OPPENHEIM, supra note 6,
§§ 131 n.15, 354 (stating that the necessity principle exists), with BOWETT, supra
note 10, at 10, and BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 42-48 (arguing that the necessity
doctrine does not exist). But see id. at 376-77, 432 (approving doctrine in LOS
context); see also BROWNLIE, supra note 6, at 247-48 (accepting the necessity
doctrine in LOS context); RONZITTI, supra note 5, at 13-14 (asserting that if
necessity has locus standi in contemporary international law, the principle cannot
justify intervention); State Responsibility, supra note 3, at 47-48 nn. 171-72.
22. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (explaining the ILC's position on
state of necessity doctrine).
23. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. No one doubts that custom is a
primary source. Compare I.C.J. Statute, arts. 38, 59, with RESTATEMENT (THIRD),
supra note 9, §§ 102-03. If Article 33 is a customary norm, does this negate the
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State of necessity is a defense to actions otherwise denounced as
criminal in common-law jurisprudence and municipal statutes. Not
all jurisdictions within the United States recognize the defense.
Modem analyses of the defense say it is available if the social
advantage gained when an actor's choosing the lesser of two evils
avoids the greater harm.
Elements of the defense include (1) reasonable foreseeability of
degree of harm an actor seeks to avoid, compared with harm the
actor imposes, which may include intentional homicide (e.g., when
an actor, such as a policeman, kills one person to save the lives of
two or more threatened with death); (2) the actor's intention to avoid
the greater harm; (3) relative value of harm avoided versus harm
done, i.e., proportionality, with many jurisdictions saying the
threatened harm must clearly outweigh the harm invoked; (4) the
possibility of the imminence of disaster, i.e. necessity; and (5) an
actor's lack of fault in bringing about the situation calling for action
under state of necessity.2 4 If necessity is a defense common to most
national legal systems, it is another argument for accepting the
doctrine as a general principle of law, a primary source of
international law, according to most commentators.
Article 33(2)(b) limitation, or did the ILC mean that treaties trump custom? See
Raby, supra note 3, at 267 (believing that "[t]he considerable number of states
which claim that the right of intervention is valid, as well as the numerous writers
who think likewise, demonstrate that intervention to protect nationals cannot
certainly be seen as a violation of a norm ofjus cogens."); see also supra notes 9-
10 and accompanying text.
24. U.K. and U.S. cases underscore the defense's antiquity, its narrow nature,
and its relationship to self-defense. See LAFAVE, supra note 2, § 5.4; see also
JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 415-36 (2d ed. 1960);
MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 3.01(l), 3.02(1), 3.05 (Proposed Official Draft 1962);
PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 2, ch. 9, § 2H-21; 2 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL
LAW DEFENSES § 124 (1984); 1 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 90; George C.
Christie, The Defense of Necessity Considered from the Legal and Moral Points of
View, 48 DUKE L.J. 975 (1999) (claiming that private individuals can never use the
necessity defense, even if many lives are threatened, to justify intentionally taking
innocent human life); John T. Parry, The Virtue of Necessity: Reshaping
Culpability and the Rule of Law, 36 HOUs. L. REV. 397 (1999); Paul H. Robinson,
Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 213-20
(1982); cf Raby, supra note 3, at 258.
25. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing prevalent views on
accepting general principles of law as primary sources of international law).
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State of necessity differs from necessity, a component of the law
of self-defense. Necessity and proportionality, and in the case of
anticipatory self-defense, admitting of no alternative, condition the
inherent right of individual and collective self-defense.26 State of
necessity also differs from the necessity component of the LOAC,
which must be observed with proportionality in conducting attacks
during armed conflict.27 What is necessary or proportional in a self-
26. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text (detailing the use of the
doctrine of self-defense).
27. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8,
1977, arts. 51, 57, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 26, 29 [hereinafter Protocol 1] (providing rules
of distinction, necessity and proportionality, with the concomitant risk of collateral
damage inherent in any attack generally restate customary norms); MICHAEL
•BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICT 309-11 (1982);
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN REMO MANUAL ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA 39-42 & cmts.
(Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1995) [hereinafter SAN REMO MANUAL]; FRITS
KALSHOVEN, CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF WAR 99-100 (1987); MCDOUGAL
& FELICIANO, supra note 10, at 525; JULIUS STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 352-53 (1954); William J. Fenrick, The Rule of
Proportionality and Protocol I in Conventional Warfare, 98 MIL. L. REV. 91, 125
(1982) (questioning whether proportionality is an accepted customary norm); see
also Michael J. Matheson, Remarks, Session One: The United States Position on
the Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to
the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 419, 423, 426 (1987);
Results of the First Meeting of the Madrid Plan ofAction Held in Bochum, F.R.G.,
November 1989, 7 BOCHUMER SCHRIFTEN ZUR FRIEDENSSICHERUNG UND ZUM
HUMANITAREN VOLKERRECHT 170-71 (1991); Major William G. Schmidt, The
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts: Protocol I Additional to
the Geneva Conventions, 24 A.F.L. REV. 189, 233-38 (1984); Waldemar A. Solf,
Protection of Civilians Against the Effects of Hostilities Under Customary
International Law and Under Protocal1, 1 AM U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 117, 131
(1986); G.J.F. van Hegelsom, Methods and Means of Combat in Naval Warfare, 8
BOCHUMER SCHRIFTEN ZUR FRIEDENSSICHERUNG UND ZUM HUMANITAREN
VOLKERRECHT 1, 18-19 (1992). Although the United States is likely to ratify the
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts [hereinafter
Protocol II], the Reagan Administration expressed reservations on Protocol I and
did not seek Senate advice and consent for it. See Protocol I, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 609; see also Letter of Transmittal from President Reagan to U.S. Senate,
Jan. 29, 1987; Letter of Submittal from Secretary of State George P. Schultz to
President Reagan, Dec. 13, 1986, in Message from the President of the United
States Transmitting the Protocol 11 Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Noninternational Armed Conflicts,
Concluded at Geneva on June 10, 1977, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-2, 100th Cong.,
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defense response may or may not be necessary or proportional for an
attack during armed conflict, and vice versa.28 State of necessity also
differs from the now-outlawed military necessity (kriegsraison)
doctrine.29
State of-necessity circumstances can arise in situations involving
the law of the sea ("LOS"), self-defense, or the LOAC. Ocean
pollution furnishes an example from the LOS. High seas pollution by
ever-larger tankers or other vessels, perhaps registered under flags of
convenience, 0 that break up or collide is an example of LOS
application of state of necessity. Pollutants may drift toward coasts
1st Sess. (1987), reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 561 (1987). Although Protocol I is not in
force for the United States, 159 states are party to it and 151 are party to Protocol
11. See Protocol 1, supra, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; see also Protocol II, supra, 1125
U.N.T.S.; International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949 and Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977: Ratifications, Accessions
and Successions, available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/party-gc (last visited Dec.
3, 2001). Many of their terms restate customary law.
28. See THE TANKER WAR, supra note 9, at 352.
29. Cf HILAIRE MCCOUBREY, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: MODERN
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LIMITATION OF WARFARE 303-07 (2d ed. 1998); see also
NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 10, 5.2 nn. 5,6; STONE, supra note 27, at
351-53; THE TANKER WAR, supra note 9, at 350, 353; Matthew Lippman,
Conundrums of Armed Conflict: Criminal Defenses to Violations of the
Humanitarian Law of War, 15 DICK. J. INT'L L. 1, 60-66 (1996).
30. Flag of convenience nations are also known as open registry states. See
generally BOLESLAW A. BOCZEK, FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE: AN INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL STUDY (1962); RODNEY CARLISLE, SOVEREIGNTY FOR SALE: THE ORIGINS
AND EVOLUTION OF THE PANAMANIAN AND LIBERIAN FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE
(1981); SAMUEL A. LAWRENCE, UNITED STATES MERCHANT SHIPPING: POLICIES
AND POLITICS 101-04, 182-89 (1966); ROBERT E. MCCLEAVE, TRANSPORTATION
19-29 (1986); CLINTON H. WHITEHURST, JR., THE U.S. MERCHANT MARINE: IN
SEARCH OF AN ENDURING POLICY 59, ch. 18 (1986); Frank L. Wiswall, Jr., Flags
of Convenience, in UNITED STATES SHIPPING POLICIES AND THE WORLD MARKET
ch. 4 (William A. Lovett ed., 1966); U.N. Convention on Law of the Sea, Dec. 10,
1982, art. 91(1), 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, 397, 433 [hereinafter LOS Convention];
Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 5(1), 13 U.S.T. 2312, 2314, 450
U.N.T.S. 82, 86 [hereinafter High Seas Convention] (requiring a genuine link
between a registry state and a ship); Convention on Conditions for Registration of
Ships, Feb. 7, 1986, 26 I.L.M. 1229 (1987) (not in force); 3 SATYA N. NANDAN &
SHABTAI ROSENNE, UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982:
A COMMENTARY paras 91.1- 91.9(f) (Myron H. Nordquist ed., 1982); 2 D.P.
O'CONNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 755-57 (I.A. Shearer ed.
1984); OPPENHEIM, supra note 6, §§ 287-88, 290; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra
note 9, § 501; THE TANKER WAR, supra note 9, at 291-95.
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of a country that is not the ship's registry state or pose a danger to
shipping and other activities (e.g., fishing) of many states on the high
seas or in coastal waters.
The 1982 LOS Convention, echoing the 1969 Intervention
Convention, allows states "to take [proportionate] measures, in
accordance with international law, beyond the limits of the territorial
sea" to protect their coastlines "or related interests, including fishing,
from grave and imminent danger" from pollution or the threat of
pollution.3  The ILC specifically recognized environmental
protection as an occasion for invoking state of necessity.
3 2
State of necessity in the maritime pollution context begins with a
high seas spill of oil or other substance; the threat is to coastal states'
beaches or fishing grounds, perhaps in an exclusive economic zone
("EEZ"), perhaps in territorial waters. As may happen in high seas
rescues, those attacking the pollution problem may board a damaged
polluting vessel and perhaps destroy it to prevent or minimize
pollution or the threat, but in doing so, they must see to crew safety.33
3 1. See LOS Convention, supra note 30, art. 221, at 489; see also Convention
Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties,
Nov. 29, 2969, arts. 1-3, 5, 26 U.S.T. 765, 767-69, 970 U.N.T.S. 211, 212, 214
(prohibiting intervention for warship oil pollution and stating that measures taken
must be proportional), amended by Protocol Relating to intervention on the High
Seas in Cases of Marine Pollution by Substances Other Than Oil, Nov. 2, 1973, 34
U.S.T. 3407, 1313 U.N.T.S. 3; BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 376-77, 432;
BROWNLIE, supra note 6, at 247-48; D'AMATO, supra note 10, at 50-51; 4 MYRON
H. NORDQUIST, UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: A
COMMENTARY paras 221.1-221.9(h) (1991); O'CONNELL, supra note 30, at 1006-
08; OPPENHEIM, supra note 6, § 354; THE TANKER WAR, supra note 9, at 161, 494-
95; Ago, supra note 21, at 28-29.
32. See 2001 ILC Report, supra note 3, at 202; see also State Responsibility,
supra note 3, at 39-40.
33. A duty to rescue those in peril on the sea, so long as a succoring ship or its
crew is not endangered, applies in peace and war. See LOS Convention, supra note
30, art. 98, at 435; see also High Seas Convention, supra note 30, art. 12, 13
U.S.T. at 2316, 450 U.N.T.S. at 88; Convention on Maritime Search & Rescue,
Apr. 27, 1979, Annex, chs. 2.1.9-2.1.10, T.I.A.S. No. 11903, 1405 U.N.T.S. 97,
125; id., T.I.A.S., chs. 3.1.2-3.1.4, 1405 U.N.T.S. 126-27 (providing for immediate
entry into a state's territorial waters for rescue and transmittal of a request to that
state's rescue center, giving "full details of the projected mission and the need for
it," requiring coastal state "immediate acknowledgement" of request, agreements
with neighboring states for SAR); Convention on Salvage, Apr. 28, 1989, arts. 4,
10, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-12, reprinted in Doc. No. 4-2A, 6 Benedict on
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The result, whether the polluting vessel is destroyed or boarded, is a
violation, however "technical," of registry state sovereignty. 4 As in
the case of high seas rescues, the objective is limited and the means
must be proportional. Presumably the flag state of the antipollution
vessels notifies the flag state of the polluter and its owners through
appropriate channels.
Separate and apart from necessity as a factor in the law of self-
defense, international law recognizes situations where a state,
responding in self-defense to an attack or aggression, may claim state
of necessity. An example is where an aggressor uses neutral territory
as a base of operations or to shelter its vessels (e.g., submarines in
neutral territorial waters) or aircraft, and the neutral has no
knowledge of the attacking state's intrusion or presence, or the
neutral does not have means to enforce the law of neutrality and
drive out the aggressor's platforms. The state that is the target of
aggression does have means to accomplish this. If so, the state that is
Admiralty (Frank L. Wiswall, Jr., ed., 7th ed. rev. 2001), to supersede Convention
for Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Assistance & Salvage at Sea, Sept. 23,
1910, arts. 11, 14, 37 Stat. 1658, 1672 [hereinafter 1910 Salvage Convention] (not
applicable to warships); Convention for Safety of Life at Sea, Nov. 1, 1974,
Annex, ch. V, regs. 1, 10, 32 U.S.T. 47, 56, 232, 238 (not applicable to warships);
Convention for Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Assistance & Salvage of
Aircraft or by Aircraft at Sea, Sept. 29, 1938, art. 2, reprinted in 6 Benedict on
Admiralty, supra, Doc. No. 4-5 (not in force); Convention for Adaptation to
Maritime Warfare of Principles of Geneva Convention (Hague X), Oct. 18, 1907,
art. 16, 36 Stat. 2371, 2388; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea,
Aug. 12, 1949, arts. 12, 18, 21, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 3226, 3230, 3234, 75 U.N.T.S. at
85, 92-96 [hereinafter Second Convention]; Protocol I, supra note 27, arts. 1-2,
33(1), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 7, 20 (supplementing Second Convention to require search
for the missing); BOTHE ET AL., supra note 27, at 171-75; C. JOHN COLOMBOS,
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA § 369 (6th rev. ed. 1967) (discussing the
ancient duty of persons in charge of a vessel to save lives at sea); MCCOUBREY,
supra note 29, at 114-18; Nandan & Rosenne, supra note 30, paras 98.1-98.1 1(g)
(addressing general tradition and practice); NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note
10, paras 2.3.2.5, 3.2.1-3.2.1.2, 11.4; OPPENHEIM, supra note 6, § 298; 2 JEAN S.
PICTET, THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, 84-92, 129-36, 150-53
(1960); CLAUDE PILLOUD ET AL., COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS
OF 8 JUNE 1977 TOTHE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, 33-63, 350-54
(1987); THOMAS M. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 14-8 (3d
ed. 2001).
34. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (describing high-seas pollution
by tankers and other vessels).
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the target of aggression may seek and flush out or destroy the
aggressor's sheltered vessels as an incident of self-defense, even
though this involves intrusion into neutral territorial waters to do
so. 35 The right to self-defense under these circumstances, like any
claim of self-defense, is subject to the conditioning factors of
necessity and proportionality and, in the case of anticipatory self-
defense, admitting of no other alternative.36 A further caution is that
besides these conditioning factors, states acting in self-defense must
be aware of the extraordinary nature of intervening in a neutral's
territorial sea; 37 state of necessity principles should be injected into
the analysis.
The foregoing hypothetical involving a belligerent submarine
could occur during war, governed by the LOAC -- an earlier case
being the World War II Altmark incident. In LOAC situations
similar, but not necessarily identical, necessity and proportionality
principles apply.38
35. See 50 ROBERT W. TUCKER, THE LAW OF WAR AND NEUTRALITY AT SEA
220-26, 256 (Naval War C. Int'l L. Stud. 1955); see also Horace B. Robertson, Jr.,
The "New" Law of the Sea and the Law of Armed Conflict at Sea, in 68 READINGS
ON INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW 1978-1994, at
263, 304 (Naval War C. Int'l L. Stud., John Norton Moore & Robert F. Turner
eds., 1995); qf MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 10, at 406-07; see also NWP
1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 10, para 7.3 at 370-71; U.S. Department of the
Navy, Law of Naval Warfare: NWIP 10-2, para 441 & n.27 (1955 through Change
6, 1974) [hereinafter NWIP 10-2].
36. See 2001 ILC Report, supra note 3, at 196-97 (equating anticipatory self-
defense with state of necessity); see also supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
37. Cf U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4; see also supra note 9 and accompanying
text (discussing the ILC's prohibition of a state violating a norm of international
law).
38. See MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 10, at 406-07; see also NWIP
10-2, supra note 35, 441 & n.27; NWP I-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 10,
7.3.4-7.3.4.1; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 27, 15, 17-18, 20-22; Tucker,
supra note 35, at 220-26; Robertson, supra note 35, at 304; Dietrich Schindler,
Commentary to 1907 Hague Convention XIII Concerning the Rights and Duties of
Neutral Powers in Naval War, in THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE: A COLLECTION
OF AGREEMENTS AND DOCUMENTS WITH COMMENTARIES 211, 216-17 (Natalino
Ronzitti ed., 1988) (stating that the issue concerning the use of territorial waters to
evade capture during war and the applicability of the 24 hours rule of Article 12 of
the 1907 Hague Convention is "still controversial."); O'CONNELL, supra note 30,
at 40-44 (claiming that Germany and Great Britain violated international law in the
1940 Altrnark incident, in which a British destroyer followed a German vessel into
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II. THE PROPOSED PRINCIPLES
What about collective intervention to succor persons who are
nationals of the persecuting state who have suffered, or who have
been threatened with, gross and systematic human rights violations,
gross and systematic violations of humanitarian law, or war crimes,
where the country claiming these persons its nationals does not
protect them from these violations, or may be actively or passively
involved with these violations, i.e., the Kosovo situation? Part II
offers analysis of principles under state of necessity in this situation.
A. PRIOR SITUATIONS
NATO's Kosovo intervention was but one of those crises where
states, individually or collectively, succored indigenous nationals as
part of a rescue operation for their own or other nonstate nationals, or
with the sole goal of protecting indigenous nationals. Some occurred
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries before the Charter era,
in some cases pursuant to the Concert of Europe, which lasted in one
form or another from 1815 through most of the nineteenth century.39
neutral Norwegian waters to liberate British prisoners of war). But see
O'CONNELL, supra note 30, at 1118-19; COLOMBOS, supra note 33, § 715 (arguing
that Britain was justified in the Altmark incident in attacking the German vessel
and removing prisoners). See Convention on Maritime Neutrality, Feb. 20, 1928,
47 Stat. 1989, 135 L.N.T.S. 187 (failing to address the issue); see also Convention
Concerning Rights & Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War (Hague XIII), Oct.
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2415 (failing to cover the precise point); Edwin M. Borchard,
Was Norway Delinquent in the Case of the Altmark?, 34 AM. J. INT'L L. 289, 294
(1940) (claiming that Germany and Norway did not violate international law);
Michael Bothe, The Law of Neutrality, in DIETER FLECK, THE HANDBOOK OF
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 485, 501-06 (1995); Arne W. Dahl,
Passage Through Neutral Territorial Waters, in 25 BOCHUMER SCHRIFTEN ZUR
FRIEDENSSICHERUNG UND ZUM HUMANITAREN VOLKERRECHT 67 (1995)
[hereinafter BOCHUMER]; Dahl, Comment No. 2, in BOCHUMER, supra, at 79; W.
Heintschel von Heinegg, Comment No. 10, in BOCHUMER supra, at 111, 112-15;
supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
39. See RONZITTI, supra note 5, at 90; see also Louis B. Sohn, International
Law and Basic Human Rights, in 62 READINGS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM THE
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW 1947-1977, at 587, 590-91 (Richard B. Lillich &
John Norton Moore eds., Naval War C. Int'l L. Stud. 1980). In 1827, there was a
British-French-Russian intervention in the Greek revolution against Turkey. See
MURPHY, supra note 5, at 52; see also OPPENHEIM, supra note 6, § 131 n.18
("public opinion reacted with horror to the cruelties committed."); FERNANDO R.
TESON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY
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177-78 (2d ed. 1997); Behuniak, supra note 19, at 160; Jean-Pierre Fonteyne, The
Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current
Validity under the U.N. Charter, 4 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 203, 207 (1974). In 1840
and from 1857-58 and 1877-78 there were successful U.S. protests over Jews'
treatment in the Ottoman Empire without armed force intervention. See W.
Michael Reisman with the Collaboration of Myres S. McDougal, Humanitarian
Intervention to Protect the lbos, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE
UNITED NATIONS 167, 180, 181 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973) [hereinafter
Reisman & McDougal]. In 1860-61, France intervened in Syria, with approval of
other Western powers, to end atrocities there. See MURPHY, supra note 5, at 53;
see also TESON, supra, at 178; Behuniak, supra note 19, at 160; Fonteyne, supra,
at 208; Reisman & McDougal, supra, at 180. But see RONZITTI, supra note 5, at 90
(stating that the Ottoman Empire agreed to intervention). From 1866-68, European
states' pressure on the Ottoman Empire to ameliorate the position of Christians on
Crete succeeded without military intervention. See Fonteyne, supra, at 210; see
also Reisman & McDougal, supra, at 18. But see RONZITTI, supra note 5, at 90
(arguing that this was not a case of intervention). In 1877, Russia declared war
against the Ottoman Empire due to the harsh treatment of Christians in the
Balkans, and the Empire's rejection of the Protocol of Conference. See Protocol of
Conference, Mar. 31, 1877, 68 Brit. & For. St. Pap. 823; see also MURPHY, supra
note 5, at 54; RONZITTI, supra note 5, at 91; TESON, supra, at 178; Behuniak,
supra, at 161; Fonteyne, supra, at 211; Reisman & McDougal, supra, at 182. From
1898-1900, the United States staged an intervention in Cuba, resulting in the
establishment of an independent Cuba. See I CHARLES CHENEY HYDE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 81 (2d rev. ed. 1945); see also MURPHY, supra note 5, at
55; TESON, supra, at 178; MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 102-05 (3d
ed. 1977); Behuniak, supra, at 163; Reisman & McDougal, supra, at 182. From
1903-08, the Russian and Austro-Hungarian threat of intervention in Macedonia
resulted in reforms to protect Macedonians. See Fonteyne, supra, at 212; Reisman
& McDougal, supra, at 183. From 1904-16, the United States and other states
engaged in humanitarian intercession with the Ottoman Empire on Armenians'
behalf. See MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 19, at 240. In 1913, Bulgaria, Greece,
and Serbia intervened to respond to "Turkification" in Macedonia. See MURPHY,
supra note 5, at 56; see also RONZITTI, supra note 5, at 91; TESON, supra, at 178;
Behuniak, supra note 19, at 162; Fonteyne, supra, at 213. In 1939, the United
Kingdom evacuated 450 Spanish Republicans from Minorca as part of a surrender
agreement with Spanish Nationalists. See JAMES CABLE, GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY
1919-1991, at 174 (3d ed. 1994); see also Jurgen Habermas, Bestiality and
Humanity: A War on the Border between Law and Morality, in KOSOVO:
CONTENDING VOICES ON BALKAN INTERVENTIONS 306, 308 (William Joseph
Buckley ed., 2000). Russia's 1877 intervention resulted in Treaty for Settlement of
Affairs in the East, guaranteeing equal treatment for Christians within the Ottoman
Empire. See Treaty for the Settlement of Affairs in the East, July 13, 1878, art. 62,
153 Consol. T.S. 171, 189-90. The Treaty, later modified, realigned Balkan states',
the Empire's and Russia's frontiers; recognized Bulgaria and Montenegro
independence; Eastern Rumelia's autonomy under the Empire with a European
Commission to organize the province; and Bosnia-Herzegovina autonomy under
Austria-Hungary. See id. arts. 1-61, 153 Consol. T.S., at 174-89. Although
"nothing in the language of the Covenant [of the League of Nations] prohibited
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Scholars have traced these principles to ancient times.4 ° Others have
arisen since 1945, i.e., after the Charter became effective for
interstate relations. 41 Among the most important of the latter were
humanitarian intervention[,]" the Covenant era, 1920-39, was a time of egregiously
unlawful interventions (Japan in China, Italy in Ethiopia, Germany in
Czechoslovakia), allegedly to protect humanity, but whose primary purposes were
territorial aggrandizement, i.e., conquest. See MURPHY, supra note 5, at 59-62; see
also RONZITTI, supra note 5, at 91; Thomas M. Franck & Nigel S. Rodley, After
Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by Military Force, 67 AM. J.
INT'L L. 275, 284 (1973) (generally criticizing humanitarian intervention).
40. See generally MURPHY, supra note 5, at 33-49; Fonteyne, supra note 39, at
205-06, 214-15; Raby, supra note 3, at 257-60; Sohn, supra note 39, at 588;
Wingfield, supra note 19, at 441-44; cf James Kurth, First War of the Global Era:
Kosovo and U.S. Grand Strategy, in WAR OVER KOSOVO: POLITICS AND
STRATEGY IN A GLOBAL AGE 63, 79 (Andrew J. Bacevich & Eliot A. Cohen eds.,
2001) (stating that the "Kosovo [War] was ostensibly the first truly humanitarian
war, fought not for national interests as traditionally defined but for the furtherance
of human rights alone," but asserting that the real reason for Allied Force was "the
furtherance of NATO").
41. There are many examples of such interventions. In 1965, the United States
intervened in the Dominican Republic to save U.S. and foreign nationals' lives; the
intervention was subsequently legitimated by an OAS resolution. See AREND &
BECK, supra note 19, at 117; see also MURPHY, supra note 5, at 94; RONZITTI,
supra note 5, at 32-35 (debating the lawfulness of the U.S. action); Behuniak,
supra note 19, at 172; Major J.D. Godwin, NATO's Role in Peace Operations:
Reexamining the Treaty After Bosnia and Kosovo, 160 MIL. L. REV. 1, 38 (1999);
Lillich, supra note 19, at 341; Wingfield, supra note 19, at 449. But see Akehurst,
supra note 19, at 100; Ian Brownlie, Thoughts on Kind-Hearted Gunmen, in
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 39, at 139,
143-44. In 1971-72, India invoked humanitarian grounds to partly support its
intervention in East Pakistan, which became Bangladesh. See AREND & BECK,
supra note 19, at 118; MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 19, at 243-45; MURPHY,
supra note 5, at 97; OPPENHEIM, supra note 6, § 131 n.18; RONZITTI, supra note 5,
at 95-97 (considering the legality of India's action); TESON, supra note 39, at 200-
10; Walzer, supra note 39, at 105-06; NICHOLAS J. WHEELER, SAVING
STRANGERS: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY ch. 2
(2000); Behuniak, supra note 19, at 174; Stanley Hoffmann, The Problem of
Intervention, in INTERVENTION IN WORLD POLITICS, supra note 19, at 7, 24. But
see MICHAEL J. GLENNON, LIMITS OF LAW, PREROGATIVES OF POWER 73 (2001);
Akehurst, supra note 19, at 96. From 1978-79, Tanzania supported'the overthrow
of Ugandan President Idi Amin. See AREND & BECK, supra note 19, at 123; see
also MURPHY, supra note 5, at 105; OPPENHEIM, supra note 6, §, 131 n.18; TESON,
supra note 39, at 179-95; WHEELER, supra, ch' 4'; Hoffmann, supra, at 24. But see
GLENNON, supra, at 72; RONZITTI, supra note 5, at 102-06; Akehurst, supra note
19, at 98. In 1979, France intervened in the Cenrial African Republic. See AREND
& BECK, supra note 19, at 125; see also MURPHY, supra note 5, at 107; TESON,
supra note 39, at 196-200. But see Akehurst,'! siipra note 19,:at 98; Dominique
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NATO's bombing and sea interdiction campaigns, pursuant to
Security Council decisions authorizing them, that led to the 1995
Dayton Accords for Bosnia-Herzegovina, which included protection
for indigenous peoples.42 NATO's 1999 Allied Force ("Allied
Force") action was among the most recent of this type of campaign.43
Moisi, Intervention in French Foreign Policy, in INTERVENTION IN WORLD
POLITICS, supra note 19, at 67, 69-71 (highlighting French intervention tied to
francophone Africa policies). But see GLENNON, supra, at 73. In 1989, the
Economic Community of West African States intervened in the Liberian civil war.
See Godwin, supra, at 49. In 1991, a coalition was formed in northern Iraq to
provide emergency aid to Kurdish refugees fleeing after a failed insurrection
against the Iraqi government. See MURPHY, supra note 5, at 165; see also
OPPENHEIM, supra note 6, § 131 n.18 (intervening states "emphasized that their
actions were solely humanitarian, were temporary, and were not directed against
Iraq's sovereignty or security."); WHEELER, supra, ch. 5. S.C. Res. 688, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/688; KAREL C. WELLENS, RESOLUTIONS AND STATEMENTS OF THE UNITED
NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL (1946-1992) 579 (2d ed. 1993) (condemning Iraqi
repressions but only insisting on international humanitarian organizations' access
and appealing to U.N. member states to contribute to humanitarian relief efforts);
Behuniak, supra, at 177; Falk, Introduction, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CIVIL
WAR supra note 19, at 26; Reisman & McDougal, supra note 39, at 167 (stating
that the 1967-70 Biafra secession, civil war and humanitarian disaster in Nigeria
were candidates for humanitarian intervention); MICHAEL O'HANLON, SAVING
LIVES WITH FORCE: MILITARY CRITERIA FOR HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 80
(1997); MURPHY, supra note 5, at 146-65, 243-60 (nominating the Liberian civil
war of the early 1990s and the 1994 Rwanda genocide as candidates for
intervention); WHEELER, supra, ch. 7 (arguing the same for Rwanda); Day, supra
note 19, at 45-46; Wingfield, supra, at 460. Other post-1945 widely criticized
interventions include Indonesia's 1975 East Timor intervention, South Africa's
1975 Angola intervention, Syria's 1976 intervention in Lebanon, Vietnam's 1978
intervention in Kampuchea; U.S. actions in Grenada, 1983 and Panama, 1989-90.
See AREND & BECK, supra note 19, at 119-23, 126-28; see also MURPHY, supra
note 5, at 100, 102, 108-15; RONZITTI, supra note 5, at 98-102; WHEELER, supra,
ch. 3; Godwin, supra, at 43, 82; Wingfield, supra, at 457-59.
42. See General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia & Herzegovina,
Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 75, 89 (1996); see also Dayton Agreement on
Implementing the Federation of Bosnia & Herzegovina, Nov. 10, 1995, 35 I.L.M.
170 (1996); RICHARD HOLBROOKE, TO END A WAR chs. 16-18 (1998); VICTOR
MEIER, YUGOSLAVIA: A HISTORY OF ITS DEMISE 244-45 (Sabrina P. Ramet trans.,
1995); MURPHY, supra note 5, at 198-217; ALEKSANDAR PAVKOVIC, THE
FRAGMENTATION OF YUGOSLAVIA: NATIONALISM IN A MULTINATIONAL STATE ch.
12 (1997); Nicola Butler, NA TO: From Collective Defence to Peace Enforcement,
in KOSOVO AND THE CHALLENGE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: SELECTIVE
INDIGNATION, COLLECTIVE ACTION, AND INTERNATIONAL CITIZENSHIP 273, 275
(Albrecht Schnabel & Ramesh Thakur eds., 2000) [hereinafter KOSOVO AND THE
CHALLENGE]; Marie-Janine Calic, Kosovo in the Twentieth Century: A Historical
Account, in KOSOVO AND THE CHALLENGE, supra, 19, 28; Godwin, supra note 41,
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Besides the sovereignty principle, restated in the Charter, 44 and
Charter prohibitions on violating a state's territory or political
at 59-66; Jasminka Udovicki & Ejub Stitkovac, Bosnia and Hercegovina: The
Second War, in BURN THIS HOUSE: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF YUGOSLAVIA
175, 199-202 (Jasminka Udovicki & James Ridgeway eds., 2000); Jasminka
Udovicki, Neither War Nor Peace, in BURN THIS HOUSE: THE MAKING AND
UNMAKING OF YUGOSLAVIA 281-314; Susan L. Woodward, International Aspects
of the Wars in Former Yugoslavia: 1990-1996, in BURN THIS HOUSE: THE
MAKING AND UNMAKING OF YUGOSLAVIA 217, 241-42; infra note 108 and
accompanying text (analyzing Security Council decisions pursuant to Articles 25
and 48 of the U.N. Charter).
43. See Godwin, supra note 41, at 73-74 (predicting more crises like Bosnia
and Kosovo); see also Habermas, supra note 39, at 308 (suggesting that
"humanitarian interventions since 1945 have taken place only in the name of the
U.N. and with the formal assent of the government involved (to the extent that a
functioning state existed)"). But see supra note 41 and accompanying text
(providing examples of intervention without the affected state's consent or U.N.
approval).
44. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. I (stating that the United Nations is "based
on the principle of sovereign equality of all its Members"). National sovereignty,
sometimes diminished or eroded, has been a fundamental principle of international
law since the peace of Westphalia, which created the modem state system. The
Peace of Westphalia is comprised of the Treaty of Peace of Munster and the Treaty
of Peace of Osnabruck. See Treaty of Peace of Munster, Oct. 14(24), 1648, art. 64,
1 Consol. T.S. 271, 319, 337; Treaty of Peace of Osnabruck, Oct. 14(24), 1648,
arts. 8, 9, 1 Consol. T.S. 119, 198, 241-43; see also LOS Convention, supra note
30, art. 157(3), at 458; Vienna Convention, supra note 9, preamble, 1155 P.C.I.J.
331, 332; S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 4, 18; S.S.
Wimbledon (U.K. v. F.R.G.), 1923 P.C.I.J. No. 1, at 25; Declaration on Principles
of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Principle 6, G.A. Res.
2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970), reprinted
in 9 I.L.M. 1292 (1970) [hereinafter Friendly Relations Declaration]; Declaration
on Inadmissibility of Intervention in Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection
of Their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/2131 (1965), reprinted in DIETRICH RAUSCHNING ET AL., KEY
RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY 1946-1996, at 26-27
(1997) [hereinafter Res. 2131]; U.N. Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace:
Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, U.N. Doc.
A/49/277, S/24111 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 956, 959 (1992); MICHAEL
AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 21-23 (Brian
Chapman ed., 3d ed. 1977); J.B. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 45-49
(Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963); BROWNLIE, supra note 6, at 289-90;
GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 9, at 36-40; HENRY KISSINGER, DOES AMERICA
NEED A FOREIGN POLICY?: TOWARD A DIPLOMACY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 21-22,
235-37 (2001) (stating that the future of the concept of state sovereignty is
uncertain); OPPENHEIM, supra note 6, § 37; MCNAIR, supra note 15, at 754-66;
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independence,45 another factor, the domestic jurisdiction principle,
has been at play where states would intervene to protect nationals of
an affected state, i.e., people indigenous to that state. Pre-World War
II international law was thought to hold that how a state treated its
own nationals was a matter within its exclusive domestic
jurisdiction. 6 International agreements condemn intervention by
other states. 7 One of the more recent is the 1977 Protocol II to the
1949 Geneva Conventions, whose Article 3 provides:
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, Part 1, ch. 1, Introductory Note, 16 & 17;
SIMMA, supra note 9, at 79-97; R.P. Anand, Sovereign Equality of States in
International Law, 197 R.C.A.D.I. 9, 22-51 (1986); Boutros Boutros-Ghali,
Empowering the United Nations, FOREIGN AFF., Winter 1992, at 89, 98-99;
Jonathan 1. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529, 539
(1993); Gerald Fitzmaurice, The General Principles of International Law
Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law, 92 R.C.A.D.I. 1, 49-50 (1957);
Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice, 178 R.C.A.D.I. 9, 32
(1982); Humphrey Waldock, General Course on Public International Law, 106
R.C.A.D.I. 1, 156-72 (1962) Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics, Values
and Functions, 216 R.C.A.D.I. 9, 46, 130 (1989). But see HENKIN, supra note 10,
at 8-10 (subsequently denouncing the concept of sovereignty).
45. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 (stating that "[a]ll Members shall refrain
in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state"); see also supra note 9 and
accompanying text (discussing customary norms of international law).
46. Cf Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis & Morocco (French Zone), 1923
P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 4, at 4 (adv. op.); see also OPPENHEIM, supra note 6, §§ 118,
131, 377; U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7 (barring U.N. intervention in matters of
states' domestic jurisdiction). This differs from states' intervention. See generally
GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 9, at 60-72; SIMMA, supra note 9, at 141-54. But see,
e.g., PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 33, at 1362 (refraining from making that
distinction).
47. See, e.g., Charter of Organization of African Unity, May 25, 1963, art. 3,
479 U.N.T.S. 39, 74; Charter of Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948,
art. 15, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 2419, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, 56 [hereinafter OAS Charter],
amended by Protocol of Buenos Aires, Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607, 721 U.N.T.S.
324, amended by Protocol of Cartagena, Dec. 5, 1985, 25 I.L.M. 527, amended by
Protocol of Washington, Dec. 14, 1992, 33 I.L.M. 1005, amended by Protocol of
Managua, June 10, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 1009; Pact of League of Arab States, Mar. 22,
1945, art. 8, 70 U.N.T.S. 237, 254; Convention on Rights & Duties of States, Dec.
26, 1933, art. 8, 49 Stat. 2957, 3100, 165 L.N.T.S. 19, 25; U.S. Reservation, Dec.
22, 1933, 49 Stat. at 3101, 165 L.N.T.S. at 29; Additional Protocol Relative to
Non-Intervention, Dec. 23, 1936, art. 1, 51 Stat. 41, 44, 188 L.N.T.S. 31, 36; Act
of Chapultepec, Mar. 6, 1945, art. 2, 60 Stat. 1831, 1839 (mandating respect of
every State's individuality and independence); Resolution Relating to Scheme of
Observation of Spanish Frontiers by Land & Sea, Mar. 8, 1937, 31 AM. J. INT'L L.
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1. Nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked for the purpose of
affecting the sovereignty of a State or the responsibility of the
government, by all legitimate means, to maintain or re-establish law and
order in the State or to defend the national unity and territorial integrity of
the State.
2. Nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked as a justification for
intervening, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatsoever, in the armed
conflict or in the internal or external affairs of the High Contracting Party
in the territory of which that conflict occurs.
48
Protocol 1149 supplements the 1949 Geneva Conventions,
particularly their Common Article 3 governing non-international
armed conflicts.5 ° The Friendly Relations Declaration, other General
SuPP. 163 (1937) (referring to the agreement on nonintervention during the
Spanish civil war by twenty-seven European states' declarations); OPPENHEIM,
supra note 6, § 128, at 429 (discussing European states' declarations regarding
nonintervention); Norman J. Padelford, The International Non-Intervention
Agreement and the Spanish Civil War, 30 AM. J. INT'L L. 578 (1937); Ann Van
Wynen Thomas & A.J. Thomas, Jr., International Legal Aspects of the Civil War
in Spain, 1936-39, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CIVIL WAR, supra note 19, at
111; HYDE, supra note 39, § 83B; THOMAS & THOMAS, NON-INTERVENTION: THE
LAW AND ITS IMPORT IN THE AMERICAS ch. 17 (1956) (analyzing humanitarian
intervention issues in the OAS system).
48. See Protocol 1I, supra note 27, art. 3, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 611; see also BOTHE
ET AL., supra note 27, at 632-34; PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 33, at 1362-64.
49. Protocol II, supra note 27, art. 1, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 611; see also BOTHE ET
AL., supra note 27, at 623-29; PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 33, at 1341-56.
50. See Convention for Amelioration of Condition of Wounded & Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 3116, 75 U.N.T.S.
31, 32 [hereinafter First Convention]; see also Second Convention, supra note 33,
art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3220, 75 U.N.T.S. at 86; Convention Relative to Treatment of
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3,6 U.S.T. 3316, 3319, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 136
[hereinafter Third Convention]; Convention Relative to Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3518, 75 U.N.T.S.
287, 288 [hereinafter Fourth Convention]; JEAN S. PICTET, THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 38-61 (1952) (explaining that today 189 states
are party to these treaties); INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977:
RATIFICATIONS, ACCESSIONS AND SUCCESSIONS (Dec. 3, 2001) (suggesting that
many if not all of their provisions represent customary norms), available at
http://www.icrc.org/eng/party-gc (last visited Sept. 12, 2002); BROWNLIE, supra
note 6, at 5; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, § 102 cmts. f(i); OPPENHEIM,
supra note 6, § 10, at 28, 31; George K. Walker, Anticipatory Collective Self-
Defense in the Charter Era: What the Treaties Have Said, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
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Assembly Resolutions, and the Helsinki Accords support the
nonintervention principle, although many of them also support
human rights."
However, today "[i]nternational law is no longer -- if it ever was
concerned solely with states. Many of its rules are directly
concerned with regulating the position and activities of individuals;
and many more indirectly affect them. '52 There are limits to how a
state may treat its own nationals, among them deprivations of human
rights.5 3 "[W]hen a state commits cruelties against and persecution of
its nationals in such a way as to deny their fundamental human rights
and to shock the conscience of [hu]mankind, the matter ceases to be
of sole concern to that state and even intervention in the interest of
humanity might be legally permissible."54
This is one side of the matter. Commentators differ sharply over
legitimacy of humanitarian intervention, individual or collective,
under various circumstances. 5 The same has been true for other
321, 367-68 (1998); 72 JACK GRUNAWALT, THE LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS:
LIBER AMICORuM 365, 391-92 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., Naval War C. Int'l L.
Stud. 1998).
51. See Declaration on Inadmissibility of Intervention & Interference in
Internal Affairs of States, G.A. Res. 36/103, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/36/103 (1981), reprinted in RAUSCHNING ET AL., note 44, at 27; see also
Definition of Aggression, arts. 2, 3(a), G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314 (1974), reprinted in RAUSCHING ET AL, supra note 44, at
13-14; Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 44, Principles 3, 5; Res. 2131,
supra note 44; Conference on Security & Cooperation in Europe, Final Act, Aug.
1, 1975, Principles VI, VII, 14 I.L.M. 1292, 1294 (1995); RONZITTI, supra note 5,
at 49-52; Ralph Zacklin, The United Nations and Humanitarian Intervention, 41
VA. J. INT'L L. 923, 933 (2001) (joining many who say nonintervention is a jus
cogens norm).
52. OPPENHEIM, supra note 6, § 374.
53. Seeid. § 118, at 384.
54. Id. § 131, at 442. See also Zacklin, supra note 51. Cf Arnold Fraleigh, The
Algerian Revolution as a Case Study in International Law, in THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF CIVIL WAR, supra note 19, at 179, 181 (asserting that the same issue can
arise in an internal power struggle, with innocent civilians caught in the middle).
55. Compare D'AMATO, supra note 10, at 226, and ROSALYN HIGGINS,
PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE USE IT 247 (Oxford
UP 1994), and MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 19, at 236-47, and OPPENHEIM,
supra note 6, §§ 118, 131, 374, and JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES § 10.3
(1999), and TESON, supra note 39, and WALZER, supra note 39, at 107-08, and
WHEELER, supra note 41, at 51-52, 285-310, and Behuniak, supra note 19, and
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Alberto R. Coll, Kosovo and the Moral Burdens of Power, in Bacevich & Cohen,
supra note 40, at 124, 136, and Gerald Fitzmaurice, The General Principles of
International Law Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law, 92
R.C.A.D.I. 5, 172-74 (1957), and Fonteyne, supra note 39, and Rosalyn Higgins,
Intervention and International Law, in INTERVENTION IN WORLD POLITICS, supra
note 19, ch. 3, and Hoffmann, supra note 41, and Stanley Hoffmann, Sovereignty
and the Ethics of Intervention, in STANLEY HOFFMAN, THE ETHICS AND POLITICS
OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 12, 22-23 (1996) (explaining the different
unilateral and collective intervention standards), and Robert C. Johansen, Limits
and Opportunities in Humanitarian Intervention, in Hoffmann, supra, ch. 4 (also
noting the need to avoid mixing self-defense claims with humanitarian
intervention), and Lillich, supra note 19, and Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention:
A Reply to Ian Brownlie and a Plea for Constructive Alternatives, in LAW AND
CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD ch. I I (John Norton Moore, ed., 1974), and
Theodor Meron, Commentary on Humanitarian Intervention, in Zhang Yunling,
China: Whither the World After Kosovo?, in KOSOVO AND THE CHALLENGE, supra
note 42, ch. 8, supra note 10, ch. 19, and Reisman & McDougal, supra note 39,
and Henry G. Schermers, The Obligation to Intervene in the Domestic Affairs of
States, in ASTRID J.M. DELISSEN & GERARD J. TANJA, HUMANITARIAN LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICT: CHALLENGES AHEAD 583 (1991), and Zacklin, supra note 51
(stating that the U.N. Secretary General appears to be moving toward a view
supporting humanitarian intervention under certain circumstances, thus supporting
the right to intervention), with AREND & BECK, supra note 19, at 135-37, and
BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 301, and RONZITTI, supra note 5, at 135, and
THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 47, ch. 17, and Akehurst, supra note 19, and
Derek W. Bowett, The Interrelation of Theories of Intervention and Self-Defense,
in Moore, supra, at 44, and Ian Brownlie, Humanitarian Intervention, in Moore,
supra, ch. 10, and Hedley Bull, Conclusion, in INTERVENTION IN WORLD POLITICS,
supra note 19, at 181, 193, and Lori Fisler Damrosch, Commentary on Collective
Military Intervention to Enforce Human Rights, in LAW AND FORCE, supra note
10, ch. 20, and Franck & Rodley, supra note 39, at 302, and Louis Henkin, Kosovo
and the Law of "Humanitarian Intervention, " 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 824 (1999), and
Vladimir Kartashkin, Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention, in LAW AND
FORCE, supra note 10, ch. 18, and Schachter, supra note 44, at 143 (opposing it).
See also MURPHY, supra note 5, at 135-42 (summarizing views); RONZITTI, supra
note 5, at 88 (summarizing early views); Tom J. Farer, An Inquiry into the
Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention, in LAW AND FORCE, supra note 10, ch.
17 (reviewing debate); Edwin Brown Firmage, Summary and Interpretation, in
INTERVENTION IN WORLD POLITICS, supra note 19, at 405, 406-13 (summarizing
panelist views on various kinds of intervention); Jean-Pierre Fonteyne, Forcible
Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights: Recent Views from the United
Nations, in Lillich, supra note 39, at 197 (claiming diminished opposition within
United Nations for intervention); Evan Luard, Collective Intervention, in
INTERVENTION IN WORLD POLITICS, supra note 19, at 156, 168-69 (arguing that
although intervening to protect human rights is likely to increase in future, use of
force for this will be infrequent); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, § 703 cmt.
e, r.n.8 (taking no defintive position and noting the issue's difficulty); GLENNON,
supra note 41, at 34-35 (declaring that although international law did not support
Allied Force, there are new factors for future humanitarian interventions).
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forms of intervention, e.g., rescue of a state's own endangered
nationals, a debate beyond this Article's scope.56 However, some of
these arguments surfaced in debate over Allied Force's legitimacy. 7
What made Allied Force unique was that it was the first time a
collective self-defense organization constituted under Article 51 of
the Charter58 intervened while the Security Council was seized of a
crisis the Council had said threatened international peace and
security. 9 Unlike the NATO Bosnia-Herzegovina campaign leading
56. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (describing the use of the state of
necessity doctrine to justify intervention).
57. See generally Antonio Cassesse, Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving
Towards International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in
the World Community?, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 23 (1999) (arguing that although
NATO's actions may be illegal under international law, there may be an emerging
rule that would allow such exceptions when certain conditions are met). See also
Jonathan 1. Chamey, Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo, 93 AM. J.
INT'L L. 834 (1999); Christine M. Chinkin, Kosovo: A "Good" or "Bad" War?, 93
AM. J. INT'L L. 841 (1999); Richard A. Falk, Kosovo, World Order, and the Future
of International Law, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 847 (1999); Thomas M. Franck, Lessons
of Kosovo, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 857 (1999); A.J.R. Groom & Paul Taylor, The
United Nations System and the Kosovo Crisis, in KOSOVO AND THE CHALLENGE,
supra note 42, at 291, 299; CATHERINE GUICHARD, International Law and the War
in Kosovo, 41 SURVIVAL 19 (No. 2, 1999); Dino Kritsiotis The Kosovo Crisis and
NA TO's Application of Armed Force Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
49 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 330, 339-54 (2000); W. Michael Reisman, Kosovo's
Antinomies, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 860 (1999); Adam Roberts, NATO's
"Humanitarian War" Over Kosovo, 41 Survival 102 (No. 3, 1999); Bruno Simma,
NA TO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1 (1999);
Ruth Wedgwood, NATO's Campaign in Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 828
(1999); GLENNON, supra note 41 (offering a new analysis for changed international
conditions, saying the old de jure approach will not work). The article offers a new
analysis within existing international law, i.e., the state of necessity doctrine. Id.
58. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text (detailing the use of the
doctrine of self-defense).
59. See S.C. Res. 1160, U.N. Doc. S/RES/I 160 (1998); S.C. Res. 1199 (1998),
U.N. Doc. S/RES/I 199 (1998), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 249 (1999); S.C. Res. 1203
(1998), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1203 (1998); S.C. Res. 1207 (1998), U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1207 (1998), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 254 (1999); S.C. Res. 1239, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1239 (1999); S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999), reprinted in
38 I.L.M. 1451 (1999); see also U.N. CHARTER art. 12(1) (stating that when the
Security Council ("Council") exercises functions the Charter assigns to it in a
dispute, the General Assembly ("Assembly") may not make recommendations on
that dispute unless the Council so requests); GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 9, at
129-31; SIMMA, supra note 9, at 255-62. Even here, however, the Assembly may
initiate studies on human rights deprivations and might invoke the Uniting for
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to the Dayton Accords,6 ° no Council resolution authorized Allied
Force. 6' The narrow issue is whether state of necessity, now part of
customary law and a general principle of law,62 legitimated Allied
Force as a collective humanitarian intervention under circumstances
prevailing in early 1999, from what NATO decision makers knew, or
reasonably should have known, at the time.63 If so, a second round of
issues is whether attacks on selected targets once the campaign began
were necessary and proportional. This Article does not address this
issue, apart from analyzing a NATO projected maritime interdiction
campaign in Part III. B.
What was necessary and proportional under state of necessity in
Kosovo might or might not be necessary and proportional with
Peace Resolution ("UFP") to recommend action if the Council is deadlocked by a
veto. See Uniting for Peace Resolution, G.A. Res. U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp.
No. 20, at 10, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950), reprinted in 45 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 1
(1950); see also SIDNEY J. BAILEY, THE PROCEDURE OF THE UN SECURITY
COUNCIL 209, 264-65 (2d ed. 1988); JORGE CASTENEDA, LEGAL EFFECTS OF
UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 104-16 (Alba Amoia trans., 1969); GOODRICH ET
AL., supra note 9, at 21, 26, 122-25; MURPHY, supra note 5, at 299-302; SIMMA,
supra note 9, at 15, 231-35, 257-58 (criticizing UFP); THE TANKER WAR, supra
note 9, at 175-78; NICHOLAS WHEELER, Reflections on the Legality and Legitimacy
of NATO's Intervention in Kosovo, in THE KOSOVO TRAGEDY: THE HUMAN
RIGHTS DIMENSIONS 145, 158-59 (Ken Booth ed., 2001) (explaining that NATO
could not attempt the UFP resolution route; it might not have had enough votes in
the Assembly). Cf S.C. Res. 1366 on the Role of the Security Council in the
Prevention of Armed Conflicts, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1366 (2001), pmbl., para. 9,
reprinted in 41 I.L.M. 248, 249 (2002) (reaffirming the Council's primary but not
exclusive role and responsibility in maintaining international peace and security
and in the peaceful settlement of disputes). Assembly or Council calls for action or
recommendations passed pursuant to U.N. CHARTER arts. 10-11, 13-14 and
chapters VI-VII are nonmandatory, although they may strengthen preexisting
customary and treaty norms recited in them. Id. See also SYDNEY D. BAILEY &
SAM DAWS, THE PROCEDURE OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL ch. 1.5 (3d ed.
1998); BROWNLIE, supra note 6, at 14-15, 694; CASTENEDA, supra, ch. 3;
GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 9, at 126, 144, 290-314; OPPENHEIM, supra note 6, §
16, at 47-49; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, § 103(2)(d), cmt. c, r.n.2;
SIMMA, supra note 9, at 284, 407-18, 605-36, 652.
60. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
61. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
62. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
63. For further analysis of this point, see infra notes 114-134 and
accompanying text. See also infra note 65 and accompanying text.
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respect to attacks.64 This Article also does not address claims in some
NATO and national documents that self-defense, perhaps
anticipatory in nature, justified Allied Force because of threats to and
geographic proximity of NATO Members. These documents laid
primary stress on humanitarian intervention, however.65 Acting in
anticipatory collective self-defense would have supported NATO
intervention if there was a threat to nearby NATO Members.66
B. STATE OF NECESSITY: OPPOSING PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
Commentators approving state of necessity unanimously say that
it, as a basis for intervention, is an extraordinary action, even when a
state intervenes to protect its own nationals. It is not to be lightly
cited as the reason for entering upon the affected state's territory,
even with the most benevolent motives in mind.67 This is particularly
64. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
65. See generally North Atlantic Council, Statement on Kosovo, Apr. 23, 1999,
reprinted in Ivo H. DAALDER & MICHAEL E. O'HANLON, WINNING UGLY:
NATO's WAR TO SAVE KOSOVO 262 (2000); Javier Solana, Statement by NATO
Secretary General (Mar. 23, 1999) in 45 Keesing's Record of World Events 1999
[hereinafter 45 Keesing]; United States Department of Defense, Report to
Congress: Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report 10 (Jan. 31, 2000)
[hereinafter After-Action Report]. Cf CoIl, supra note 55, at 131 (citing three
reasons for intervention: humanitarian, regional security, normative, i.e., upholding
norms, precedents necessary to maintain a humane, peaceful international order).
66. See generally Walker, supra note 50; supra notes 9-11 and accompanying
text.
67. Debate over Kosovo among states and commentators makes this clear.
Some support the state of necessity theory this Article advances; others reject it.
Others support or reject the Kosovo operation on other grounds. See, e.g., William
Joseph Buckley, Introduction, in Buckley, supra note 39, at 1; TED GALEN
CARPENTER, NATO's EMPTY VICTORY: A POSTMORTEM ON THE BALKAN WAR
(2000); DAALDER & O'HANLON, supra note 65, at 16 ("[T]he Kosovo crisis is
largely a saga of NATO and its major international partners doing the right thing
but in the wrong way."); INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON Kosovo,
THE KOsOVO REPORT 4 (2000) (citing the Kosovo operation as unlawful but
legitimate); WHEELER, supra note 41, at 275-84; Vladimir Baranovsky, Russia:
Reassessing National Interests, in KOSOVO AND THE CHALLENGE, supra note 42,
ch. 7; Cassesse, supra note 57; Charney, supra note 57; Chinkin, supra note 57;
Simon Duke et al., The Major European Allies: France, Germany, and the United
Kingdom, in KOSOVO AND THE CHALLENGE, supra, note 42, ch. 9; Falk, supra note
57; Franck, supra note 57; Groom & Taylor, supra note 57; GUICHARD, supra note
57; David G. Haglund & Allen Sens, Kosovo and the Case of the (Not So) Free
Riders: Portugal, Belgium, Canada, and Spain, in KOSOVO AND THE CHALLENGE,
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true if the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense,
which may be a jus cogens norm," is not a consideration, as it is
when rescue of nationals of the intervening state(s) is involved.
When succor of nonstate indigenous peoples is the issue, opposing
policies include an affected state's sovereignty, political
independence and territorial integrity, states' right to be free from
aggression, which may also have jus cogens status, 69 versus equal
rights of peoples, self-determination of peoples, and most
importantly, human rights and humanitarian law, which may also
have jus cogens status."' As a U.S. conflict of laws scholar said in
supra note 42, ch. 12; Henkin, supra note 55; G. John Ikenberry, The Costs of
Victory: American Power and the Use of Force in the Contemporary Order, in
KOSOVO AND THE CHALLENGE, supra note 42, ch. 6; Ibrahim A. Karawan, The
Muslim World: Uneasy Ambivalence, in KOSOVO AND THE CHALLENGE, supra note
42, ch.14; George Khutsishvili & Albrecht Schnabel, The Kosovo Conflict: The
Balkans and the Southern Caucasus, in KOSOVO AND THE CHALLENGE, supra note
42, ch. 5; Georges Kostakos, The Southern Flank: Italy, Greece, Turkey, in
KOSOVO AND THE CHALLENGE, supra note 42, ch. 11; Kritsiotis, supra note 57;
Michael Mandelbaum, A Perfect Failure: NATO's War Against Yugoslavia, 78
FOREIGN AFF. 2 (Sept.-Oct. 1999); Bjorn Moller, The Nordic Countries: Whither
the West's Conscience?, in KOSOVO AND THE CHALLENGE, supra note 42, ch. 10;
Satish Nambiar, India: An Uneasy Precedent, in KOSOVO AND THE CHALLENGE,
supra note 42, ch. 17; Philip Nel, South Africa: The Demand for Legitimate
Multilateralism, in KOSOVO AND THE CHALLENGE, supra note 42, ch. 16; Reisman,
supra note 57; Roberts, supra note 57; Monica Serrano, Latin America: The
Dilemmas of Intervention, in KOSOVO AND THE CHALLENGE, supra note 42, ch. 15;
SIMMA, supra note 57; Peter Talas & Laszlo Valki, The New Entrants: Hungary,
Poland, and the Czech Republic, in KOSOVO AND THE CHALLENGE, supra note 42,
ch. 13; Wedgwood, supra note 57; Zhang Yunling, China: Whither the World
After Kosovo?, in KOSOVO AND THE CHALLENGE, supra note 42, ch. 8.
68. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51; see also supra notes 9-11 and accompanying
text.
69. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 1(1), 2(1), 2(4); see also supra notes 9, 44 and
accompanying text.
70. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 1(2)-1(3), 55-56; see also Lori Fisler Damrosch,
The Inevitability of Selective Response?[.] Principles to Guide Urgent
International Action, in KOSOVO AND THE CHALLENGE, supra note 42, at 405, 410
(citing inter alia Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc.
A/810, at 71 (1948); Convention on Prevention & Punishment of Crime of
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention];
First, Second, Third and Fourth Conventions, supra notes 33, 50; International
Covenant on Civil & Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171;
International Covenant on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3; Groom & Taylor, supra note 57, at 292 (citing the Universal
Declaration and "subsequent Covenants, as well as growth and development of the
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relation to theories of choice of law in private international law
within the United States, it is a battle between territoriality and the
law a person carries with him or her from his or her sovereign.
"Which of the two ... should yield is a question not susceptible of a
solution upon which all parties would agree."'" In the public
international law context, the choice is between principles supporting
state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence, and
the personal law of equal rights, self-determination, human rights,
and humanitarian law that individuals possess everywhere.
Besides these opposing principles that have roots in the Charter,
the Charter also argues for other policies, applicable to parties and
situations, that must be thrown into the balance: international peace
and security for all, use of principles of justice and international law,
adjusting or settling international disputes or situations that might
lead to a breach of the peace, friendly relations among nations,
strengthening universal peace, international cooperation in solving
international problems of an economic, social, cultural or
humanitarian character, good faith fulfillment of Charter obligations,
and settlement of disputes by peaceful means.72 The Charter
contemplates Members' resolving disputes by negotiation and other,
Geneva Conventions"). There has been nearly universal acceptance, albeit with
some states' reservations, to the First, Second, Third and Fourth Conventions and,
the Genocide Convention and the Covenant on Civil & Political Rights. See
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 387-88, 392, 452-53
(2002) [hereinafter TIF] see also BROWNLIE, supra note 6, at 573-84; GOODRICH
ET AL., supra note 9, at 25-36, 371-82; OPPENHEIM, supra note 6, §§ 433-44;
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, §§ 701-02; SIMMA, supra note 9, at 49-72,
760-95; Godwin, supra note 41, at 79; supra note 9 and accompanying text.
Human rights law and humanitarian law developed separately; humanitarian law
applies during armed conflict. There is a view that the two are today intertwined,
although the traditional principle is that they are separate bodies of law. Often
treaty terms and protections they afford are similar. See generally, MCCOUIBREY,
supra note 29, at 5-8 (explaining the evolution of humanitarian and human rights
law). See also Robert Kolb, The Relationship Between International Humanitarian
Law and Human Rights Law: A Brief History of the 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 1998 INT'L REV. RED CROSS
409; see also Franck & Rodley, supra note 39, at 276.
71. 3 Joseph H. Beale, History and Doctrines of the Conflict of Laws, in A
TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 53, at 1929 (1935).
72. See U.N. CHARTER arts. l(l)-l(3), 2(2)-2(3); see also Friendly Relations
Declaration, supra note 44; GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 9, at 25-36, 40-43;
SIMMA, supra note 9, at 49-72, 90-106.
[18:35
HUMANITARIAN INTER VENTION
similar means including adjudication,73 with possible resort to
regional organizations or the United Nations as options.74 There are
thus policies applying to all parties to an intervention issue and
international institutions and for a for dispute resolution besides
parties' opposing policies and action options.
ILC state of necessity principles, today customary law according
to the ICJ, and perhaps a general principle of law as well,75 weigh
competing states' (those of the intervenor(s) and the affected state)
interests and those of the international community and its
institutions. Restated for today's international law over twenty years
after the ILC first published its principles, state of necessity might be
argued to proceed along these lines at the beginning of this century:
State of necessity can be invoked only if it is the only means of
safeguarding an essential interest of the state(s) involved against a
"grave and imminent peril;" by extension, this means today states'
essential collective interest in protecting against a grave and
imminent peril to persons entitled to protections of equal rights,
human rights and humanitarian law, and self-determination. 6 The act
under state of necessity must not impair an essential interest of the
state to which an obligation of international law observance is owed,
i.e., the affected state. State of necessity cannot be invoked,
individually or collectively, for what would otherwise be wrongful
conduct if the obligation arises from jus cogens not opposed by
another, competing jus cogens norm. By extension, if a competing
jus cogens norm opposes principles in treaties, custom or general
principles, the competing jus cogens norm must be applied.7 State of
necessity cannot be invoked if a treaty or other primary source of
international law excludes the possibility of invoking the principle. If
73. See U.N. CHARTER art. 33; see also GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 9, at 257-
65; SIMMA, supra note 9, at 505-14.
74. See U.N. CHARTER chs. VI-ViII; see also GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 9,
at 257-369; MURPHY, supra note 5, ch. 7; SIMMA, supra note 9, at 505-757.
75. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text (explaining how the doctrine
can be considered a general principle of law).
76. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (explaining how the state of
necessity doctrine can be used by a state to protect against a "grave and imminent
peril").
77. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (describing the relationship
between jus cogens norms and the necessity doctrine).
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a state or states contribute to occurrence of the state of necessity, that
state or those states may not invoke state of necessity. 8
C. ANALYSIS OF PRINCIPLES AND FACTORS GOVERNING STATE OF
NECESSITY INTERVENTION
Beyond the general principles and policies, are there principles
and factors that might refine analysis of state of necessity in
humanitarian intervention situations? Commentators on Kosovo have
offered them; 79 factorial analysis based on the U.S. Restatements has
78. Compare 2001 ILC Report, supra note 3, art. 25, at 194 with State
Responsibility, supra note 3, art. 33, at 34. See also supra notes 9-29 and
accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., Buckley, supra note 67 at II (citing Falk); Damrosch, supra note
70, at 409-10; DAALDER & O'HANLON, supra note 65, at 206-16 (offering "lessons
for international intervention" that have a multidisciplinary focus). These lessons
are:
Intervention should occur as early as possible. Coercive diplomacy requires a
credible threat of force. When force is used, military means must relate to
political ends. Airpower alone usually cannot stop the killing in civil wars.
The [Colin W.] Powell doctrine for the use of force remains valid; i.e., the
United States should use military force only after exhausting all other
alternatives and then only decisively, to achieve clearly defined political
objectives. (To which I would add, with reasonably solid U.S. public support
if at all possible). Humanitarian interventions need realistic goals. Exit
strategies are desirable but are not always essential.
Id. They recited these "lessons for multilateral operations:"
Other countries need better, more deployable militaries. U.N. authorization
for intervention is highly desirable, even if it is not required. (I would add this
as a factor for unilateral intervention as well, and as discussed infra note 108
and accompanying text, mandatory for Security Council decisions pursuant to
U.N. CHARTER arts. 25, 48.) Russia's support is valuable in these types of
operation. (I would add that any interested state's support, particularly if it
has significant military power or other influence, e.g. economic strength,
ethnic kinship or religious commonality.) NATO works well in peace and in
war but only if the United States leads.
Id. at 216-23. They also state two "lessons for U.S. policy:"
An effective foreign policy requires that the President lead with confidence.
The United States is no hegemon or hyperpower; it is a superpower more
prone to underachievement than to imperial ambition.
Id. at 223-25. Henry Kissinger would require four conditions
to embed humanitarian intervention as a top priority into American foreign
policy ... : [1] the principle must be universally acceptable; [2] it must lead
to actions sustainable by American domestic opinion; [3] it must find
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been suggested for oceans environmental law issues in self-defense
and LOAC situations, and for other cases8 0 A similar analysis may
be useful to flesh out state of necessity analysis for humanitarian
intervention crises like Kosovo, taking into account the ILC
principles and others at work in collective intervention under claim
of state of necessity.
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States8 ("Restatement (Third)" factorial analysis for jurisdiction to
enforce, combined with features from the Restatement (Second),
Conflict of Laws ("Restatement (Second)"),82 offers one method for
considering legitimacy of states' collective humanitarian intervention
in public international law. The Restatement (Third) analysis was
developed for transnational legal problems in courts of the United
States; the earlier Restatement (Second) approach is used for private
international law, i.e., conflict of laws, issues in primarily civil
litigation under federal or state law of the fifty states of the United
States.83 The Restatement (Third)4 and the Restatement (Second)85
resonance in the international community; and [4] it must have some
relationship to the historical context. All these conditions are relevant to...
an "exit strategy," which determines whether one is fixing a temporary
problem or plunging into a permanent bog.
KISSINGER, supra note 44, at 257.
80. See THE TANKER WAR, supra note 9, ch. 6 (proposing specific categories
of principles that may affect the state of necessity in humanitarian intervention
actions); see also George K. Walker, The Interface of Criminal Jurisdiction and
Actions Under the United Nations Charter with Admiralty Law, 20 TULANE
MARIT. L.J. 217, 246 (1996); George K. Walker, Responses to Humanitarian Law
Violations in Non-International Armed Conflicts: Historical Perspectives and
Considerations on Conflicts of Jurisdiction, 30 ISRAEL Y.B. HUM. RTS. 79 , 95-
102 (2001), reprinted in International Institute of Humanitarian Law,
Humanitarian Protection in non-International Armed Conflicts: First Reports of a
Research Project 79, 95-102 (2001).
81. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9.
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971 & 1988 rev.)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)].
83. Id. § 2, cmt. c.
84. See, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airways, 731 F.2d
909, 948-53 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also Reinsurance Co. of America v. Aministrata
Asigurarilor de Stat, 902 F.2d 1275, 1283-84 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.,
concurring); Robert H. Bork, Introduction, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 241, 244 (1982);
Stephen B. Burbank, The World in Our Courts, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1456, 1463-64
(1991); Eleanor J. Fox, Extraterritoriality, Antitrust, and the New Restatement: Is
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have their detractors within the United States and elsewhere.
Nevertheless, most U.S. federal courts apply Restatement (Third),
Restatement (Second) or similar factorial analyses in cases involving
federal law,86 and most U.S. state courts apply variants of a factorial
Reasonableness the Answer?, 19 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 565, 592-93 (1987);
David J. Gerber, Beyond Balancing: International Law Restraints on the Reach of
National Laws, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 185, 208 (1984); James M. Grippando,
Declining to Exercise Extraterritorial Antitrust Jurisdiction on Grounds of
International Comity: An Illegitimate Extension of the Judicial Abstention
Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 395, 400 n.22 (1983); Steven A. Kadish, Comity and
the International Application of the Sherman Act: Encouraging Courts to Enter the
Political Arena, 4 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 130, 156-66 (1982); Larry Kramer,
Extraterritorial Application ofAmerican Law After the Insurance Antitrust Case: A
Reply to Professors Lowenfeld and Trimble, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 750, 755 (1995);
Harold G. Maier, Interest Balancing and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 31 AM. J.
COMP. L. 579 (1983); Karl M. Meesen, Conflicts of Jurisdiction Under the New
Restatement, 50 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 53-69 (No. 3, 1987); James A. Rahl,
International Application of American Antitrust Laws: Issues and Proposals, 2
Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 336, 362-64 (1980); Phillip R. Trimble, The Supreme
Court and International Law: The Demise of Restatement Section 403, 89 AM. J.
INT'L L. 53 (1995); Michael J. McKinnon, Comment, Federal Judicial and
Legislative Jurisdiction Over Entities Abroad: The Long-Arm of U.S. Antitrust Law
and Viable Solutions Beyond the Timberlane/Restatement Comity Approach, 21
PEPP. L. REV. 1219, 1300-11 (1994); Note, Beyond the Rhetoric of Comparative
Interest Balancing: An Alternative Approach to Extraterritorial Discovery
Conflicts, 50 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 95, 101 (No. 3, 1987).
85. See, e.g., Boudreau v. Baughman, 368 S.E.2d 849, 853-56 (N.C. 1988); see
also EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2.14 (3d ed. 2000).
86. See, e.g., Hellenic Lines v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306 (1970) (expanding on
Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953) factors); Neely v. Club Med Mgt. Serv.,
Inc., 63 F.3d 166, 186-98 (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc) (applying RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) and Lauritzen); Oil Shipping (Bunkering) B.V. v. Sonmez Denizclik VE
Ticaret A.S., 10 F.3d 1015, 1019-20 (3d Cir. 1993) (applying RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 614 (9th
Cir. 1976), opin. after remand, 747 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984) (cited with approval
by RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, § 403 r.n.6); Mannington Mills, Inc. v.
Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297-99 (3d Cir. 1979) (same). Federal
common law conflict of laws principles apply if federal substantive law governs,
unless a federal statute or a treaty to which the United States is a party supplies
conflicts rules. See infra notes 104-106 and accompanying text. The Supreme
Court of the United States has never passed on the RESTATEMENT (TIIRD) analysis.
In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d 919, 933-34 (9th Cir. 1991) applied
Timberlane factors, but the Court found no conflict between U.S. antitrust law and
U.K. law and therefore saw no need to decide if a factorial test was appropriate to
resolve a prescriptive jurisdiction conflict. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509
U.S. 764, 797-99 (1993); compare British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways, Ltd.,
1985 A.C. 58, 78-86, 95-96 (H.L.)'s similar analysis. See also Roger P. Alford,
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approach to conflicts issues.87 Despite early objections,88 an
increasing number of countries accept the factorial approach to
decision making through treaties, courts and parliaments outside the
United States at the supranational89 and national9" levels, particularly
in Europe, but also in the Americas and Asia. Outside the courts, the
U.S. government has applied similar methodologies in legislation9'
and administrative regulations.92 The United States, and undoubtedly
other countries, use a similar procedure in military planning
processes. 93
The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Law: A Postscript on Hartford Fire
Insurance Co. v. California, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 213 (1991); Case Two:
Extraterritorial Application of United States Law Against United States and Alien
Defendants, in Symposium, Conference on Jurisdiction, Justice, and Choice of
Law for the Twenty-First Century, 29 NEw ENG. L. REV. 517, 577 (1995); Kramer,
supra note 84; Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Conflicts, Balancing of Interests, and the
Exercise of Jurisdiction to Prescribe: Reflections on the Insurance Antitrust Case,
89 AM. J. INT'L L. 42 (1995); International Litigation and the Quest for
Reasonableness, 245 R.C.A.D.I. 9, 49-58 (1994); Trimble, supra note 84;
McKinnon, supra note 84.
87. See SCOLES ETAL., supra note 85, §§ 2.15-2.25.
88. See, e.g., British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chem. Indus., [1953] 1
Ch. 19,final judgment, [1955] 1 Ch. 37; Otto Kahn-Freund, English Contracts and
American Anti-Trust Law-- The Nylon Patent Case, 18 MOD. L. REV. 65 (1955);
see also supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., Wood Pulp, Case 89/85, [1988] E.C.R. 5193. Nevertheless, these
states' and others' blocking or clawback statutes represent contrary policy in
recognizing extraterritorial effect of U.S. multiple damages awards, particularly in
antitrust cases, and reach of U.S. discovery requests. See generally British Airways
Bd. v. Laker Airways, Ltd., 1985 A.C. 58 (Lord Diplock, J.); Rio Tinto Zinc Corp.
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978] A.C. 547; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note
9, § 442. r.n.4; A.V. Lowe, Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The British
Protection of Trading Interests Act, 75 Am. I. INT'L L. 257 (1981).
90. See, e.g., SCOLES ET AL., supra nofe 85, § 2.27.
91. See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2000).
92. U.S. Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust
Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations 10- 11, 20-22 (Apr. 1995),
reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 1080, '1092-94, 1102-04 (1995), inter alia citing North
American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 289, 605
(1993), and treaties with the European Union and other major U.S. trading
partners.
93. See, e.g., Frank M. Snyder, Introduction, in SOUND MILITARY DECISION
(1992); George K. Walker, Sea Power and the Law of the Sea: The Need for a
Contextual Approach, 7 OCEAN DEVEL. & INT'L L. 299 (1979), 30 NAY. WAR C.
REV. 88 (No. 4, 1978).
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Thus despite objections within the United States and abroad to the
factorial approach exemplified by the Restatements' analytical
methodology, prior employment of it and growing trends in its use in
a variety of contexts recommends the factorial approach as a useful
way to consider the intervention problem.
1. Restating the Restatements' Principles
Under the Restatement (Third), jurisdiction to enforce, or a state's
authority to use resources of government to induce or compel
compliance with its law,94 also known as enforcement jurisdiction or
executive jurisdiction, allows a state to, according to § 431,
(I) employ judicial or nonjudicial measures to induce or compel
compliance with its laws or regulations, provided it has jurisdiction to
prescribe in accordance with [Restatement (Third)] §§ 402 and 403.
(2) Enforcement measures must be reasonably related to the laws or
regulations to which they are directed; punishment for noncompliance
must be preceded by an appropriate determination of violation and must
be proportional to the gravity of the violation.
(3) A state may employ enforcement measures against a person located
outside its territory
(a) if the person is given notice of the claims or charges against him in the
circumstances;
(b) if the person is given an opportunity to be heard, ordinarily in advance
of enforcement, whether in person or by counsel or other representative;
and
(c) when enforcement is through the courts, if the state has jurisdiction to
adjudicate.
95
Reading the foregoing § 431 shows that the section was intended
for a relationship between a state and an individual or similar entity;
however, its references to jurisdiction to prescribe (§§ 402, 403) and
94. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, § 401(c); see also id., Introductory
Note, at 231.
95. Id. § 431.
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general concepts of reasonable relationship of enforcement to laws to
which enforcement is directed, prior determination of violation, and
proportionality of punishment bear on the state of necessity issue.
Similarly, concepts of adequate notice under the circumstances and a
chance to be heard, "ordinarily in advance of enforcement," are
relevant.96
Section 402 recites basic principles of jurisdiction to prescribe,
also known as legislative or prescriptive jurisdiction, a state's
authority to make its law applicable to persons or activities:97
Subject to § 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to
(1)(a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its
territory;
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its territory;
(c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial
effect within its territory; and
(d) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is
directed against the security of the state or against a limited class of other
state interests.
Section 402 thus recites traditional rules of territorial, nationality,
protective and passive personality principles, including the floating
territorial and the effects (objective territorial) jurisdiction
principles.9"
Section 403 is a lengthy recitation of factors for exercise of
jurisdiction:
(1) Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under § 402 [and through
incorporation by reference, § 43 1, for enforcement jurisdiction] is present,
96. Enforcement through the courts, id. § 431(3)(c), is not an issue for this
analysis. The only public international law case involving Allied Force that has
been decided were the SFRY ICJ suits. See infra notes 210-212 and accompanying
text.
97. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, § 401(a) (providing an understanding
of the different forms ofjurisdiction that exist).
98. Id. § 402, cmts. a-h & r.n. 1-4.
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a state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a
person or activity having connections with another state when the exercise
of such jurisdiction is unreasonable.
(2) Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is
unreasonable is determined by evaluating all relevant factors, including,
where appropriate:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the
extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has
substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity,
between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the
activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the
regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of
regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate
such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation
is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt
by the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or
economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of
the international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
(3) When it would not be unreasonable for each of two states to exercise
jurisdiction over a person or activity, but the prescriptions are in conflict,
each state has an obligation to evaluate its own as well as the other state's
interest in exercising jurisdiction, in light of all the relevant factors,
[18:35
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including those set out in Subsection (2); a state should defer to the other
state if that state's interest is clearly greater.
99
The § 403(2) considerations are not exhaustive.' 0  The
Restatement, § 404 also provides for universal jurisdiction, i.e.,
jurisdiction over certain activities that are condemned everywhere:
A state has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for certain
offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern,
such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide,
war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism, even where none of the
bases of jurisdiction in § 402 (and, through incorporation by reference, §
431 ) is present.'()'
The § 404 list is not exclusive, and certainly today would include
crimes against humanity.1
0 2
The Restatement (Second), Conflicts suggests a second, more
abbreviated reasonableness analysis, with an important conceptual
difference; it says that a state of the United States should first apply a
state statute addressing conflicts issues.'03 Both Restatements
acknowledge that if a U.S. Constitutional provision, federal statute or
treaty applies, it would trump any state law, 10 4 and the same is true
for a State constitutional provision when State conflicts principles
99. Id. § 403.
100. Id. § 403 cmt. b.
101. Id. § 404.
102. See id. § 404 cmt. a (listing the broad situations in which a state has
universal jurisdiction); see also KISSINGER, supra note 44, at 273-74 (stating that
Black's Law Dictionary does not have an entry for the term and would include
only piracy as a universal crime).
103. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, § 403 with RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), supra note 82, §§ 6, 9. The Second Hickenlooper Amendment, 22
U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (2000), governing some act of state issues and partly
superseding Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), might be
considered an example from federal law. See also W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v.
Environmental Tectonics Corp. Int'l, 493 U.S. 400 (1990).
104. U.S. Const. art. VI; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, § 115;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 82, §§ 2 cmt. b, 6(1). The 1910 Salvage
Convention is an example of treaty-mandated conflicts rules. See 1910 Salvage
Convention, supra note 33, art. 15, 37 Stat. at 1672.
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are involved, 05 in litigation in U.S. courts. A treaty, executive action
(e.g., an executive agreement), or federal statute trumps any federal
common law conflicts principles.0 6 The Restatement (Third) § 403's
reasonableness principles do not refer directly to supremacy of other
law, e.g., jus cogens " 7 or Security Council decisions'08 in public
international law issues, although elsewhere the Restatement
acknowledges their possible supremacy over other norms. 09
2. Refining the International Law Commission and the Restatements'
Analyses Jor Collective Humanitarian Intervention Under State of
Necessity
The ILC established basic principles for state of necessity that are
now customary law. The Restatements offer factorial approaches to
decision making. Principles from the Charter and the law of self-
defense that might apply in analysis of when state of necessity may
be validly invoked to justify collective humanitarian intervention.
What follows is a nonexclusive list'"' of principles and factors, some
105. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 82, § 6(l).
106. See generally The Pacquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (dictum)
(showing that a court must also apply precedent before referring to customary
norms). See also Free v. Bland, 368 U.S. 663 (1962) (holding that state courts
within the United States must also apply federal common law, whether in
substantive rules or conflict of laws principles).
107. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
108. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 25, 48, 103; GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 9, at
207-11, 334-37, 614-14; International Law Association Committee on Maritime
Neutrality, Final Report: Helsinki Principles on Maritime Neutrality, reprinted in
International Law Association, Report of the Sixty-Eighth Conference Held at
Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China 497, Principle 1.2 (1998) [hereinafter Helsinki
Principles]; MURPHY, supra note 5, at 79-80 (providing background on the
Security Council's view of what constitutes a "threat of peace"); Reisman, supra
note 9, at 87 (articulating the way in which the Security Council exerts its power
under the guise of the U.N. Charter); SIMMA, supra note 9, at 407-18, 651-55,
1117-25.
109. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, §§ 102, cmts. g, k,
r.n.3,6; 33 l(2)(b), cmt. e, r.n.4; 338, cmt. c; supra note 9 and accompanying text.
110. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, § 403(2), cmt. b (providing the
textual language of § 403 that lists the jurisdictional factors used to decide whether
a state may or may not exercise jurisdiction).
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seriatim and others considered collectively that might apply in these
operations."1
a. Reasonable Knowledge and Information About a Crisis at the
Time of Decision
As under the law of self-defense and the LOAC, collective
decision makers in a state of necessity situation should be bound by
what they know, or reasonably should know, at the time when a
decision to intervene is made. I2
The LOAC predicates liability for violating the rules of warfare on
what the decision maker knew, or reasonably should have known, at
the time when the decision to attack is made.' Nuremberg
convictions were based on what defendants knew or should have
known when the decision was taken to invade other states." 4 Since
11. See AREND & BECK supra note 19, at 128, 134 (listing four basic criteria
that a "humanitarian intervention" must satsify and discussing the legality of
"humanitarian intervention"); WHEELER, supra note 41, at 33-34; Behuniak, supra
note 19, 186-90 (focusing on the modem criteria used to assess the legality of
humanitarian intervention); Tom Farer, Humanitarian Intervention: The View from
Charlottesville, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 149,
151 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973); Fonteyne, supra note 39, at 258-68 (describing
the substantive, procedural, and preferential criteria for humanitarian intervention
appraisal); Lillich, supra note 19, at 347-51 (clarifying the criteria necessary to
assess whether a state has a legitimate purpose in using forcible self-help); JOHN
NORTON MOORE, Toward an Applied Theory for the Regulation of Intervention, in
LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 3 (1974); O'HANLON, supra note
41; at 17-46 (discussing the military criteria necessary for humanitarian
intervention). See generally MURPHY, supra note 5, at 321-34 (suggesting
improvement for future U.N.-led interventions, some of which are the same as
those recommended for other collective interventions); TEsON, supra note 39, ch. 6
(summarizing the moral framework for intervention); YAACOV .I.VERTZBERGER,
RISK TAKING AND DECISIONMAKING: FOREIGN MILITARY INTERVENTION
DECISIONS 17-41 (1998) (discussing the anatomy of risk taking and the
relationship that risk taking has to the decision-making process).
112. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (explaining why what NATO
knew, or reasonably should have know at the time of the decision to launch Allied
Force is important).
113. See infra notes 116-132 and accompanying text (explaining that to be
found liable for violating the rules of warfare, a decision-maker is judged on what
he or she knew or should have known at the time the decision to attack was made).
114. See Nuremberg Judgment, I Tr. Maj. War Crim. Before Int'l Mil. Trib.
208, 212-22 (1947); United States v. Araki, Judgment of Int'l Mil. Trib. for the Far
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that time, there has been no authoritative statement on whether
liability accrues based on what decision makers know or should
know if a self-defense response is contemplated." 5 Commentators
have been tempted to justify opinions, at least in part, on evidence
available after a decision, maybe years later." 6
Developing LOAC rules confirm that the proper time for
predicating liability is what decision makers knew or should have
known when an operation was authorized. Hindsight can be 20/20;
decisions at the time may be clouded with the fog of war."7
Declarations of understanding" 8 by countries party to Protocol F"19 to
East, reprinted in I The Tokyo Judgment: The International Miliary Tribunal for
the Far East (I.M.T.F.E.) 29 Apr. 1946 - 12 Nov. 1948, at 382 (B.V.A. Roling &
C.F. Ruter eds., 1977); see also MCCORMACK, supra note 10, at 253-56 (providing
an example of the International Military Tribunal's viewpoint of the right of self-
defense).
115. See KISSINGER, supra note 44, at 280, 296 n.46. (using the General
Belgrano matter, in which families of naval personnel lost in the Argentine cruiser
during the 1982 Falklands/ Malvinas War sued the United Kingdom in the
European Court of Human Rights, to show the pressure for universal jurisdiction).
116. See id. at 280; see also MCCORMACK, supra note 10, at 98-99 (explaining
that Israel had been given a necessary guarantee of security under the U.S. "Star
Wars" program, which was a reason why it may not have been necessary for Israel
to bomb the Iraqi nuclear reactor); see also ALEXANDROV, supra note 10, at 163
(asserting the view that the 1981 Israeli raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor could not
be supported by self-defense because of the 1994 debate on imposing sanctions on
North Korea, rather than using force, because of the danger of nuclear weapons).
117. See CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 117-21 (Michael Howard & Peter
Paret eds. & trans., 1976) (discussing the thought process that a commander must
undergo during combat missions).
118. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, § 313 cmt. b (analyzing
declarations and understandings with respect to international agreements). The
Restatement says:
When signing or adhering to an international agreement, a state may make a
unilateral declaration that does not purport to be a reservation. Whatever it is
called, it constitutes a reservation in fact if it purports to exclude, limit, or
modify the state's legal obligation. Sometimes, however, a declaration
purports to be an "understanding," an interpretation of the agreement in a
particular respect. Such an interpretive declaration is not a reservation if it
reflects the accepted view of the agreement. But another ... party may
challenge the expressed understanding, treating it as a reservation which it is
not prepared to accept.
... [For] a multilateral agreement, a declaration of understanding may have
complex consequences. If it is acceptable to all . . . ,they need only acquiesce.
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the 1949 Geneva Conventions 20 state that for civilians' protection in
Article 51,121 protection of civilian objects in Article 52,122 and
If, however, some.., share or accept the understanding but others do not,
there may be a dispute as to what the agreement means, and whether the
declaration is in effect a reservation. In the absence of an authoritative means
for resolving that dispute, the declaration, even if treated as a reservation,
might create an agreement at least between the declaring state and those who
agree with that understanding. See [RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra, §
313(2)(c), dealing with reservations] .... However, some ... parties may
treat it as a reservation and object to it as such, and there will remain a dispute
between the two groups as to what the agreement means.
Id. § 313(2)(c); see also ILC Rep supra note 15, at 189-90 (discussing the
membership, attendance, officers, meeting, agenda, and laws of treaties); D.W.
Bowett, Reserv ations to Non-Restricted Multilateral Treaties, 48 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 67, 69 (1977).
119. Protocol I, supra note 27.
120. See First Convention, supra note 50; Second Convention, supra note 33;
Third Convention, supra note 50; Fourth Convention, supra note 50.
121. See Protocol I, supra note 27, art. 51, at 26 (articulating the Article 51
prohibitions on attacks on civilians, absent other considerations such as those
civilians that take up arms); see also BOTHE ET AL., supra note 27, at 299 n.3
(listing the protections available to citizens within the context of military attacks);
SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 27, para. 39 (describing the principle of
distinguishing between civilians and combatants within the realm of naval
warfare); NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 10, paras. 6.2, 3.2, and 11.2
(noting Fourth Convention protections for noncombatants persons, prisoners of
war, wounded, sick, and shipwrecked persons, and civilians with the occupied
territory); PICTET, supra note 50, at 208-09, 224-29 (discussing the development of
the International Red Cross Commission and its relationship to providing
protection and relief to individuals in the armed forces); STONE, supra note 27, at
684-732 (articulating the goals of the Geneva Convention, the protections of
civilians in enemy territory, and the concept of a "legal paradise"); Matheson,
supra note 27, at 423, 426 (providing remarks about Protocols I and II); Solf,
supra note 27, at 130-31 (explaining that civilians may not be used as human
shields, nor may they be a subject of attacks intended to terrorize them, although
otherwise legitimate attacks that happen to terrorize them are permissible);
Commission of Jurists to Consider and Report Upon the Revision of the Rules of
Warfare, 1923 Hague Rules or Aerial Warfare, reprinted in RONZITTI, supra note
38, at 381, 385 (1987) (providing authentic language regarding the adoption of the
Hague warfare rules); Schmidt, supra note 27, at 225-32 (explaining that the rules
of distinction, necessity and proportionality, combined with the concomitant risk of
collateral damage inherent in any attack together restate custom). See generally
Hans-Peter Gasser, Prohibition of Terrorist Attacks in International Humanitarian
Law, 1985 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 200.
122. See Protocol I, supra note 27 (discussing the general customary norm
exception in article 52(1), which prohibits reprisals against civilians). See
generally BOTHE ET. AL., supra note 27, at 320-37 (discussing the drafting history
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precautions to be taken in attacks, stated in Article 57,123 a
commander should be held liable based on that commander's
assessment of information available at the relevant time, i.e., when a
decision is made.'24 Two 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention
12 5
protocols have similar terms, i.e., a commander is only bound by
information available when a decision to attack is made. 26 The
of articles 52 and 57); COLOMBOS, supra note 33, §§ 510-11, 524-25, 528-29;
NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 10, paras 6.2.3 & n.36, 6.2.3.2, 8.1.1 & n.9,
8.1.2 & n.12 (noting the Fourth Convention protections for some civilians from
reprisals and the U.S. position that Protocol I "creates new law"); O'CONNELL,
supra note 30, at 1105-06 (articulating the "doctrine of necessity" within the
context of the Geneva Red Cross Conventions); PICTET, supra note 50, at 13 1;
Matheson, supra note 27, at 426; Horace Robertson, The Principle of the Militaly
Objective in the Law of Armed Conflict, in THE LAW MILITARY OPERATIONS ch. l0
(Michael N. Schmitt ed., 1998) (discussing the principle of distinction within the
context of Protocol I); Solf, supra note 27, at 131 (discussing the prohibitions
against civilians reprisals in article 52); Frank Russo, Targeting Theory in the Law
of Naval Warfare , 40 NAV. L. REV. 1, 17 n.36 (1992) (arguing against the
application of Protocol I to naval warfare).
123. See Protocol 1, supra note 27, art. 57, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 29; see also BOTHE
ET AL., supra note 27, at 359-69 (explaining that the rules of distinction, necessity,
and proportionality, along with the concomitant risk of collateral damage inherent
in any attack in Article 57 generally restate customary norms); NWP 1-14M
ANNOTATED, supra note 10, paras 8.1-8.1.2.1.
124. See DIETRICH SCHINDLER & JIRI TOMAN, THE LAWS OF ARMED
CONFLICTS: A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER
DOCUMENTS 706-17 (3d. ed., 1988) (detailing the ratification processes of the
Declaration of Belgium held on May 20, 1986, the Declaration of the Netherlands
held on June 26, 1977, and the Declaration of the United Kingdom held on
December 12, 1977).
125. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons Which May Be Deemed Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate
Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Conventional Weapons
Convention].
126. See id; see also Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on Use of Mines,
Booby Traps & Other Devices (Protocol 11), Oct. 10, 1980, art. 2(4), 1342
U.N.T.S. 168, as amended, May 3, 1996, art. 2(6), 35 I.L.M. 1206, 1209 (1996)
(Amended Protocol ii); Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on Use of
Incendiary Weapons (Protocol 111), Oct. 10, 1980, art. 1(3), 1342 U.N.T.S. 171,
172. The United States has ratified the Convention and Protocols I and 11 supra;
Protocol III is not in force for the United States. See TIF, supra note 70, at 480.
Amended Protocol II, Protocol III and Protocol IV on Blinding Laser Weapons,
May 3, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 1218 (1996) are now before the U.S. Senate. See Marian
Nash (Leich), Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 325 (1997) (discussing the amended versions
of Protocols I, II, and I11). Protocol IV and Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments
[18:35
HUMANITARIAN INTER VENTION
Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention
also recites this principle. 27
Protocol I, with its understandings, and the Conventional Weapons
Convention protocols are on their way to acceptance among states.
1 28
These treaties' common statement, in text or declarations, that
commanders are held accountable based on information they have at
the time for determining whether attacks are necessary and
(Protocol I), Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 168, do not have these provisions.
Protocol II and III commentators say little about these provisions; they state the
obvious. See Burrus M. Carnahan, The Law of Land Warfare: Protocol H to the
United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 105 MIL. L. REV.
73 (1984) (discussing the recent attention given to the proper use of conventional
weapons); W.J. Fenrick, Comment, New Developments in the Law Concerning the
Use of Conventional Weapons in Armed Conflict, 19 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 229
(1981) (explaining that the annexing of Protocols 1, 11, and III during the Geneva
Convention was a major accomplishment because it fostered the peace settlement
process); Howard S. Levie, Prohibitions and Restrictions on the Use of
Conventional Weapons, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 643 (1994) (providing background
on Protocols I and II in the Conventional Weapons Convention and focusing on the
definitions of specific weapons); J. Ashley Roach, Certain Conventional Weapons
Convention: Arms Control or Humanitarian Law?, 105 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1984)
(analyzing Protocol I of the Conventional Weapons Convention); William G.
Schmidt, The Conventional Weapons Convention: Implications for the American
Soldier, 24 A.F.L. REV. 279 (1984) (discussing the implications and obligations
that the Conventional Weapons Convention had on the U.S. military). The United
States declared it would not sign Convention on Prohibition of Use, Stockpiling,
Production & Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines & on Their Destruction, Sept. 18,
1997, 36 I.L.M. 1507 (1997). See generally President William J. Clinton, Remarks
on Landmines and an Exchange with Reporters, in 33 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
Sept. 17, 1997, at 1356-59 (outlining the need for two new provisions within the
Conventional Weapons Agreement: (1) an extension of the transition period that
would be used to phase-out mine-usage and (2)allowing the preservation of
antibank mines).
127. See Second Protocol to Hague Convention of 1954 for Protection of
Cultural Property in Event of Armed Conflict, Mar. 26, 1999, art. l(f), 38 I.L.M.
769 (1999) [hereinafter Second Protocol], referring to Convention for Protection
of Cultural Property in Event of Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240
[hereinafter Hague Cultural Property Convention]. The Second Protocol, supra, is
not in force; 9 states are party, and 101 have ratified Hague Cultural Property
Convention, supra. See International Committee of the Red Cross, supra note 27.
128. Nearly all countries, but not the United States, are party to Protocol I. See
supra note 27 (explaining how many states are party to Protocol I); see also
International Committee of the Red Cross, supra note 27 (listing the 88 states that
are party to the Conventional Weapons Convention, the 79 states party to Protocol
II, the 63 states party to Amended Protocol II, and the 81 states party to Protocol
III).
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proportional has become a nearly universal norm. The San Remo
Manual recognizes it as the naval warfare standard. 29 It can be said
with fair confidence that this is the jus in bello customary standard. It
should be the standard for jus ad bello, and the same principle should
apply for action under state of necessity. A national leader or military
commander directing a self-defense response, whether reactive or
anticipatory, or acting pursuant to state of necessity, should be held
to the same standard as a commander in the field deciding on attacks,
i.e., being held accountable for what he or she, or those reporting to
the leader, knew or reasonably should have known, when a decision
is made to respond in self-defense or in state of necessity. 30 What is
sufficient knowledge depends on each situation. What might be
sufficient knowledge in an LOAC situation might not be sufficient
knowledge in a self-defense situation, and vice versa. What is
sufficient knowledge in either might or might not be sufficient
knowledge in a state of necessity situation.
Therefore, as in any decision procedure, including the military
planning process,' 3' before proceeding to further analysis:
Priniciple A. A first requirement is assembling sufficient data to inform
those who must decide on collective humanitarian intervention under state
of necessity of the seriousness of a situation at the time a decision to
intervene on this basis is made.
This data would include information on how widely accepted and
relatively uncontroversial are the human rights or humanitarian law
norms that the affected state is accused of violating; violations
should be widespread, clear and well documented. 32 Principle H,
discussed below, declares standards for durational time. 133
129. See SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 27, [ 46(b), Commentary 46.3; see
also CHENG, supra note 21, at 90 (1983) (analyzing the German invasion of the
Netherlands); MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 10, at 220 (describing the
factors required for self-defense to be legitimate).
130. See THE TANKER WAR, supra note 9, at 160-61; Walker, supra note 50, at
370-74 (discussing Protocol I of the Conventional Weapons Convention and
anticipatory collective self-defense).
13 I. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
132. See MURPHY, supra note 5, at 16-18, 322, 324-326 (acknowledging the
lack of clarity in determining when a human rights violation actually occurs); see
also Johansen, supra note 55, at 71-72 (indicating that the standard for triggering
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Did NATO have sufficient data to be informed of the seriousness
of the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo before it acted? There seems to
be little doubt that there was a humanitarian disaster in the making.1
3 4
b. Consensus Decision Making
NATO and many self-defense alliances operate by consultation
(i.e., consensus through the NATO Council) among NATO
members, 3 ' a feature common to many of these agreements,'36 that
may be a customary norm.'37 By contrast, the U.N. Security Council
humanitarian intervention requires that there be widespread human rights
violations).
133. See infra notes 277-280 and accompanying text.
134. See generally S.C. Res. 1160, 1199, 1203, supra note 59. See After-Action
Report, supra note 65, at 2-4,10,22, A-4, A-6, A-7 (arguing that NATO achieved
its goals during the Kosovo conflict); U.S. Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen
& U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Henry H. Shelton, Message /, in
After-Action Report, supra note 65 (reporting the United States and NATO
intervention in Kosovo and explaining how such an intervention stabilized Eastern
Europe, thwarted ethnic cleansing, and ensured NATO's credibility); Butler, supra
note 42, at 278-79 (describing NATO's objectives in the humanitarian catastrophe
in Kosovo); Calic, supra note 42, at 29 (setting forth the historical legacies with
respect to NATO's intervention in the Kosovo matter); Agon Demjaha, The
Kosovo Conflict: A Perspective from Inside, in Kosovo AND THE CHALLENGE,
supra note 42, at 32, 34-36 (providing a historical account of the events leading up
to NATO's intervention in the Kosovo ethnic conflict); Ray Funnell, Did Air
Power Win the War?, in KOSOvO AND THE CHALLENGE, supra note 42, at 437, 443
(discussing NATO's operating procedures, position of power, and casualty
avoidance during the Kosovo conflict); Groom & Taylor, supra note 57, at 294
(comparing the role that the United States and NATO played in the Gulf War to
the role they played in the Kosovo conflict); Kritsiotis, supra note 57, at 334-39;
45 Keesing, supra note 65, at 42845-42847.
135. See North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, arts. 4-5, 63 Stat. 2241, 2242,
2244, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, 246; Protocol, Accession of Greece & Turkey, Oct.17.
1951, 3 U.S.T. 43, 126 U.N.T.S. 350; Protocol, Accession of Federal Republic of
Germany, Oct. 23, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 5707, 243 U.N.T.S. 308; Protocol, Accession of
Spain, Dec. 10, 1981, 34 U.S.T. 3510; Protocol, Accession of Czech Republic,
Dec. 16, 1997, Protocol, Accession of Hungary, Dec. 16, 1997, and the Protocol,
Accession of Poland, Dec. 16, 1997, reprinted in S. Treaty Doe. No. 105-36
(1997).
136. See Walker, supra note 50, at 362-68.
137. See BROWNLIE, supra note 6, at 5; see OPPENHEIM, supra note 6, § 10
(discussing the practical aspects of international law); Walker, supra note 50, at
367-68 (describing the collective self-defense treaties during the Charter Era).
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operates under a supermajority, nine of fifteen, including votes of all
permanent members, for all but procedural issues; the General
Assembly votes by a two-thirds majority of states present and voting
on "important questions," which include recommendations on
maintenance of international peace and security, and a simple
majority of states present and voting on all other issues; the ICJ votes
by simple majority. 3 ' The Council and Assembly have developed a
practice of passing resolutions by consensus as well. 39 Consensus
decision making is also likely the case within other groups, e.g.,
Article 52 regional organizations and formal or ad hoc coalitions, 140
informal groups, alliances, or other multilateral organizations.
Besides probably being a customary rule, consensus decisions
have practical (or political) advantages: (1) organizational cohesion;
(2) the "fail-safe" of group thinking and less of the "appearance of
evil" that a unilateral decision may have; (3) the appearance to those
outside the organization (states, other international organizations,
people, the media, etc., and particularly the affected state) will be
stronger than a babble of differing voices. A well-conducted choir of
any size can sing more loudly than an unamplified solo performer.141
The second principle is:
138. U.N. CHARTER arts. 18, 27; I.C.J. Statute, art. 55 (explaining that the ICJ
uses a majority vote method); see also GOODRICH ET. AL., supra note 9, at 168-76,
215-31; SIMMA, supra note 9, at 318-27, 434-69.
139. See SIMMA, supra note 9, at 324-27, 462-63.
140. See Damrosch, supra note 55, at 221 (explaining that there is no difference
in legal status between regional interventions by ad hoc groups of states and
unilateral intervention); GLENNON, supra note 41, at 199 (preferring intervention
by preexisting coalitions, preferable composed of democracies that are close to an
affected state to further the likelihood); see Godwin, supra note 41, at 8-11, 93-95
(arguing that NATO should declare itself a U.N. Charter ch. VII1 organization, and
need not seek U.N. Security Council approval to do so, as it engages in
peacemaking operations like Kosovo).
141. See GLENNON, supra note 41, at 198-99; see also Behuniak, supra note 19,
at 189 (discussing collectivism within the context of humanitarian intervention);
Fonteyne, supra note 39, at 266 (mentioning that collective action is the
preferential criteria for humanitarian intervention appraisal); Godwin, supra note
41, at 82 (discussing the process of making agreements in order to uphold
democracies); Johansen, supra note 55, at 72-76 (placing emphasis on the U.N.
humanitarian intervention and the risk taking involved in such U.N. efforts);
Zacklin, supra note 5 1, at 939 (stating that states should cooperate collectively to
remedy serious international law breaches, especially jus cogens norms).
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Prinicple B. Any organization or group of states considering proposed
collective humanitarian intervention should operate by consensus in
deciding on intervention and throughout the ensuing operation.
Given the probable customary nature of consensus decision
making by Article 51 organizations, this requirement should be
mandatory for them, and probably so for other groups, e.g.,
coalitions or other organizations. An exception might be situations
where an organization or group has delegated decisions to one or
more states, or where group or organizational rules, e.g., are
different.
Although there were differences within the Alliance as Allied
Force proceeded, NATO operated by consensus within its treaty
mandate. 
42
c. Seriousness of the Situation
Commentators, including the ILC and the ICJ (which also
recognizes state of necessity), agree that state of necessity is an
extraordinary circumstance. 43 A state or states in effect must act in a
way that would otherwise be a breach of international law by using
force to relieve an immediate and egregious situation, be it high seas
pollution or, in the Kosovo context, actual or risk of serious,
widespread deprivations of protections under human rights and
humanitarian law, including loss of life, serious bodily injury,
142. See generally After-Action Report, supra note 65, at 9 (placing emphasis
on the unity that NATO maintained so that diplomacy could be achieved). See also
WESLEY K. CLARK, WAGING MODERN WAR; BOSNIA, KOSOVO, AND THE FUTURE
OF COMBAT 14, 446 (2001) (indicating that NATO incorporates convergence,
compromise, and harmonization to merge the differing viewpoints within its
organization while simultaneously sustaining its unity and ultimately its
diplomacy); BENJAMIN S. LAMBETH, NATO's AIR WAR FOR KOSOvO 185, 205-07
(2001) (discussing NATO's inefficiencies with respect to its leadership and
approach to decisionmaking); BUTLER, supra note 42, at 279-81 (articulating
NATO's air strike strategies in Kosovo); Duke et. al., supra note 67, at 135
(examining the role that Germany played during the Kosovo crisis); Continued Air
Strikes on Yugoslavia, in 45 Keesing, supra note 65, at 42899, 42900, 42956.
143. See supra notes 10-29 and accompanying text.
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outrages to men, women and children, and the like. 144 In this regard,
state of necessity is a more serious situation than peacetime reprisals,
which under the majority view cannot involve threat or use of force
to compel a lawbreaking country to play by the rules, or retorsions,
which are lawful but unfriendly acts.' 45 There must be no other
reasonable alternative to intervention, given the crisis' immediacy
and egregious nature. In this regard, state of necessity is similar to,
144. See Raby, supra note 3, at 262-64 (stressing that in order for a State to
"invok[e] necessity as an excuse for its violation," there must be no other available
means of action); see also supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
145. Reprisals must be proportionate; a state contemplating reprisal must first
call upon an offending state to mend its ways. Compare Friendly Relations
Declaration, paras. 1, 3, supra note 44, at 1294, 1297 (1970), and Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovakia), 1997 i.C.J. 7; 54, and Military &
Paramilitary Activities in & Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
127, and Air Service Agreement of 27 March 1946 (U.S. v. Fr.), 18 R.I.A.A. 417,
443, and 2001 ILC Report, supra note 3, arts. 49-54, at 324-55 (including the use
of "countermeasures" instead of reprisals), and State Responsibility, supra note 3,
art. 34, at 26, 52, 54, and BOWETT, supra note 10, at 13, and BRIERLY, supra note
44, at 401-02, and BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 281, and D'AMATO, supra note
10, at 41-43, and GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 9, at 340-47, and ROSALYN
HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL
ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 217 (1963), and MURPHY, supra note 5, at 13,
and NWP I- 14M ANNOTATED, supra note 10, para 6.2.3.1, and OPPENHEIM, supra
note 10, §§ 43, 52a, at 152-53, and PICTET, supra note 50, at 228-29, and SIMMA,
supra note 9, at 105, and STONE, supra note 27, at 286-87, and THE TANKER WAR,
supra note 9, at 158-60, and Ago, supra note 21, at 39, 42, and Anthony Clark
Arend, International Law and the Recourse to Force: A Shift in Paradigms, 27
STAN. L. REV. 1, 14 (1990), and Roberto Barsotti, Armed Reprisals, in ANTHONY
CASSESSE, THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 79 (1986),
and D.W. Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AM. J. INT'L
L. 20 (1972), and Day, supra note 19, at 50, and ROSALYN HIGGINS, The Attitude
of Western States Toward Legal Aspects of the Use of Force, in CASSESSE, supra,
57 at 435, 444, and McHugh, supra note 10, at 144-45, and Tucker, supra note 10,
at 586-87, with Res. 2131, supra note 44, at 28 (stating that economic reprisal is
forbidden), and DINSTEIN, supra note 10, at 193-204 (stating that "defensive armed
reprisals"are admissible in the Charter era), and LAWRENCE T. GREENBERG ET AL.,
INFORMATION WARFARE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 26-27 (1997) (stating that
reprisals using force are admissible). See also Lobel, supra note 10, at 540 (failing
to clearly distinguish between reprisals involving force and those that do not).
However, the context of his colloquy appears to make it reasonably clear that he
considers only the former. Id. at 542 (citing W. Michael Reisman, Defence or
Reprisals? The Raid on Baghdad: Some Reflections on Its Lawfulness and
Implications, 5 EUR. J. INT'L L. 120, 125 (1994) (standing for the proposition that
the 1993 U.S. attack on Baghdad, responding to threats against former President
George H.W. Bush, might be better characterized as a reprisal).
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but in a given situation not necessarily the same as, the anticipatory
self-defense principle of admitting of no other reasonable
alternative.'46 For example, immediate threat of deprivation of life in
clear violation of international law on a widespread basis could not
in most cases be cured by resort to adjudication because of its
relatively (and necessarily) deliberative process. 147
Similarly, if another organization, e.g., the Security Council with
its Article 25 and 48 authority to issue decisions binding in law,
cannot act because of reasonably perceived or actual threat of veto
when an intervention decision must be made, 48 state of necessity
might be validly invoked. In cases where the Council is not seized of
a matter, by analogy to Article 51's reporting rule for self-defense
situations, 49 states may act collectively under state of necessity
pursuant to these principles but should report their action to the
Council, again by analogy to Article 51's rule. There is also a
practical (or political) side to reporting; the affected state will
undoubtedly go to the Council, and the Council should hear both
sides before calling for, recommending or deciding on action under
the Charter. 511 The third principle is:
Principle C. The situation must be so serious and so immediate, and there
must be no other reasonable alternative to collective action under state of
necessity, before states may undertake collective humanitarian action
under state of necessity.
146. See Raby, supra note 3, at 262; see also supra notes 9-11 and
accompanying text (emphasizing the scope of availability for state of necessity).
147. Cf AREND & BECK, supra note 19, at 128; WHEELER, supra note 41, at 34
(explaining how intervention has occurred too late to protect citizens from harm);
Behuniak, supra note 19, at 186-88; Coll, supra note 55, at 140 (stating that all
realistic peaceful alternatives must be used before military action); Fonteyne,
supra note 39, at 258-60; Lillich, supra note 19, at 347-49; MOORE, supra note
111, at 25; Zacklin, supra note 51, at 939.
148. See supra notes 59, 108 and accompanying text (providing an example of
an organization's use of state of necessity).
149. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text (detailing the use of the
doctrine of self-defense).
150. See MURPHY, supra note 5, at 322; Behuniak, supra note 19, at 188;
Fonteyne, supra note 39, at 264-66; Godwin, supra note 41, at 81; MOORE, supra
note 11, at 25; Zacklin, supra note 51, at 939 (discussing the primacy of the
Council's role and responsibility).
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As noted above, practice in anticipatory self-defense situations can
be guides, but not governing rules, for standards in state of necessity
situations. 5 States adhering to the view that the law of self-defense
in the Charter era does not include anticipatory self-defense' 52 may
therefore agree to intervention as no other reasonable alternative
while retaining their position on the law of self-defense. This
difference in views on self-defense may enter the collective decision
calculus, Principle B; the group or organization deciding on
collective humanitarian intervention must be aware of this. There are
also risks that a situation that is really not serious or immediate, or is
not a circumstance of true deprivation of universally-held values,
may be an occasion for invoking collective humanitarian intervention
under state of necessity. 53
Although the Security Council, seized of the crisis, passed
resolutions that recognized the increasing gravity of the situation,
5 4
it could not have passed a resolution authorizing use of force. Two
permanent Council members, China and Russia,'55 had threatened to
veto any such resolution.'56 NATO's choice was to stand by and do
151. See supra notes 9-11, 26 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
153. Cf KISSINGER, supra note 44, at 264 ("[T]he doctrine of universal
interventionism may in time redound against the very concept of humanitarianism.
Once the doctrine of universal interventionism spreads and competing truths begin
to fight each other, we may be entering a world in which, to use G.K. Chesterton's
phrase, 'virtue runs amok."').
154. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
155. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 23(1), 27(3); see also GOODRICH ET AL., supra
note 9, at 192-94, 227-31; SIMMA, supra note 9, at 393-95, 434, 447-55 (latter
noting that the Republic of China permanent member seat is now occupied by the
People's Republic of China and that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
permanent member seat is now occupied by the Russian Federation, i.e., Russia).
156. See DAALDER & O'HANLON, supra note 65, at 44 (emphasizing how China
and Russia stated they would not vote in support of a resolution that dealt with
"purely the internal affairs of Yugoslavia"); WHEELER, supra note 41, at 263-67;
WHEELER, supra note 59, at 155-58. Russia has considered the Balkans "its natural
sphere of influence since at least the 1870s." KURTH, supra note 40, at 89, 92.
China viewed the campaign as a serious threat, given the Taiwan and Tibet




nothing, or to act to alleviate the situation, which was growing worse
by the day.157 NATO rightly chose to act.
d. Necessity and Proportionality
Action(s) chosen must be necessary and proportional under
circumstances of immediacy and admitting of no other alternative.'58
As in Principle C standards for immediacy and admitting of no other
alternative, standards for necessity and proportionality in state of
necessity situations may not be the same as those in self-defense or
LOAC situations, although they can be guides. For example, there
are objects under the LOAC or the law of self-defense that are
ordinarily immune from attack or self-defense response, unless they
are used to further an opponent's war effort during armed conflict or
military activity related to its initial attack or aggression for which a
self-defense response may be forthcoming. Methods of warfare, e.g.,
weapons per se indiscriminate or indiscriminate under the
circumstances, are forbidden under the LOAC and in self-defense
situations. These rules should guide state of necessity situations. One
problem, however, is Common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, which provides, e.g., in the Fourth Convention
applying to protection of civilians and civilian objects:
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peace time,
the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any
other conflict which may arise between two or more of the High
Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of
them.
[It] shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the
territory of a... Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed
resistance.
Although one. .. Power ... in the conflict may not be a Party to the...
Convention, the Powers that are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in
157. See supra notes 30-34, infra notes 247-273 and accompanying text.
158. Cf AREND & BECK, supra note 19, at 134; WHEELER, supra note 41, at 34;
MURPHY, supra note 5, at 323; TESON, supra note 39, at 122; Behuniak, supra note
19, at 187-88; Coll, supra note 55, at 141-47; Fonteyne, supra note 39, at 260, 262;
Johansen, supra note 55, at 76; Lillich, supra note 19, at 347-50; MOORE, supra
note 111, at 25; Zacklin, supra note 51, at 939.
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their mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the
Convention in relation to the said Power, if the latter accepts and applies
the provisions thereof. 59
The SFRY and all NATO countries had been party to the
Conventions before the SFRY's dissolution. 60 Although there was
no official record of the SFRY's having accepted and applied the
Conventions in accordance with Common Article 2 during Allied
Force, its treatment of NATO soldiers in its custody seems to
indicate acceptance. After Allied Force ended, the SFRY accepted
the Conventions retroactive to 1992 on October 16, 2001.161
Moreover, treaty succession principles, 62 even if the SFRY and other
states only had formal acceptance of the former country's treaties
159. Fourth Convention, supra note 50, art. 2 , id. at 3518, 75 U.N.T.S. at 288
(applying to protection of the civilians and civilian objects); see also First
Convention, supra note 50, art. 2, id. at 3116, 75 U.N.T.S. at 32; Second
Convention, supra note 33, art. 2, id. at 3220, 75 U.N.T.S. at 86; Third
Convention, supra note 50, art. 2, id. at 3319, 75 U.N.T.S. at 136; PICTET, supra
note 50, at 28-37.
160. See TIF, supra note 70, at 319, 452-53 (providing the list of agreements
prior to dissolution).
161. See International Committee of the Red Cross, supra note 27 (explaining
that "for States which have made a declaration of succession, entry into force takes
place retroactively, on the day of their accession to independence."); see also
Christopher Greenwood, The Applicability of International Law and the Law of
Neutrality to the Kosovo Campaign, in LEGAL AND ETHICAL LESSONS OF NATO'S
Kosovo CAMPAIGN (forthcoming). When this article was researched and delivered
in June 2001 as a paper, the SFRY acceptance had not been deposited. The ensuing
and sometimes convoluted discussion based on treaty succession principles and the
Conventions and Protocols as restating custom or general principles of law
demonstrates the importance of the Conventions and Protocols as treaty law. See
Thomas Bruha, The Kosovo War before the International Court of Justice-A
Preliminary Appraisal, in KOSOVO AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY: A
LEGAL ASSESSMENT 287, 298-300 (Christian Tomuschat ed., 2002) (perceiving
similar problems for the Genocide Convention, "in which an express reservation
was made to the effect that accession shall have no 'retroactive effect' as regards
Article IX of the Convention").
162. See generally Symposium, State Succession in the Former Soviet Union
and in Eastern Europe, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 253 (1993) [hereinafter Symposium,
State Succession] (defining state succession as "deal[ing] with the transmission or
extinction of rights and obligations of a state that no longer exists or has lost part
of its territory"); Walker, Integration, supra note 9.
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under review,'63 may have bound the SFRY during Allied Force. The
SFRY was also bound to the extent the Conventions restated custom
or general principles of law. 164 The general view is that much, but not
all, of the Third Convention restates customary rules. 165 If Allied
Force would be considered a "conflict," as it assuredly was, the
Third Convention, indeed all four of the 1949 Conventions, bound
the SFRY and NATO to that extent. If the operation should be
analogized to a self-defense response in terms of the Conventions'
applying, Convention standards should be also be applied.
Whether applicable as positive law or as principles by analogy in
collective humanitarian intervention under state of necessity, since
the 1977 Protocol I supplements the 1949 Conventions for
international armed conflicts, 166 its standards relating to necessity and
proportionality, including objects immune from attack unless losing
immunity by being employed as part of the war effort, 67 should be
consulted as well. Not all states party in the NATO campaign, e.g.,
the United States, were Protocol I parties, and not all states consider
all of its terms to be customary law.168 The former Yugoslavia was a
Protocol I party; 69 the SFRY accepted the Conventions retroactive to
1992 on October 16, 2001.170 The SFRY was also subject to treaty
163. See TIF, supra note 70, at 319, 452-53.
164. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (discussing how Common Article
3 governing noninternational armed conflicts reflects the general common law by
providing a common provision to Geneva Conventions I-IV).
165. See, e.g., NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 10, paras 8.5.1.1, 8.5.1.4-
8.5.1.5, 11.2-11.3.
166. Protocol 1, supra note 27, arts. 1(3), 96, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 7, 46; see also
BOTHE ET AL., supra note 27, at 44-45, 552-57; PILLOUD ET AL, supra note 33, at
39-40, 1084-92.
167. Protocol I, supra note 21, arts. 8-31, 35-42, 48-59, 61-62, 1125 U.N.T.S. at
10-19, 21-23, 25-32; see also BOTHE ET AL., supra note 27, at 92-167, 183-231,
274-385, 388-403; NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 10, ch. 8, paras 11.1-
11.7; PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 33, at 107-337, 381-502, 583-706, 717-44.
168. See, e.g., NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 10, ch. 8, paras 11.1-11.7;
supra notes 12-15, 27, 121-123, 128 and accompanying text.
169. Signatures, Ratifications and Accessions Concerning the Protocols I and I
Additional to the Geneva Conventions, 1977, in SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note
124, at 701, 703 (listing the former Yugoslavia's signature on December 12, 1977
and its ratification and accession on June 11, 1979).
170. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
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succession principles and other considerations as to whether it was
bound in 1999.'1' Moreover, to the extent the Protocol's terms
relating to necessity and proportionality and immunity during attacks
reflected custom,' their terms should have been even more closely
considered for application by states involved in Allied Force.
Following two 1907 Hague Conventions 73 and the 1949
Conventions, 74 Protocol I also has a Martens clause: "In cases not
covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements,
civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority
of the principles of international law derived from established
custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of
public conscience."'' 7 Principles implicit in this clause, considered
by commentators to be a general principle of law 176 and part of the
principles of humanity and chivalry applicable during warfare, 77
must also be considered. The fourth principle might be thus stated:
171. See Symposium, State Succession, supra note 162 (analyzing the "legal
category of 'succession"'); TIF, supra note 70, at 319; Walker, Integration, supra
note 9.
172. See MCCOUBREY, supra note 29, at 255 (asking whether the former
Yugoslavia takes on the international obligations of its predecessor that do not
relate to customary norms); see also supra notes 12-15, 27, 121-123, 128, 168 and
accompanying text (detailing how commentators and states disagree on which
Protocol I provisions reflect custom).
173. Hague Convention IV Respecting Laws & Customs of War on Land, Oct.
18, 1907, preamble, 36 Stat. 2227, 2277-80 [hereinafter Hague IV]; Hague
Convention 11 with Respect to Laws & Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899,
preamble, 32 Stat. 1803, 1803-05 [hereinafter 1899 Hague II].
174. First Convention, supra note 50, art. 63; Second Convention, supra note
33, art. 62; Third Convention, supra note 50, art. 142; Fourth Convention, supra
note 50, art. 158; see also PICTET, supra note 50, at 411-13.
175. Protocol I, supra note 27, art. 1(2), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 7; see also
Conventional Weapons Convention, supra note 125, pmbl, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 163,
164 (including a Martens clause similar to that included in Protocol 1); Protocol 1I,
supra note 27, preamble, 1125 id. at 611; BOTHE ET AL., supra note 27, at 44, 620;
PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 33, at 38, 1341.
176. See BOTHE ET AL., supra note 27, at 44; see also I.C.J. Statute, supra note 9
art. 38(1); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, §§ 102-03.
177. See generally AFP 110-31, supra note 13, paras 1-3a(2), 1-3a(3), l-4d, 1-
6c, 4-3c, 5-2(g), 6-3b(2), 11-1, 11-2, 11-5, 12-1, 13-8, 14-2, 15-2a, 15-3e; NWP 1-




Principle D. Collective action in state of necessity situations involving
humanitarian intervention should be necessary and proportional to
achieve the action's objective(s). Necessity and proportionality principles
under the law of self-defense or the law of armed conflict, including rules
immunizing certain objects from attack unless used by the affected state
for forbidden purposes, e.g., to contribute to its warfighting, war-
sustaining effort, and methods and means of warfare, e.g., weapons per se
indiscriminate or indiscriminate under the circumstances, must be
considered and followed in the usual situation.
As with any collective decision situation, states within the group
or organization may have different views on what is necessary or
proportional for a campaign, or what are forbidden objects;
consensus, as Principle B notes, on this issue is important.'78 What is
necessary or proportional for an overall (usually large) campaign
may not necessarily be necessary or proportional for individual
attacks within the campaign. For example, a hypothetical collective
consensus decision might approve interdiction of shipping destined
for the affected state as distinguished from an air campaign against
the territory of the affected state or ground forces entry into that
state's territory. Individual actions against ships so interdicted would
be governed by the LOAC.
Whether the Allied Force air campaign, taken as a whole, satisfied
Principle D criteria is difficult to assess. A combined air-ground
campaign undoubtedly would have been much more destructive in
terms of human lives lost on all sides as well as in terms of property
damage.' 79 From this macro perspective, Principle D was satisfied. In
178. See supra notes 135-142 and accompanying text.
179. See Lawrence Freedman, The Split-Screen War: Kosovo and Changing
Concepts of the Use of Force, in KOSOVO AND THE CHALLENGE, supra note 42, at
420, 422-23, 428-31 (discussing how NATO ruled out a ground campaign early in
the operation, but toward the end of Allied Force it was seriously considered); see
also STEPHEN T. HOSMER, WHY MILOSEVIC DECIDED TO SETTLE WHEN HE DID
109 (2001) (explaining how the threat of a ground invasion probably influenced
Milosevic's capitulation). See generally After-Action Report, supra note 65, at 8,
10-12, 37, 102; DAALDER & O'HANLON, supra note 65, at 98, 132, 137-40;
LAMBETH, supra note 142, at 11-12 (discussing how there were over 40 air attacks
planned, including those using shipborne Tomahawk missiles, in 1998-99); Coral
Bell, Force, Diplomacy, and Norms, in KOSOVO AND THE CHALLENGE, supra note
42, at 448, 449-52, 454; Butler, supra note 42, at 279-80; Continued NATO Air-
Strikes on Yugoslavia, supra note 142, at 42901; Duke et al., supra note 67, at 134
(stressing the German objection to the use of ground troops); Ray Funnell, Military
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terms of individual targets, political leaders tightly controlled their
selection. 8 ' NATO conducted legal reviews in the field and at higher
levels to evaluate projected targets as governed by the LOAC.' 8'
Official sources, media, and commentators reported complaints
about many incidents, some of which involved attacks on objects,
some of which were legitimate targets under the LOAC. 82 Of 23,000
bombs and missiles launched, twenty reportedly went astray,
according to NATO and the Pentagon.'83 "The most unfortunate of
these incidents were those involving Kosovo Albanians, for whose
well-being the campaign was being waged. The most damaging of
these in Kosovo -- at least as far as NATO's public image was
concerned -- was the one in which a convoy of Albanian refugees
History Overturned: Did Air Power Win the War?, in KOSOVO AND THE
CHALLENGE, supra note 42, at 433, 435-37, 440; Steven Livingston, Media
Coverage of the War: An Empirical Assessment, in KOSOVO AND THE CHALLENGE,
supra note 42, at 360, 376 (emphasizing the U.S. public's objection to sending
ground troops).
180. See After-Action Report, supra note 65, at xx; CLARK, supra note 142, at
175, 180, 201, 240; LAMBETH, supra note 142, at 22; Continued NATO Air-Strikes
on Yugoslavia, supra note 142, at 42899; Funnell, supra note 169, at 436.
181. See After-Action Report, supra note 65, at 24.
182. See International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, Final Report to the
Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing
Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, June 8, 2000, 39 I.L.M.
1257, 1259-60, 1273-82 (2000) [hereinafter Final Report] (detailing how some of
these complaints involved attacks on objects, some of which were legitimate
targets under the LOAC); DAALDER & O'HANLON, supra note 65, at 144-45, 233;
LAMBETH, supra note 142, at 136-43; Continued NATO Air-Strikes on Yugoslavia,
supra note 142, at 42899-43900, 42955-56; Kritsiotis, supra note 57, at 355-57
(relying on Irish, U.K., U.S. newspaper sources); Livingston, supra note 179, at
373-74 (relying on a computer search of CNN stories); Richard B. Miller,
Legitimation, Justification, and the Politics of Rescue, in Buckley, supra note 39,
at 384, 394-96 (relying on New York Times articles); Jasminka Udovicki, Kosovo,
in Udovicki & Ridgeway, supra note 42, at 314, 343-44 (relying on press reports).
Upon whom the media relied for reporting these incidents is not always clear. The
media was again a factor (the "CNN effect"), as it had been in the 1990-91 Gulf
War. See CLARK, supra note 142, at 8, 441; LAMBETH, supra note 142 at 139;
Godwin, supra note 41, at 81; see also MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, VIRTUAL WAR:
KOSOVO AND BEYOND 52, 192 (2000) (explaining how the BBC and CNN
continued to broadcast from inside Serbia, with Milosevic's approval; he hoped to
"destabilize and unsettle" Western opinion with stories of attacks).
183. See CLARK, supra note 142, at 297; Livingston, supra note 179, at 372
(citing John Simpson, Kosovo: After the War: How Tito's Training Destroyed
NATO Hopes of a Clean War, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, June 27, 1999, at 22).
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was attacked by NATO aircraft near the border with Albania on 14
April." 84 NATO admitted the error five days later.'85
The May 7-8, 1999 attack on China's Belgrade Embassy, intended
for the SFRY Federal Directorate of Supply and Procurement, caused
by faulty intelligence information due to faulty target identification
by U.S. intelligence, raised the greatest international furor. Russia
initially labeled the attack an act of aggression. U.S. President
Clinton apologized for the incident; the United States later paid ex
gratia compensation. Most commentators outside of China agree it
was a case of mistaken attack. 8 6 Daalder and O'Hanlon, who do not
184. Funnell, supra note 179, at 439-440.
185. See CLARK, supra note 142, at 254-55; IGNATIEFF, supra note 182, at 101
(describing how pilots attacked and what they saw); LAMBETH, supra note 142, at
136-47; WHEELER, supra note 41, at 271-72; Continued NATO Air-Strikes on
Yugoslavia, supra note 142, at 42899; see also supra notes 179-183 and
accompanying text.
186. See, e.g., After-Action Report, supra note 65, at xx (explaining how the
Directorate was "a legitimate military target"); CLARK, supra note 142, at 296-97,
444; DAALDER & O'HANLON, supra note 65, at 147; IGNATIEFF, supra note 182, at
103-04; LAMBETH, supra note 142, at 144-47 (noting claims that bombing was not
accidental; the three precision-guided bombs "all too conveniently, landed squarely
on that part of the embassy" housing the defense attache's office "and the
embassy's intelligence cell, . . . widely believed ... to be the single largest Chinese
collection center in ... Europe"); WHEELER, supra note 41, at 272; Bell, supra
note 179, at 458; Ted Galen Carpenter, Damage to Relations with Russia and
China, in CARPENTER, supra note 67, at 77, 82-86 (explaining that the incident
worsened already poor relations); Continued NATO Air-Strikes Against
Yugoslavia, supra note 142, at 42955-56; Duke et al., supra note 67, at 135 (stating
that the German Chancellor apologized, for the European Union, to China);
Funnell, supra note 179, at 440; Kurth, supra note 40, at 92 (asserting that the
bombing transformed the war from a minor irritant to major issue); Livingston,
supra note 179, at 372-73 (covering most thoroughly the bombing mistake); Nel,
supra note 67, at 246, 257-58 (stating that South Africa publicly condemned
attack); Yunling, supra note 67, at 118-19 (explaining that the Chinese did not
believe it was an accident, but rather a premeditated plan); Memorandum of
Understanding Concerning Settlement of Claims Relating to Deaths, Injuries or
Losses Suffered by Chinese Personnel As a Result of U.S. Bombing of Chinese
Embassy in Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, July 30, 1999, China-U.S., T.I.A.S.
No. -- . The United States negotiated a similar treaty after the mistaken 1988
Airbus shootdown over the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war. See Settlement
Agreement on Case Concerning Aerial Incident of July 3, 1988 Before
International Court of Justice (Iran-U.S.) (Feb. 9, 1996), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 572
(1996); see also THE TANKER WAR, supra note 9, at 71.
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seem to have considered the rules for sanctity of embassies,' 87 offer
this comment supporting the view that it was a mistake:
The best proof ... is that the attack's predictable damage - not only to
U.S.-PRC relations but even to NATO solidarity - was far too great to
justify the military benefit of silencing any Chinese military or
intelligence assistance to Serbia that could theoretically have been
provided from that building. Had [it] housed a Serb weapon of mass
destruction being prepared for use against NATO troops, [e.g.], it is
conceivable that the United States could have run the risk of hurting third-
party neutrals to destroy it.
188
Apart from responses to the air campaign and media claims of
errant or deliberate NATO bombing of civilians or civilian objects,'89
the SFRY filed proceedings in the ICJ in April 1999 against ten
NATO members, accusing them of violating the laws of jus ad
bellum and jus in bello.' 9 In June 1999 the ICJ held it lacked
jurisdiction over two states, Spain and the United States, and prima
facie lacked jurisdiction over the others, but that the case should
continue on its docket for proceedings involving them.' 9'
187. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 22, 23
U.S.T. 3227, 3237, 500 U.N.T.S. 95, 106; see also BROWNLIE, supra note 6, at
356-57; OPPENHEIM, supra note 6, § 494.
188. DAALDER & O'HANLON, supra note 65, at 147.
189. See supra notes 169-74 and accompanying text.
190. See Kritsiotis, supra note 57, at 330 (citing I.C.J. Press Communique
No.99/17 (Apr. 29, 1999)). The SFRY claimed jurisdiction over Belgium, Canada,
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom under Article 36(2) of the
I.C.J. Statute and Article IX of the Genocide Convention, and jurisdiction over
France, Germany, Italy and the United States under Article 38(5) of the I.C.J.
Statute and Article 9 of the Genocide Convention. Id. The SFRY requested interim
measures, e.g., the application for preliminary injunctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65
in U.S. practice, commanding defendants to cease immediately acts or use of force
and to refrain from any act or threat of use of force against the SFRY. Id.
191. See Kritsiotis, supra note 57, at 359 n.144 (describing the court's
jurisdiction holdings in the ten cases); see also Case Concerning Legality of Use of
Force (Yugo. v. Fr.), 1999 I.C.J. 363; Case Concerning Legality of Use of Force
(Yugo. v. Belg.), 1999 I.C.J. 124 (June 2); Case Concerning Legality of Use of
Force (Yugo. v. Can.), 1999 I.C.J. 259 (June 2); Case Concerning Legality of Use
of Force (Yugo. v. F.R.G.), 1999 I.C.J. 422 (June 2); Case Concerning Legality of
Use of Force (Yugo. v. Italy), 1999 I.C.J. 481 (June 2); Case Concerning Legality
of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Neth.), 1999 I.C.J. 542 (June 2); Case Concerning
Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Port.), 1999 I.C.J. 656 (June 2); Case
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A year after Operation Allied Force ended, a Committee,
established by the ICTY Special Prosecutor in response to a
complaint filed by Canadian and European law professors with
Amnesty International support alleging NATO had committed
LOAC violations during the campaign, reported. 92 It recommended
that no investigation begin in relation to the bombing campaign.'93 In
particular, based on documents and other evidence before it, the
Committee found there was no evidence of "the necessary crime base
for charges of genocide or crimes against humanity."' 94 The
Committee's opinion was that the Prosecutor should not begin
investigating collateral environmental damage the campaign
allegedly caused; use of depleted uranium projectiles during the
campaign, since there was no evidence of their use; or use of cluster
bombs as such.'95 The Committee found NATO tried to attack
objects it perceived to be legitimate military objectives and that
NATO's obligation to apply the principle of distinction was carried
out "in the vast majority of cases." '196 The Committee also
recommended that the Prosecutor should not begin investigating an
April 12, 1999 attack on a train; the April 14 attack on the convoy,
the facts for which were difficult to ascertain; a bombing of the
SFRY central television and radio station; a May 5 Korisa village
Concerning Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Spain), 1999 1.C.J. 761 (June 2);
Case Concerning Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. U.K.), 1999 I.C.J. 826 (June
2); Case Concerning Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. U.S.), 1999 !.C.J. 916
(June 2). Although the ICJ expressed "profound concern" over use of force, which
the Court said raised "very serious issues of international law," it determined not to
indicate provisional measures against the eight remaining states, citing the Security
Council's special responsibilities under U.N. Charter, ch. VII. See Case
Concerning Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Fr.), 1999 I.C.J. 363, 370; see also
45 Keesing, supra note 65, at 43018; Bruha supra note 161 (analyzing the cases
and carrying the analysis forward).
192. See generally Final Report, supra note 182 (analyzing such issues arising
from the NATO air campaign as damage to the environment, use of depleted
Uranium projectiles and cluster bombs, legal issues related to target selection,
casualty figures and specific incidents).
193. See id. at 1283 (assessing that there were not "any particular incidents as
justifying the commencement of an investigation").
194. Id.
195. See id. at 1261-65 (discussing the merits of each of these general issues).
196. Id. at 1273.
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attack; or the Chinese embassy attack.'97 "On the basis of
information available," in summary, the Committee recommended
"that no investigation be commenced.., in relation to the NATO
bombing campaign or incidents occurring during the campaign."' 191
Other commentators have assessed, or will assess, these issues in
greater detail. It is safe to say, however, that there was no deliberate
campaign by NATO to attack protected objects. 199 Based on
information available to NATO at the time, the Alliance did not
attack protected targets. 00 Overall, NATO appears to have observed
principles of necessity and proportionality throughout Allied Force
for individual targets.2 ' There is, of course, no obligation to use
precision guided munitions (PGM's, or "smart bombs") when
conventional munitions will satisfy LOAC necessity and
proportionality criteria." 2
e. Situations Where International Law Forbids State of Necessity
Intervention
The ILC has listed three exceptions where states cannot invoke
state of necessity: (1) where the international obligation with which
197. See Final Report, supra note 182, at 1273-82 (examining each of these
specific incidents in turn).
198. Id. at 1283. Furthermore, in Bankovic v. Belgium, the European Court of
Human Rights held it lacked jurisdiction over a human rights deprivation claim
against European NATO Members (Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom) by six SFRY citizens on
account of injuries and deaths incurred during a NATO attack on Radio Televizje
Srbije's Belgrade facilities April 23, 1999. 41 I.L.M. 517 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2001)
(ruling that it had no jurisdiction because the SFRY was not party to the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the
language of which did not allow extraterritorial application of its principles, there
being no jurisdictional link between claimants and the NATO States involved
which were also parties to the Convention).
199. See supra notes 171-187 and accompanying text.
200. But see Final Report, supra note 182, at 1283 (relating the fact that NATO
admitted making mistakes during the bombing campaign).
201. But see id. (concluding that the "[s]election of certain objectives for attack
may be subject to legal debate").
202. See supra notes 21-23, 32 and accompanying text (explaining the necessity
and proportionality principles within the context of the LOAC).
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the act of the affected state is not in conformity arises out of a
peremptory norm of general international law (i.e., jus cogens); (2) if
the international obligation with which the act of the affected state is
not in conformity is in an obligation which, explicitly or implicitly,
excludes the possibility of invoking state of necessity with respect
that obligation; (3) if the state(s) invoking state of necessity
contribute(s) to occurrence of the state of necessity. 203 As analyzed
earlier, these exceptions appear defective in some respects.0 4
Exception (1) does not take into account the possibility of conflicting
jus cogens norms, including those flowing from the U.N. Charter.
Exception (2) does not take into account the Charter override in
Article 103, nor does it account for conflicting customary, treaty or
general principles norms, or a possibility of supervening jus cogens
principles. 5
Intervention prohibitions, e.g., in 1977 Protocol II to the 1949
Geneva Conventions, carry strong weight. 6 Exception (3) appears to
apply one criterion negating invocation of impossibility of
performance or fundamental change of circumstances in the law of
treaties, but it does not account for a circumstance in collective
situations where one state in a group, perhaps inadvisably,
contributes to a situation which would otherwise merit action
pursuant to state of necessity.20 7  A fourth situation where
international law forbids intervention is where an intervention's
purpose is to impair the affected state's sovereignty, territorial
203. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text (comparing the language of
the I.L.C. Draft Articles concerning state responsibility found in its Report on the
Work of Its Fifty-Third Session and Report of the Commission on the Work of Its
Thirty-Second Session).
204. See id (analyzing the invocation of state of necessity).
205. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (contemplating the numerous
structures a hierarchy of international legal norms could form).
206. See Protocol I1, supra note 27, art. 3 ("Nothing in this Protocol shall be
invoked for the purpose of affecting the sovereignty of a State or the responsibility
of the government, by all legitimate means, to maintain or re-establish law and
order in the State or to defend the national unity and territorial integrity of the
State."); see also supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (noting that under the 2001
I.L.C. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, a nation breaching a treaty cannot
claim impossibility of performance or fundamental change of circumstances).
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integrity or political independence."" With these comments in
mind, °9 these principles might be recited:
Principle E. Situations where international law forbids collective
humanitarian intervention under state of necessity:
(I) States purporting to act collectively under state of necessity in
humanitarian intervention situations may not invoke state of necessity if
the affected state's international obligation to which it has not conformed
arises out of jus cogens, so long as no conflicting jus cogens norms
support the collective action against the affected state, or there is no other
superior rule, e.g., under the U.N. Charter, supporting the collective action
under state of necessity or contradictory to the jus cogens norm under
which the affected state claims.
(2) States purporting to act collectively under state of necessity in
humanitarian intervention situations may not invoke state of necessity if
the international obligation with which the affected state is charged is not
in conformity with a treaty, binding among the intervening states and the
affected state, which explicitly or implicitly excludes the possibility of
invoking state of necessity with respect to state of necessity, unless there
are countervailing and superior norms expressed in custom, general
principles of law, other treaties without such a clause, jus cogens, Article
103 of the U.N. Charter, binding U.N. resolutions, or similar binding rules
of other international organizations, e.g., regional organizations under
Articles 52-54 of the Charter.
(3) States purporting to act collectively under state of necessity in
humanitarian intervention situations may not invoke state of necessity if
they, collectively, have contributed to the occurrence of the state of
necessity.
(4) States acting collectively under state of necessity in humanitarian
intervention situations may not invoke state of necessity if they also
208. Cf Protocol ii, supra note 27, art. 3 (articulating the non-intervention scope
of the protocol); see also supra notes 39-45, 185 and accompanying text.
209. See generally AREND & BECK, supra note 19, at 134; Behuniak, supra note
19, at 189; Farer, supra note 11l, at 151; Fonteyne, supra note 39, at 261-63;
Johansen, supra note 55, at 77; Lillich, supra note 19, at 350; Moore, supra note
55, at 25; MURPHY, supra note 5, at 323; O'HANLON, supra note 41, at 13;
Zacklin, supra note 51, at 939.
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intend to impair the affected state's sovereignty in any way not reasonably
connected with the goal of intervening for humanitarian reasons, or if they
intend to impair the affected state's sovereignty, territorial integrity or
political independence in any way not reasonably connected with the goal
of intervening for humanitarian reasons.
Exception E(3)'s allowing state of necessity where, e.g., one state
within an organization or group, acts to contribute to an occurrence
that could otherwise be a predicate for state of necessity action but
denying it if the collective group or organization contributes to the
occurrence, might be subject to criticism. For example, at one end of
the spectrum, egregious action by a dominant member of a group,
e.g., a bilateral arrangement poised for intervention under otherwise
admissible state of necessity, might contribute to the occurrence. At
the other extreme, there might be less than egregious action by a less
than dominant member of a large organization. It would seem that in
the first case the other member of a bilateral arrangement could
refuse to participate under state of necessity exceptions in ILC
Article 33(2), and in the latter case consensus governance (Principle
B) would be available to consider the gravity of the member state's
individual action for appropriate action. For example, a member state
accused of the occurrence might be excluded from participation in
the intervention.
There remains a risk that a military alliance, whose members
concur in intervention, might act for other than generally recognized
humanitarian reasons.1 Under those circumstances we are back to
Square One, with the hope of Security Council or other U.N. action,
a possibility of veto, and, as the U.N. Secretary-General said after
Allied Force, a risk of international anarchy.21'
210. Cf Habermas, supra note 39, at 314 (commenting on how "the U.S.
pursues its interests first and foremost" and always has, even while being in such
alliances as formed during World War I and II).
211. The Secretary-General said:
My regret -- then and now -- is that the Council was unable to unify these
two equally compelling interests of the international community[, national
interests and the Council's primary role].... [U]nless the Security Council is
restored to its preeminent position as the sole source of legitimacy on the use
of force, we are on a dangerous path to anarchy. But equally important, unless
the Security Council can unite around ... confronting massive human rights
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By definition, even the least intrusive intervention, not unlike state
of necessity situations under the LOS, the LOAC or self-defense, is
necessarily a violation of an affected state's sovereignty, territorial
integrity and political independence. 2 Exception E(4) would allow
whatever are reasonable actions to effect the goal of humanitarian
intervention, but no more. In this regard it echoes the Restatement
(Third)'s reasonableness principle.23 Prudent collective intervenors
should notify (see Principle G) the affected state, other states and
international organizations that they do not intend to impair the
affected state's sovereignty, territorial integrity or political
independence in any way beyond what is strictly necessary and
reasonable to effect the goal of humanitarian intervention.2"4
Did NATO comply with Principle E? Even if the non-intervention
principle associated with the Charter's Article 2(4) prohibitions on
threats to, or use of force against, a state's territorial integrity or
political independence is a jus cogens norm, there may be
countervailing jus cogens norms associated with humanitarian and
human rights law.215 Even if this non-intervention principle is custom
under general international law, the same can be said for
humanitarian and human rights norms, some of them in treaties and
violations and crimes against humanity on the scale of Kosovo, then we will
betray the very ideals that inspired the founding of the United Nations.
Kofi Annan, The Effectiveness of the International Rule of Law in Maintaining
International Peace and Security, in Buckley, supra note 39, at 221, 222. Even
though Annan spoke of the Charter as representing the "old orthodoxy" in his June
26, 1998 Ditchley Lecture, he states that protecting rights of "peoples" and of
individual human beings are equally fundamental to the Charter's goals. David
Little, Force and Humanitarian Intervention: The Case of Kosovo, in Buckley,
supra note 39 at 356, 357.
212. See supra notes 7-23 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 73-95 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text (underlining the importance
of the notions of state sovereignty and territorial and political independence by
showing how they were first recognized in the Peace of Westphalia and continue to
be recognized today by their incorporation into the U.N. Charter).
215. See Reisman, supra note 57, at 861-62 (labeling "threats to and breaches of




others in custom that bound the SFRY.216 The choice, as Reisman
said, was (A) vindication of these norms under the unique
circumstances of the Kosovo campaign, or (B) awaiting near certain
disaster to befall thousands of human beings by observance of
nonintervention principles. 17 He correctly said the choice should be
(A). 21 8 Allied Force complied with Principle E(2); there were
conflicting norms, i.e., human rights and humanitarian law; Principle
E(l)'s major premise did not apply. There is no evidence that NATO
collectively contributed to the state of necessity situation, Principle
E(3); Milosevic's actions against the Kosovars had already begun. 9
There is no suggestion that individual NATO members contributed
to the situation (succor of the Kosovars) precipitating invocation of
the state of necessity principle.22) Nor is there any suggestion that
NATO intended to impair the SFRY's territorial integrity or political
independence in ways not reasonably connected with its goal of
intervening for humanitarian reasons. 22' After hostilities ended,
Kosovo came under U.N. governance for civil affairs with NATO
and other states, e.g., Russia, serving in peacemaking roles.222 Allied
Force suspended operations June 10, 1999, when NATO received
definite evidence that SFRY forces were withdrawing from northern
Kosovo. 223 After the G-8 drafted a Security Council resolution, with
216. See id. at 862 (asserting the recent installation of a code of human rights
into international law).
217. See id. at 860 (claiming these two as the only feasible options available to
world leaders at that time).
218. Cf id. (arguing that in such circumstances it should be the Security
Council's responsibility but the Council sometimes cannot or will not act). Other
commentators would disagree. See supra notes 15, 61 and accompanying text
(listing numerous authors arguing whether the state of necessity principle is
legitimate or even exists).
219. See infra notes 247-273 and accompanying text.
220. See id.
221. See After-Action Report, supra note 65, at 7 (articulating NATO's strategic
objectives during the air campaign, which were mostly humanitarian in nature).
222. See S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 59, at 1452 (requesting the appointment of a
Special Representative "to control the implementation of the international civil
presence" and "to coordinate closely with the international security presence to
ensure that both presences operate towards the same goals and in a mutually
supportive manner").
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mediation by Russia and Finland's president (the EU senior Kosovo
envoy) for SFRY acceptance, the Council adopted Resolution 1244
that day.224 On June 2, 1999, Finland's president, acting for the EU,
and the Russian envoy had successfully mediated an agreement,
whose terms mirrored G-8 and NATO demands, except limited
SFRY or Serbian security forces at designated sites with Milosevic,
later approved by the SFRY Parliament. 25 Then, on June 9, NATO
223. See 45 Kessing, supra note 65, at 43007, 43013 (noting that NATO
Secretary-General Javier Solana ordered the halting of air strikes the same day that
the foreign ministers of the G-8 nations convened in Cologne to discuss how to
achieve long term stability in the Balkans).
224. The vote was 14-0; China abstained. See S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 59; see
also After-Action Report, supra note 65, at A-10; Bell, supra note 179, at 460;
Calic, supra note 42, at 30; DAALDER & O'HANLON, supra note 65, at 274;
Demjaha, supra note 134, at 37; Funnell, supra note 169, at 441; Groom & Taylor,
supra note 57, at 303; Withdrawal of Yugoslav Forces from Kosovo -- End of
NATO Air Campaign, in 45 Keesing, supra note 65, at 43006-13; see generally
Statement by G8 Foreign Ministers, May 7, 1999, in 45 Keesing, supra note 65, at
42957. After-Action Report comments:
Russia worked with the [A]lliance and provided considerable diplomatic
assistance in bringing the conflict to an end. Russian leaders eventually
agreed with NATO that all the Serb forces should leave Kosovo, that the
refugees should return, and that some form of international peacekeeping
force should be deployed. Today [January 31, 2000], NATO-Russian
cooperation is contributing directly to the success of the peacekeeping
operation in Kosovo as well as that in Bosnia.
After-Action Report, supra 59 at xx; see also id at 4, 9, A-10 (noting efforts by
NATO to work diplomatically with Russia concerning the conflict in Kosovo).
Negotiations to end the conflict began in mid-April, when Russia's President Boris
Yeltsin, after a call to President Clinton, "appointed former Prime Minister
Chernomyrdin as a special envoy to bring peace;" U.S. Deputy Secretary of State
Strobe Talbott was involved in negotiations. Continued NATO Air-Strikes on
Yugoslavia, supra note142, at 42901. Chernomyrdin and U.N. Secretary-General
Annan discussed Germany's separate peace plan in Berlin in late April with
German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer. Id. In May the Secretary-General
announced, "he had appointed two special envoys to help find settlement." Id.; see
also DAALDER & O'HANLON, supra note 65 at 141-42, 167-75 (noting that even
after the appointment of Chernomyrdin it took an additional seven weeks of
negotiations to end the bombing campaign).
225. See Proposal Presented by Martti Ahtisaari and Victor Chernomyrdin to
President Slobodan Milosevic, 2 June 1999, as Approved by the Yugoslav
Parliament, reprinted in DAALDER & O'HANLON, supra note 65, at 265 (calling the
document the Ahtisaari-Chernomyrdin-Milosevic Agreement); see also id. at 173-
74 (recounting Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari's meeting with Milosevic when he
final decided to accept the agreement).
[18:35
HUMANITARIAN INTER VENTION
and the SFRY military concluded a Military Technical Agreement on
withdrawing SFRY troops from Kosovo to end the conflict.22 6 The
KLA agreed to disarm and transform itself into a "national guard,"
without giving up its independence aspirations.227
Given the first premise, that intervening to save lives in jeopardy
through risk of massive violations of humanitarian and human rights
law should outweigh territorial integrity principles, NATO complied
with Principle E.
f. Self-defense and Other Actions by States in Collective
Humanitarian Intervention Under State of Necessity
Article 51 of the Charter declares that states retain inherent rights
of individual and collective self-defense "until the Security Council
takes measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security." ' The ILC 2001 Report, Article 21, like its predecessor,
Article 34 in the 1980 State Responsibility report, says wrongfulness
of an act of an affected state not in conformity with an international
obligation of that state is precluded if the act is a lawful self-defense
measure. 29 Article 21 conforms to Article 103 of the Charter, which
says Charter-based norms (e.g., those in Article 51) are superior to
treaty rules and might be considered to argue for self-defense as a jus
cogens norm, superior not only to treaties but also custom and
general principles. 2 ° The ILC draft, however, does not account for
the affected state's right of self-defense, subject as always to
necessity and proportionality principles, or the rights of individual
226. See Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force
("KFOR ") and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the
Republic of Serbia, reprinted in 45 Keesing, supra note65, at 43008; DAALDER &
O'HANLON, supra note 65, at 268; see also Calic, supra note 42, at 30. Belgrade
reportedly hailed the accords "as a national triumph that finally secured the status
of Kosovo within Serbia." Demjaha, supra note 134, at 40.
227. See Undertaking of Demilitarisation & Transformation by UCK, June 20,
1999, reprinted in 45 Keesing, supra note 65, at 43015 (reporting that the KLA's
demilitarization had a 90-day timetable).
228. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
229. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
230. See 2001 ILC Report, supra note 3, art. 59, at 365 (discussing how the
State Responsibility provisions are without prejudice to the U.N. Charter); supra
notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
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and collective self-defense by the intervening state(s), perhaps at a
unit level but also at higher echelons of organization, in a collective
humanitarian intervention under state of necessity. The ILC draft
also does not contemplate other actions states might take,
individually or collectively, e.g., nonforce reprisals (under the
majority view) and retorsions 3 1 With these thoughts in mind, the
relationship of individual and collective self-defense and other
actions by states and state of necessity in collective humanitarian
intervention situations might be stated thus:
Principle F. Self-defense and other actions by states in collective
humanitarian intervention under state of necessity.
(1) Wrongfulness of an act of an affected state not in conformity with an
international obligation is precluded if the act is a lawful measure of
individual or collective self-defense taken in conformity with the Charter.
In collective humanitarian intervention under state of necessity, all states
involved in the intervention, the affected state and the collective
intervenors, retain their inherent rights of individual and collective self-
defense in conformity with the Charter and international law, e.g., the
principles of necessity and proportionality.
(2) Subject to other principles of international law, e.g., proportionality in
reprisals, states may act individually or collectively pursuant to
international law standards through reprisals, retorsions or other means to
compel compliance with international law during collective humanitarian
intervention under state of necessity.
Principle F(1) would preserve the inherent rights of individual or
collective self-defense for all countries involved in collective
humanitarian intervention under state of necessity, subject to Charter
limitations, e.g., action by the Council under Article 51 of the
Charter. With respect to the intervention, this would mean that
intervenors retain rights of individual and collective self-defense
from unit through national and collective levels, including rights of
anticipatory self-defense against the affected state and all other
comers, to the extent that states recognize anticipatory self-defense
231. See supra notes 112, 135 and accompanying text (discussing both non-
force reprisals and reprisals in general).
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as legitimate during the Charter era.232 It would mean the same for
the affected state. These principles necessarily follow from the
inherent right of individual and collective self-defense. However,
they also point out a risk of escalation if, e.g., an affected state is part
of an Article 51 collective self-defense organization, or if an affected
state forms one, perhaps incident to an ongoing collective
humanitarian intervention that the affected state and perhaps other
states perceive, rightly or wrongly, as unlawful aggression.233 Even if
the affected state does not respond in self-defense, other states might
claim a right to aid it under claims like non-belligerency.234 At the
least the intervention may raise tensions around the world for
intervenors, perhaps giving rise to third-state reprisals or
retorsions.235 The same kinds of risks are inherent in intervening
states' acting under otherwise legitimate principles of reprisal or
retorsion, which Principle F(2) would allow, subject to other
principles of international law, incident to humanitarian intervention
under state of necessity.236
There was no application of Principle F(1) during the Kosovo
campaign, although there were NATO self-defense claims before and
after the campaign.237 States, some of them NATO Members and
others not part of the Alliance, could have invoked nonforce
economic reprisals or retorsions against the SFRY.
232. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text (examining the legitimacy of
the anticipatory self-defense principle).
233. See THE TANKER WAR, supra note 9, at 186 (believing that another
problem with informal self defense is notice).
234. See id. at 181-82.
235. Cf id. at 185 (stating that "[r]esponses to aggressors can include
proportional reprisals not involving use of force and retorsions, and States that are
not belligerents whose interests have been damaged by belligerent action can
invoke these, along with state of necessity"); see also supra note 145 and
accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 112, 135 and accompanying text; see also Hoffmann,
supra note 41, at 26 (suggesting sanctions [maybe reprisals, maybe retorsions] as
another option in addition to U.N. action.
237. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (discussing collective self-
defense in the Charter era).
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g. Notice to the Affected State and Others
Although the ILC formula does not require it, a state against
whom collective humanitarian intervention is being considered
should have notice, reasonable and timely under the circumstances,
of proposed action in all but the most extraordinary circumstances
where state of necessity is otherwise lawful. Peacetime reprisal
principles require notice;238 the Restatement (Third) requires it, along
with opportunity to be heard, in most cases for proper enforcement
jurisdiction. 39 A similar standard should apply for state of necessity-
based collective humanitarian intervention. The notice might come
during negotiations, or it might be a separate communique to the
affected state. The notice need not "telegraph the punch," i.e., inform
the miscreant state of targets, invasion route, etc. Moreover,
particularly where the offending state might take advantage of time
between notice and collective action, the time might be relatively
short. In the worst cases, where, e.g., a state is reasonably believed,
under facts available to collective decision makers at the time, to be
capable and willing to destroy the very object of the proposed
intervention, notice simultaneous with action might be justified. A
homely example from municipal law practice is the circumstance of
a debtor, a judgment debtor or a person owing plaintiff, who would
destroy an object to be sought by judicial process or secrete it so that
there would be no reasonable chance of subjecting it to judicial
process.240 An analogous situation in the international law context
might be a state capable of and willing to commit mass executions of
a minority or ethnic group against whom that state has already
committed war crimes, crimes against humanity or human rights and
238. See supra note 145 and accompanying text (asserting that an offending
state must be given notice to change its behavior before another state can
intervene).
239. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 7, sec. 431 (requiring notice to a
person of the claims or charges against him for a state to employ enforcement
measures against that person outside of its territory); see also infra note 246 and
accompanying text (discussing the method of notice).
240. See Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1991) (asserting that
"[a]lthough attachments ordinarily did not require prior notice or a hearing [in
England and in the U.S.], they were usually authorized only where the defendant
had taken or threatened to take some action that would place the satisfaction of the
plaintiff s potential award in jeopardy").
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humanitarian law violations. Opportunity to be heard is the usual
rule, but, like exigent circumstances in civil litigation (e.g., a health
department's removing poisonous food from grocery shelves to
prevent customers' illness or death before response from a grocery
owner),24" ' there may be situations, e.g., immediate risk of loss of life,
that may preclude a chance for the affected state to respond before
action under state of necessity is taken.242
Besides notice to the affected state, treaties or custom may require
notice to other states, international organizations of which the
intervenors or the affected state are members, perhaps members of
the collective intervenor group, international organizations of which
no intervening state or an affected state are members, or other third-
party states. If informal collective self-defense 'counsels general
notice of collective action,2 43 the same principle should apply in
collective humanitarian interventions under state of necessity. Here
too there is no need to telegraph the punch so as to jeopardize a
proposed collective action; in some circumstances notice may not be
appropriate to some or all states or organizations, e.g., an
organization of which the affected state is a member, the result of
which might be that the affected state would initiate the kind of mass
killings referred to above.244 The result of appropriate notice under
the circumstances to the affected state or third states, organizations,
etc., might result in persuasion leading to compliance by the affected
241. Cf, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90-91 (1972) (stating that these
situations "must be truly unusual"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 82, sec.
25 (requiring notice and opportunity to be heard in order for a state to exercise
judicial jurisdiction over a person).
242. See supra notes 239-241 and accompanying text (detailing a situation in
which a state may be compelled to act this way). In this context I recall the story of
a fellow lawyer who told me of someone who possessed a Stradivarius his client
claimed. The holder threatened to destroy the priceless violin rather than give it up.
My friend succeeded in getting the Stradivarius for his client. States or their
leaders can be capable of this kind of behavior; Nazi Germany continued, and
sometimes accelerated, mass murders of Jews, even when German personnel
assigned to the task were needed at the crumbling fronts.
243. See generally THE TANKER WAR, supra note 9, at 133-37 (asserting that
both prior practice and Article 51 of the U.N. CHARTER uphold the right of
informal self-defense).
244. See supra notes 239-241 and accompanying text.
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state without resort to intervention.245 Therefore, another requirement
is:
Principle G. Notice.
(1) An organization or other group of states considering collective
humanitarian intervention pursuant to state of necessity should give a
state, against whom the humanitarian operation is contemplated, notice of
proposed action reasonable under the circumstances and an opportunity
for the affected state to be heard in all but the most egregious cases, e.g.,
where that state would destroy the object(s) of the intervention by, e.g.,
mass killing of persons whom the intervention is designed to succor, or
where, in the case of opportunity to be heard, e.g., the chance of loss of
life is great and immediate. Notice of proposed collective action may be
given during negotiations, by unilateral communique from the
organization, or by other means reasonable under the circumstances. The
affected state's response may be given by analogous means.
(2) An organization or other group of states considering collective
humanitarian intervention pursuant to state of necessity should give other
states and international organizations notice of proposed action and an
opportunity for the addressed state or organization to be heard in
accordance with applicable treaties or custom that is reasonable under the
circumstances in all but the most egregious cases, e.g., where that state
would destroy the object(s) of the intervention by, e.g., mass killing of
persons whom the intervention is designed to succor, or where, in the case
of opportunity to be heard, e.g., the chance of loss of life is great and
immediate. Notice of proposed collective action may be given during
negotiations, by unilateral communique from the organization, or by other
means reasonable under the circumstances. Responses of third states or
other international organizations may be given by analogous means.
The method of notice, e.g., verbal, radio or other
telecommunications, facsimile, E-mail, etc., should be that or those
method(s) reasonably calculated to reach the recipient(s) in a timely
manner.
2 46
245. See also Behuniak, supra note 19, at 188; Fonteyne, supra note 39, at 265;
Moore, supra note 55, at 25; cf Zacklin, supra note 51, at 938.
246. Cf Mullane v. Central HanoverBank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950) (expressing that this principle is an "elementary and fundamental
requirement" in order to afford interested parties "an opportunity to present their
objections").
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Review of events of the six months before Allied Force shows that
NATO gave adequate notice of its intentions under the circumstances
of a rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation.247 On October 10,
1998, the NATO Council, acting on Secretary-General Javier
Solana's report that "there was sufficient legal basis for moving
forward with issuing a specific threat of force and, if necessary,
proceeding with implementation," approved an activation order
(ACTORD), establishing a date for starting air strikes. 241 "As one
NATO diplomat put it, 'the safety... will be removed, the gun will
be pointed, and we hope this will trigger a switch in ... Milosevic's
mind.' 2 49 Although all the then-sixteen NATO members voted for
the ACTORD, as they must under NATO consensus governance,250
"a last-ditch diplomatic effort was made to persuade Milosevic to
accept the U.N. demands. 25'
On October 12, Milosevic and U.S. Special Envoy Richard
Holbrooke negotiated Serbian military forces' partial withdrawal and
deploying a 2000-member Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) unarmed verification mission. This
paved the way for October 15 and 16 SFRY-NATO and SFRY-
OSCE arrangements for verification missions to ensure U.N.
Security Council resolutions compliance 3.25  Holbrooke told
Milosevic that "NATO was about to approve the ACTORD for air
247. They also demonstrate that NATO and other states tried other peaceful
means of dispute resolution. See Behuniak, supra note 19, at 188; Fonteyne, supra
note 39, at 264; Moore, supra note 55, at 25.
248. DAALDER & O'HANLON, supra note 65, at 45 (describing the events
leading up to Allied Force).
249. Id. (quoting Roger Cohen, NA TO Nears Final Order to Approve Kosovo
Strike, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1998, at A8).
250. See supra notes125-132 and accompanying text.
251. DAALDER & O'HANLON, supra note 65, at 45.
252. See Calic, supra note 42, at 29 (reporting that even though an agreement
was reached, there were several "serious clashes between Yugoslav forces and
KLA fighters" before the ending of the informal cease-fire around Christmas).
253. See Agreement on the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission, 38 I.L.M. 24
(1999); see also After-Action Report, supra note 65, at 2; Report of the Secretary-
General Prepared Pursuant to Resolution 1160 (1998) of the Security Council,
U.N. Doc. S/1998/834 & Add.1 (Sept. 4, 1998); DAALDER & O'HANLON, supra
note 65, at 23; Demjaha, supra note 134, at 35; Calic, supra note 42, at 29;
Kritsiotis, supra note 57, at 334-36.
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strikes," but if he [Holbrooke] "could go back to NATO and tell the
allies that Serbia had accepted a 'durable and independent'
verification system . . . , air strikes could probably be delayed." '254
Journeying to NATO headquarters with Milosevic's agreement in
hand, Holbrooke told the NATO Council that an ACTORD "would
make the deal stick. 25 5 The Council voted October 13 for "limited
air strikes and a phased air campaign," to begin in about ninety-six
hours.256 The KLA had announced a ceasefire October 8 but broke it
October 17, when three Serbian policemen were killed.2 57 A few days
later,258  OSCE, NATO, and SFRY authorities finalized the
Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement, including a verification mission.259
On October 24, in Resolution 1203, the U.N. Security Council
endorsed the persistence and accomplishments of diplomatic efforts,
demanding that the SFRY "fully and promptly" implement the
October 15-16 agreements.260
Although the October Holbrooke-Milosevic agreements may have
bought time to get 50,000 people through the winter without
exposing them to freezing temperatures and risks of starvation, the
underlying conflict remained. 6  Winter's arrival calmed the
situation, but serious KLA-SFRY clashes broke down the informal
254. DAALDER & O'HANLON, supra note 65, at 47.
255. Id. at 47-48.
256. Id. at 48 (citing Javier Solana, Statement to the Press by the Secretary-
General (Oct. 13, 1998).
257. See Kritsiotis, supra note 57, at 336 n.25 (stating that the killings occurred
in Orlate).
258. NATO had extended its threat of air strikes for 10 more days to give SFRY
forces time to comply and to give OSCE monitors time to enter and gather data in
Kosovo. See DAALDER & O'HANLON, supra note 65, at 229; see also Record of
NATO-Serbia/Yugoslavia Meeting in Belgrade, Oct. 25, 1998, reprinted in
DAALDER & O'HANLON, supra 59. at 256, 258 (outlining security aspects of
defusing the crisis, but also committing SFRY "unconditional" compliance with
S.C. Res. 1199).
259. See DAALDER & O'HANLON, supra note 65, at 48-59 (criticizing the
agreements as "flawed").
260. S.C. Res. 1203, supra note 59 at 2; DAALDER & O'HANLON, supra note 65,
at 252.
261. DAALDER & O'HANLON, supra note 65, at 59-62 (discussing how the
Holbrook-Milosevic were only a temporary solution to the problem and that the
conflict still remain unsolved in the region).
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cease-fire by Christmas.26 2 The U.N. Secretary-General's report was
263ominous. On December 24, SFRY and Serbian forces led an
assault near Podujevo, Kosovo, effectively ending the ceasefire. 64
On January 15, 1999, forty-five Albanians were massacred at Racak,
and 5500 Racak citizens fled.265 An observer later saw Racak as a
defining moment, a major turning point because it focused world
attention on the nature, methods, and magnitude of the conflict and
its potential for further deterioration.266 The NATO Council gave full
support to the Contact Group Strategy for a final round of talks.267
The Group then pressured negotiations at Rambouillet, France
beginning February 6, 1999.268 The United States brought Russia on
board for these talks and the U.N. Secretary-General met with the
NATO Council to endorse the strategy.2 69 The Kosovo Albanians and
the KLA approved but the SFRY rejected a draft interim agreement,
citing foreign interference in its internal affairs; it would have given
Kosovo a large degree of self-government and an international
implementation force, while reducing SFRY army presence in
Kosovo and disarming paramilitary units. The agreement would have
262. See id. (noting how the cease fire contained the crisis, but did not solve it,
which lead to the breakdown).
263. See id. at 61-62 (noting the statement of the head of the Kosovo
Verification Mission that the two sides of this situation wanted to "go after one
another," regardless of what peace agreement was in place).
264. Id. at 61.
265. See Contact Group Statement Calling for Rambouillet Conference,
Conclusions of the Contact Group, Jan. 29, 1999, reprinted in DAALDER &
O'HANLON, supra 65, at 259 [hereinafter Contact Group Statement]; see also
After-Action Report, supra note 65 at 2; DAALDER & O'HANLON, supra 65 at 63.
266. See After-Action Report, supra note 65, at 2 (explaining how the massacre
at Racak renewed the international communities emphasis on the negotiating
process in the Kosovo situation).
267. See id. at 2, 22 (noting how NATO issued a statement on January 30, 1999,
giving full support to the Contact Group Strategy).
268. See Contact Group Statement, supra note 265 at 259 (explaining how
ministers wanted both sides to end the cycle of violence and to commit themselves
to negotiations leading to a peaceful settlement).
269. See DAALDER & O'HANLON, supra note 65 at 73-75 (discussing America's
desire to involve Russia along with the Secretary General's meeting with the North
Atlantic Council).
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provided for SFRY sovereignty and territorial integrity and
functioning of Kosovo's representative democratic government.270
Racak was also a turning point for NATO; the Alliance reaffirmed
plans to use air strikes if parties in Kosovo did not achieve a political
settlement. The threat was intended to back Contact Group efforts to
reach agreement in Rambouillet. Even as the Rambouillet
negotiations were ongoing, intelligence reports showed a significant
buildup of SFRY forces in Kosovo.27" '
Apparently the Serbian Rambouillet delegation was willing to
sign, but someone in Belgrade (Milosevic?) decided to change
course. The claims were that SFRY sovereignty would be
compromised and that the agreement was a violation of international
law and the U.N. Charter. It is possible that Belgrade thought the
threatened campaign would cause disunity within the Alliance.272
270. See Ramouillet Accords, Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-
Government in Kosovo, Feb. 23, 1999, U.N. Doc. S/1999/648 (June 7, 1999); see
also After-Action Report, supra note 65, at 2, 22, A-4, A-5; Duska Anstasijevic,
The Closing of the Kosovo Cycle: Victimization Versus Responsibility, in KOSOvO
AND THE CHALLENGE, supra note 42, at 44, 56-57; Calic, supra note 42, at 29; Ted
Galen Carpenter, Introduction: A Great Victory?, in Carpenter, supra note 67, at I-
2 (criticizing the actions at Rambouillet); DAALDER & O'HANLON, supra note 65,
at 63-64, 69-84, 229-30; Groom & Taylor, supra note 57, at 294; James George
Jatras, NATO's Myths and Bogus Justifications Jbr Intervention, in Carpenter,
supra note 67, at 21, 24; KISSINGER, supra note 44, at 262-63, 269-70 (criticizing
the actions of Rambouillet); Kurth, supra note 34, at 78-79 (stating that the
Agreement's use of the term "a direct threat to the sovereign independence of
Serbia" in Appendix B is reminiscent of the 1914 Austro-Hungarian ultimatum
that led to World War I); Godwin supra note 41, at 44, 56-57; Kritsiotis, supra
note 57, at 77.
271. After-Action Report, supra note 65, at 2, 22, A-6; Butler, supra note 42, at
278; DAALDER & O'HANLON, supra note 65, at 64, 75-77, 230; Godwin, supra
note 41, at 77.
272. See After-Action Report, supra note 65, at 3, A-7; Anastasijevic, supra
note 270, at 57; Kritsiotis, supra note 57, at 339; Kurth, supra note 34, at 78;
NATO Air-Strikes on Yugoslavia, 45 Keesing, supra note 65, at 42845, 42846;
Godwin, supra note 41, at 77. Another possibility was the December 1998 Desert
Fox operation in Iraq and its goals, which were much less than decisive victory.
See Freedman, supra note 179, at 424-25. Milosevic later characterized
Rambouillet as "not a negotiation. It was a Clinton Administration diktat. It wasn't
take it or leave it -- just take it or else." We Are Neither Angels Nor Devils: An
Interview with Slobodan Milosevic by United Press International CEO Arnaud de
Borchgrave, Apr. 30, 1999, in Buckley, supra note 39, at 273, 276.
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Nonetheless, last-ditch shuttle diplomacy had failed. NATO's
resolve had been made clear.
Two days after the Serbians refused to sign at Rambouillet, Serb
forces launched a major offensive dubbed Operation Horseshoe. The
Serb forces drove thousands of ethnic Albanians out of their homes
and villages, summarily executed some and setting fire to many
houses. Milosevic had comprehensively planned this ethnic-
cleansing campaign months in advance.
This lengthy recitation of nearly six months of attempts to resolve
the Kosovo crisis and NATO's recitations of intentions, including a
force buildup, gave Milosevic notice of NATO intentions. There was
also notice to all states and international organizations, including the
United Nations. 274 NATO complied with Principle G.
273. See After-Action Report, supra note 65, at 2-3 (stating that Allied Force
may have induced the SFRY to intensify the tempo of Horseshoe); see also
Lambeth, supra note 142, at 24, 226; Alex j. Bellamy, Human Wrongs in Kosovo:
1974-99, in THE Kosovo TRAGEDY: THE HUMAN RIGHTS DIMENSIONS, supra note
59, at 105, 121; Nigel Biggar, On Giving the Devil the Benefit of Law in Kosovo, in
Buckley, supra note 39, at 409, 414 n. 11; Chris Brown, A Qualified Defense of the
Use of Force for "Humanitarian" Reasons, in THE Kosovo TRAGEDY: THE
HUMAN RIGHTS DIMENSIONS, supra note 59 at 286; Mark Danner, Endgame in
Kosovo: Ethnic Cleansing and American Amnesia, in id. 56, 69; Godwin, supra
note 41, at 77; Eric Herring, From Rambouillet to the Kosovo Accords: NATO's
War against Serbia and the Aftermath, in THE KOSOVo TRAGEDY: THE HUMAN
RIGHTS DIMENSIONS, supra, at 59, 229-30. WHEELER, supra note 41, at 269-70.
The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had expected the SFRY would resume
a more intense campaign of violence in 1999, but it did not anticipate wholesale
expulsions and intensified violence against civilians. DAALDER & O'HANLON,
supra note 65, at 107. Nevertheless, the expected upsurge persuaded President
Clinton to convene the Rambouillet negotiations later in 1999 and to use force if
they did not produce favorable results. Id. Kosovar refugee accounts say SFRY
repression began before Allied Force and intensified after the Rambouillet talks
collapsed. See, e.g., Sevdije Ahmeti, ed., "My Father Was Burned Alive":
Testimonies from Kosovo Refugees, in Buckley, supra note 39 at 33; Flora
Kelmendi, A Tale from Prishtina, in Buckley, supra note 39, at 27. Reportedly
CIA members serving as Kosovo ceasefire monitors were in touch with and
assisted the KLA leadership, including cell phone access to NATO officers and
U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. Udovicki & Ridgeway, supra note 42,
at 337.
274. See, e.g., MURPHY, supra note 5, at 322-23 (stating that it also complied
with requirements of some commentators for negotiations).
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h. Time for Completing Humanitarian Intervention Under State of
Necessity
Principle A establishes the rule for collective humanitarian
intervention under state of necessity, like the self-defense and LOAC
rules, that those deciding to intervene are liable for what they know,
or reasonably should know, at the time when a decision to intervene
is taken. 75 The time, or duration, of an intervention, is also
important, given the historical background of intervention
generally.276 Before the Charter, a principal objection to intervention
generally was that what began as intervention eventually became
occupation, de facto control or conquest, and absorption of states.277
Although the amount of time collective intervenors should have to
effect humanitarian intervention under state of necessity might be
considered as a factor under necessity and proportionality, Principle
D, its cardinal importance in view of this history, rooted as it has
been in claims of derogations of the affected state's sovereignty,
territorial integrity, and political independence (see Principle E[4]),
elevates it to a separate principle: 78
Principle H. Duration of time to effect collective humanitarian
intervention under state of necessity. Collective humanitarian intervention
under state of necessity must be undertaken with a view to employing
methods and means, commensurate with the scope and gravity of the
situation and principles of necessity and proportionality (Principles A, C,
D), and principles protecting the affected state's sovereignty, territorial
integrity and political independence (Principle E[4]), to effect the
intervention in the minimum time reasonably necessary to accomplish this
goal.
275. See supra notes 104-124 and accompanying text.
276. Cf AREND & BECK, supra note 19, at 134; MURPHY, supra note 5, at 323;
O'HANLON, supra note 41, ch. 3 (discussing exit strategies); Behuniak, supra note
19, at 188; Farer, supra note 19, at 151; Fonteyne, supra note 39, at 263; Lillich,
supra note 19, at 349-50; Moore, supra note 55, at 25; cf Zacklin, supra note 51,
at 939 (noting that intervention must be discontinued once its limited goal has been
achieved).
277. See Lillich, supra note 19, at 50 (discussing the principle objection to
intervention in a country).
278. See supra notes 203-227 and accompanying text.
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Principle I advances reasonableness factors that may bear upon the
durational principle.279 States deciding on collective humanitarian
intervention under state of necessity should publish a durational time
limit, i.e., intervention will last only long enough to achieve its
humanitarian goals. Publication of a Principle H goal does not mean
that the goal be for a stated time, e.g., so many days, weeks, or
months, or that it give a firm termination date for ending
intervention. Those options are impractical and unwise; an affected
state has calendars and can take note of these kinds of
announcements and act accordingly, s° perhaps to the detriment of its
indigenous nationals or the intervenors.
i. Reasonableness Factors Counseling For or Against Collective
Intervention Under State of Necessity
Principles A-H occasionally refer to reasonableness. An adaptation
of Restatement (Third) factors, tailored to collective humanitarian
intervention under state of necessity, can serve as a decision matrix
for reasonableness in principles stated above.28 Like the principles,
these factors are a nonexclusive list. The Restatement (Third)
reasonableness analysis was developed for state-to-state situations
involving private parties on one or both sides.8 2 However,
considering collective groups, e.g., NATO, as a single entity for this
purpose, i.e., NATO vs. the SFRY, a Restatement-style factorial
analysis might be employed. The analysis may not apply in universal
jurisdiction cases, i.e., when, e.g., war crimes, genocide, terrorism, or
279. See infra notes 281-312 and accompanying text.
280. This has been a criticism of stated time limits in the U.S. War Powers
Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1554(b) (2000). See, e.g., ROBERT F. TURNER, REPEALING
THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION 134-46, 148-49 (1991).
281. In this regard the proposed analysis resembles the relationship between
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, sec. 431, referring to sec. 402, chapeau
paragraph, which in turn refers to sec. 403 that recites the reasonableness factors
upon which this analysis is primarily built. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note
82, sec. 7 requires characterizing the problem, e.g., as a tort issue, followed by
analysis for each type of case, e.g., general principles for choice of law in torts in
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 82-74, sec. 145, which in turn refers
principles and contacts in sec. 6, which are subject to reasonableness principles in
sec. 9. See also supra notes 72-102 and accompanying text.
282. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, sec. 403 (explaining when it
would be reasonable to exercise jurisdiction over another state).
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violations of human rights or humanitarian law over which all states
have potential jurisdiction.283 However, because perhaps some of
these international law violations -- some acts of terrorism,284 some
human rights violations, or some humanitarian law violations285 --
may not be subject to universal jurisdiction principles, the ensuing
analysis treats the factors as applying when there are some serious
universal jurisdiction issues and some that are not. It might be argued
that as to clearly universal jurisdiction issues, collective intervenors
may disregard reasonableness factors and act; any state can arrest, try
and punish those accused of universal crimes,286 or can arrest
accuseds and hand them over to a tribunal with jurisdiction, e.g., the
ICTY, for further proceedings. The issue for humanitarian
intervention is a step removed from any criminal process;
intervention issues revolve around acting to protect universal
principles of human rights and humanitarian law in the face of
principles of sovereignty and states' territorial integrity and political
independence.287
283. See id. sec. 404 (stating that "a state has jurisdiction to define and prescribe
punishment for certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of
universal concern").
284. Id.
285. E.g., rape. Only recently have there been clear statements; some states may
yet claim rape is not a crime against humanity or a humanitarian law violation. But
see Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9
(1998), July 17, 1998, arts. 7(1')(g), 8(2)(b)(xxii), 8(2)(e)(vi), 37 I.L.M. 999, 1004-
09 (1998); Annex, Statute of International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955
(1994), U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), art. 3(g); Statute of International Tribunal
for Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law in Territory of Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, art. 5(g),
established by S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993); Third Convention,
supra note 50, arts. 13-14, Fourth Convention, supra note 50, art. 27; NWP 1-14M
ANNOTATED, supra notelO, 6.2.5 n.55; PICTET, supra note 33, at 139-42; 4
PICTET., supra note 33, at 205-06; Theodor Meron, Rape as a Crime Under
International Humanitarian Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 424, 425 (1993).
286. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, § 404.
287. Reasonableness issues have a rough analogue in how rules of engagement
(ROE) are developed. Behind all ROE are factors of law, policy, diplomacy, etc.
ROE factors are like the ensuing reasonableness factors suggested for humanitarian
intervention; e.g., what is diplomatically proper for one situation may not be
appropriate in another situation, and the difference may influence ROE options.
Rules of engagement (ROE) state options for and perhaps limits on actions or
weapons commanders may take or use in armed conflict or peacetime situations.
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Based on Restatement (Third) sec. 403, the nonexclusive list of
reasonableness factors follows, with occasional commentary on some
of them. Reasonableness factors under this analysis, like those under
the Restatement formula and cases following it or which formed the
basis for it,288 should not be mechanically added, e.g., six for, two
against, three neutral or not applicable; a single strong
reasonableness factor can outweigh all opposing factors. First, as a
primary statement:
Even if there is an initial predicate for collective humanitarian
intervention under state of necessity, intervention may not be justifiable
when action to intervene is not reasonable. 289
Following from this,
Whether collective humanitarian intervention under state of necessity is
justifiable is determined by evaluating all relevant factors appropriate
under the circumstances at the time of decision. These factors include:
290
However, United States and undoubtedly other countries' ROE make clear a
commander's right and duty of individual or collective self-defense. Similarly, in a
particular situation the reasonableness factors advanced infra may not be
appropriate. States prepare individual and collective ROE for peacetime, wartime
and peacemaking operations, e.g., humanitarian intervention. NATO observed
"especially strict rules of engagement" during Allied Force. IGNATIEFF, supra note
182, at 161. See generally Bradd C. Hayes, NAVAL RULES OF ENGAGEMENT:
MANAGEMENT TOOLS FOR CRISIS (1989); NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note
10, at xxxvi-xxxvii, paras. 3.11.5.1, 4.3.2.2, 5.5; Day, supra note 19; Richard J.
Grunawalt, The JCS Standing Rules of Engagement: A Judge Advocate's Primer,
42 AIR FORCE L. REV. 245 (1997); J. Ashley Roach, Rules of Engagement, 36
NAy. WAR C. REV. 46 (No. 1, 1983), reprinted in 14 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. &
COM. 865 (1988); Brian T. O'Donnelll & James C. Kraska, International Law of
Armed Conflict and Computer Network Attack: Developing the Rules of
Engagement, in Schmitt & O'Donnell, supra note 10, at 399-401 (history of ROE);
Stephen A. Rose, Crafting the Rules of Engagement for Haiti, in GRUNAWALT,
supra note 50, ch. 11; Ivan A. Shearer, Rules of Engagement and the
Implementation of the Law of Naval Warfare, 14 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM.
767 (1988); James P. Terry, Responding to Attacks on Critical Computer
Infrastructure: What Targets? What Rules of Engagement?, in Schmitt &
O'Donnell, supra note 10, ch. 20.
288. See supra notes 80-110 and accompanying text.
289. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, § 403(1) (stating that in
Foreign Relations Law, the jurisdiction may not apply its own law unless it is
reasonable), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 82, sec. 9 (indicating that in
domestic law, the jurisdiction may not apply its own law unless it is reasonable).
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This chapeau paragraph declares the ensuing factors are not
exclusive; it also says that the factors must be "appropriate under the
circumstances." In some cases, factorial analysis might say that only
a few enumerated factors apply besides others not listed here. In
some cases, no factors might apply, or other factors not listed below
might apply. "[A]t the time of decision" repeats Principle A's
admonition that the proper time to assess whether a decision to
intervene was lawful is based on what the decision maker(s) knew, or
reasonably should have known, at the time the decision is made.29" '
i. Linkage
The first reasonableness factor might be:
(1) Linkage of action(s) of a collective intervenor under state of necessity
to its territories or jurisdiction, i.e., the extent to which the action takes
place within those territories or jurisdiction, or has substantial, direct and
foreseeable effect upon or within those territories or jurisdictions. 292
In collective humanitarian intervention to succor indigenous
peoples of the affected state, Factor (1) will often tip toward the
affected state. However, in situations where the affected state's
actions may result in threats to collective intervenors' territories or
jurisdiction, 293 as asserted before and after the NATO Kosovo
290. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, sec. 403(2), chapeau
paragraph (discussing the importance of relevant factors when choosing
jurisdiction), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 82, sec. 6(2), chapeau
paragraph. (noting the importance of relevant factors when choosing jurisdiction or
relevant law).
291. See supra notes 114-134 and accompanying text.
292. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, sec. 403(2)(a) (noting how
reasonableness factors must be determined by the link or effect the actors has with
the state or territory), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 82, sec. 37
(discussing how reasonableness factors must be determined by the link or effect
the actors has with the state or territory in the judicial jurisdiction context). See
THE TANKER WAR, supra note 9, at 544 (discussing the factors of reasonableness
or due regard can be found in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) sec. 403(2)).
293. "Territories" refers to areas of land, sea, and airspace over which the
state(s) exercise(s) sovereignty; "jurisdiction" refers to areas like the EEZ, which is
not subject to sovereignty but which may be subject to coastal state sovereign
rights for certain purposes, e.g., EEZ exploration and exploitation and jurisdiction
over establishing artificial islands, installations and structures, marine scientific
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campaign,294 Factor (1) may weigh in favor of intervention, be found
in equipoise, or be tipped toward the affected state with a notation of
some weight in the collective intervenors' favor. In the circumstance
of Kosovo, moreover, if the factor of the Kosovars' rights to their
homes, and not to be driven from them by ethnic cleansing, is
considered, this factor tips strongly in favor of NATO intervention.
(In intervention to protect diplomats in an embassy, the embassy
grounds, although subject to the underlying sovereignty of a state in
which they are situate, are inviolate and in that sense have a very
strong connection to the state whose representatives use these
facilities.295) Collective intervenors' action(s) on their territories to
prepare for and conduct an intervention are not part of this
territory/jurisdiction factor, except insofar as these actions relate to
individual or collective self-defense. Otherwise, collective
intervenors could easily claim that Factor (1) always weighs in their
favor.
ii. Connectivity
Connectivity might be a second factor:
(2) Connections, e.g., nationality, residence or economic activity, (a)
between a collective intervenor and the state principally responsible for
the activity to be regulated, curtailed, eliminated, or protected, i.e., the
affected state, or (b) between a collective intervenor and those whom
international law norms that collective humanitarian intervention under
state of necessity seeks to protect. 296
research and protecting and preserving the marine environment. See generally LOS
Convention, supra note 30, arts. 55-75, Delimitation of Maritime Boundary of
Gulf of Maine (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246, 294; NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED,
supra note 10, paras. 1.5.2, 2.4.2-2.4.2.2; O'CONNELL, supra note 30, ch. 15; 1
OPPENHEIM, supra note 6, sec. 329; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, § 514;
THE TANKER WAR, supra note 9, at 251-52.
294. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing how the documents
presented stress humanitarian intervention).
295. See supra notes 186-188 and accompanying text.
296. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, sec. 403(2)(b) (listing
factors to be considered for reasonableness); THE TANKER WAR, supra note 9, at
544 (using the Restatement (Third's) factors for reasonableness). RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), supra note 82, sec. 145(2)(c) (torts) applies similar principles in
sections for different kinds of claims.
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In Factor (2)(a) the balance would seem to usually tip in an
affected state's favor; collective intervenors may have few
nationality, residence, etc., connections between them and an
affected state. However, as in the case of the SFRY and Kosovo, this
might have been the situation if Slavic countries had intervened
collectively, at least insofar as Serbians were concerned. 297 If Muslim
states had intervened collectively to protect the Kosovars, 298 Factor
(2)(b) would have come into play. To do so in either case, however,
would almost assuredly have exacerbated ethnic or religious-based
animosities in Kosovo or elsewhere if a reason for collective
humanitarian intervention would have been based partly on claims to
alleviate deprivations grounded in religious or ethnic relationships.
On the other hand, collective intervenors under state of necessity
could rely on Factor (2)(b) if they rely on generally accepted and
297. There was at least the potential for this kind of relationship during Allied
Force. On April 12, 1999 the SFRY parliament voted overwhelmingly to join a
pan-Slav union with Belarus and Russia, seen as a largely symbolic step. See
Continued NA TO Air-Strikes on Yugoslavia, supra note 142, at 42903. In April a
Russia-Belarus 73-vehicle convoy carrying relief cargo but including five armored
vehicles and eight fuel tankers arrived at Hungary's border, bound for Yugoslavia.
See S.C. Res. 1160, supra note 59, that imposed an embargo, Hungary denied
entry. Later, in compromise after Russia recalled its ambassador, the tankers
stopped at the border and the armored vehicles did not enter; the rest of the convoy
reached Belgrade without further problems. See DAALDER & O'HANLON, supra
note 65, at 130; Talas & Valki, supra note 67, at 206. As Allied Force wound
down, Russian forces moved to occupy the Pristina airport; disputes over this
incursion were eventually resolved. See CLARK, supra note 142, ch. 15; DAALDER
& O'HANLON, supra note 65at 176; Baranovsky, supra note 67, at 112;
Withdrawal, supra note 224, at 43014. Although this appeared to be a dangerous
time for otherwise bad Russia-U.S. relations, this may not have been true. See Bell,
supra note 179, at 457-58.
298. Countries with large Muslim populations divided in views on Allied Force.
NATO Member Turkey supported the campaign and later accepted 20,000
Kosovar refugees for temporary resettlement. See Kostakos, supra note 10, at 168-
69. Other states, while approving succor of fellow Muslims, were concerned about
the sovereignty issue. Some Islamic countries, e.g., Saudi Arabia and the United
Arab Emirates, established refugee camps for fleeing Kosovars and encouraged
non-governmental organization fund-raising. See Karawan, supra note 67; see also
John Kelsay, Islamist Response to the War in Kosovo/a: Materials for an Ironic
Narrative, in Buckley, supra note 39, at 419. Only Iran outspokenly supported the
SFRY. See Kritsiotis, supra note 57, at 347. Muslim leaders never proclaimed a
jihad (holy war). See Stanley Samuel Harakas, Kosovo Crisis Contexts:
Nationalism, Milosevic, and the Serbian Orthodox Church, in Buckley, supra note
39 at 378, 383.
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universal rules prohibiting certain conduct of the affected state, e.g.,
those in human rights and humanitarian law, which was NATO's
rationale for the campaign.29 9 A collective intervenor acting to
protect these principles has a connection of humanity between it and
peoples suffering these deprivations. This was the case for the
Kosovo intervention.
iii. Character, Importance, and Acceptance
What is the character, importance and projected acceptance of the
activity to be curtailed, regulated, eliminated or protected might be a
third factor:
(3) The character of the activity to be curtailed, regulated, eliminated or
protected; the importance of curtailing, regulating, eliminating, or
protecting that activity to collective intervenors in collective humanitarian
intervention under state of necessity; the extent to which other states have
curtailed, regulated, eliminated or protected this activity in the past; and
the degree to which desirability of such curtailment, regulation,
elimination or protection is generally accepted by other states or the
international community, in situations of collective intervention under
state of necessity. 300
In Factor (3), emphasis shifts to the nature of the activity involved,
in positive and negative terms, and concern of collective intervenors
and other states and the international community. For example,
collective intervenors act to protect positive principles, e.g., those in
human rights and humanitarian law; at the same time they act to
curtail or eliminate violations of that law. Complete analysis of
Factor (3) would include determining which principles are universal,
i.e., those that states most widely accept and whether they are
restated in custom and general principles as well as multilateral
299. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons why
NATO intervened in Kosovo, particularly stressing the humanitarian aspect); see
also Bankovic, 41 I.L.M. 517 (noting how connectivity did not prevail as a factor
in this case). The European Court of Human Rights held there was no jurisdictional
connectivity between SFRY claimants and NATO Members also party to the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, refusing to apply extraterritorial jurisdiction principles because of the
Convention's language.
300. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, 403(2)(c) (explaining the
importance of the character of the activity which is regulated).
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treaties or have jus cogens status.30 How the collective intervenors,
other states and the general international community view these
principles is important. Besides human rights and humanitarian law
principles, relative strengths of principles like sovereignty, territorial
integrity of states and their political independence under the
particular circumstances must be considered. 302 Factor (3) would
demand a difficult, and perhaps the crucial, weighing process for
collective humanitarian intervention under state of necessity. Due
regard, analogous to due regard in the LOS, the LOAC, and
international environmental matters,3 °3 for others' interests, including
those of the affected state, must be given.
As NATO began and conducted Allied Force operations, it
qualified its aims to succor the Kosovar Albanians with explicit
declarations of respect for SFRY territorial integrity and political
independence and its people.3"4 These actions illustrate NATO's
recognition of the sensitivity of entering a sovereign state's territory
while acting to prevent further massive human rights and
humanitarian law violations and, therefore, the balancing of
considerations Factor (3) would require.
301. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 1(2), 1(3) (noting that two of the U.N. principles
are to develop friendly relations among nations based on equal rights and self-
determination and to achieve international cooperation in solving international
problems, including those with a humanitarian character); see also supra note 70
and accompanying text (discussing how humanitarian law may have jus cogens
status).
302. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 2(1), 2(4) (stating that the organization is based on
the sovereignty of the states and that members cannot use threat against another
member to gain territory); see also supra notes 9, 44 and accompanying text
(noting that nothing in international allows one state to take the territory of another
state).
303. See, e.g., THE TANKER WAR, supra note 9, at 246, 536-37, citing inter alia
LOS Convention, supra note 30, art. 87(2); High Seas Convention, supra note 30,
art. 2; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 27, paras. 12, 34, 36, 88, 106(c);
Robertson, supra note 35, at 302-03.
304. See North Atlantic Council, Statement, supra note 65, at 262; Solana,
Statement by NATO Secretary General, supra note 65, at 42847; DAALDER &
O'HANLON, supra note 65, at 101-02; Butler, supra note 42, at 279; Calic, supra




Justified expectations of all concerned, including third states and
international organizations, might be a fourth factor:
(4) The existence of justified expectations that might be protected or
hurt by collective humanitarian intervention under state of necessity. 305
A principal question is whether there was a justified expectation
that NATO could not act because the U.N. Security Council, seized
of the crisis, could not act because of a threatened veto.30 6 Although
the Charter, Chapter VII, says the Council "shall" determine what are
threats to the peace, etc., and "shall" recommend or decide on action,
there is nothing in the Charter governing a situation if the Council,
seized of a matter, does not act because of a threatened veto.3 °7 The
U.N. General Assembly is barred from acting when the Council is
seized of a matter, unless the Council requests such.30 8 The Council,
given "primary responsibility" to maintain international peace and
security,3 °19 is not the only agency for this. " " Article 51 declares that
305. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, sec. 403(2)(d);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 82, sec. 6(2)(d); THE TANKER WAR, supra
note 9, at 545 (discussing how in some cases a justified exception will affects
many factors including: the exercise of jurisdiction, the choice of laws, and
shipping interests).
306. China and Russia threatened a veto of a resolution to authorize action in
Kosovo. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 23(1), 27; supra notes 59, 155-156 and
accompanying text.
307. U.N. CHARTER, art. 39 (stating that the Security Council determines the
existence of a threat to peace, beach of peace, or act of aggression and makes
recommendation and determines what the course of action will be); see also
GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 9, at 290-309 (discussing the history of the U.N.
CHARTER and why the Security Council has so much power); SIMMA, supra note 9,
at 606-16 (explaining the historical origins of the United Nations).
308. See U.N. CHARTER art. 12 (explaining how the General Assembly cannot
act or recommend a course of action on any dispute unless the Security Council so
requests); see also supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing how the
Security Council is in charge of matters that threaten peace and security).
309. U.N. CHARTER art. 24; see also GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 9, at 202-07
(giving commentary on the functions and powers of the Security Council); SIMMA,
supra note 9, at 398-407 (noting the importance and origins of the Security
Council and why they are in charge of maintaining peace and security).
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states subject to attack, assuredly a threat to international peace and
security, may respond individually or collectively in self-defense
until the Council acts.3"' However, Article 51 says nothing about
other lawful actions states may take, individually or collectively, e.g.,
retorsions or reprisals, 312 in these situations. Moreover, if a state
encounters a situation that a Council decision does not cover, that
state may act in individual or collective self-defense to respond to
that situation. If this is true, although there might be a belief among
some that if the Council is seized of a matter, no other action may be
taken when the Council has not decided on or recommended 313 a
course of action and would be paralyzed by a veto if it did,
international law does not condemn states to individual or collective
inaction, particularly in the face of widespread human rights and
humanitarian law violations. 314 No one would have argued that states
had no right to respond individually or collectively through
retorsion(s) or reprisal(s) in the Kosovo crisis. NATO chose another
path, however, and decided instead to pursue collective humanitarian
intervention under state of necessity, which is another option under
international law and fully supported in custom. 3 5 The sovereignty
principle 31 6  underscored NATO's freedom of action to act
collectively under state of necessity principles.
310. Cf supra note 59 and accompanying text (explaining other ways in which
the United Nations can use other bodies to make recommendations on peace and
security).
311. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing when it is appropriate
for a state to use self defense).
312. See supra note 145 and accompanying text (noting how reprisals must
always be in a proportionate and before using a reprisal, a state must give the law
breaking state a chance to mend its ways).
313. U.N. CHARTER arts. 25, 48, 103 (outlining the vital and binding nature of
Security Council decisions to all members of the United Nations) ; see also supra
notes 9, 108 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text (describing the state of
necessity doctrine generally).
315. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2(l) (establishing the principle of sovereignty in the
U.N. Charter); see also supra note 44 and accompanying text.
316. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(l); see also supra note 44 and accompanying text
(discussing the sovereignty principle).
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To a certain extent, insofar as states, particularly the affected state,
and a collective intervenor are concerned, Factor (4) may overlap
Factor (3) analysis. However, there may be other participants at
different levels that may have advisory, persuasive, recommendatory,
or other functions that may be brought to bear on a situation, e.g.,
individual human beings, governmental organizations within states
(e.g., the U.S. Congress within the United States), opposition parties
within parliamentary democracies, third states, intergovernmental
organizations like the United Nations or the European Union,
nongovernmental organizations like the ICRC, 3 7 business interests
(insurance, etc.), religious organizations, the media (the "CNN
effect"), 3 8 and Internet communications, whose voices may be raised
in concerns, if not always in concert, over resolving a crisis through
collective humanitarian intervention under state of necessity.
Although decision makers under principles and factorial analysis
make law-oriented choices, these choices are never made in a
vacuum. As someone in a previous generation said, judges read the
newspapers. 3 9 Due regard, analogous to due regard in the LOS, the
LOAC, and international environmental matters, 20 for others'
interests must be given.
NATO was undoubtedly aware of these factors and planned and
executed Allied Force accordingly. It is very clear that NATO had
authority to act under state of necessity when the Security Council
was seized of the crisis but would have been impotent to act because
317. See generally David Weissbrodt, The Role of International Organizations
in the Implementation of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in Situations of
Armed Conflict, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 313, 345-55 (1988) (detailing the role
and purpose of the ICRC in humanitarian law); Rynker, supra note 4, at 529
(noting the objections of the ICRC to the use of the term "humanitarian
intervention" when the means used to intercede include military action).
318. See CLARK, supra note 142, at 14-15, 441-42 (detailing the ways
instantaneous cable news changed war strategy during the 1980's and 90's).
319. See, e.g., James G. Wilson, The Role of Public Opinion in Constitutional
Interpretation, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1037, 1039-1143 (1993) (offering a
discussion of the ways in which public opinion has affected judicial opinions by
focusing on the U.S. Supreme Court).
320. See supra note 303 and accompanying text (discussing due regard in the
context of character, importance and acceptance).
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of a threatened veto.32" ' How other expectations coming from other
sources should be assessed in the Kosovo context is difficult, given
the multiplicity of these sources. A book, rather than an article,
would be necessary to assess them. It is relatively safe to say,
however, that NATO took these into consideration.
v. Importance to the International Community
The importance of the intervention to the international community
might be a fifth factor:
(5) The importance of the collective humanitarian intervention under state
of necessit to the international political, legal, economic or other
systems.
3 2 2
Factor (5)'s legal aspects overlap, to a certain extent, those of
Factors (3) and (4). The question here, however, is not the conflict or
concurrence of principles but their relative importance, e.g., human
rights or humanitarian law versus sovereignty and a state's territorial
integrity and political independence. Put more succinctly, in a given
situation where collective humanitarian intervention under state of
necessity is considered: What is more important, protection of human
life and the like from the almost certain loss of it through human
rights or humanitarian law deprivations, or temporary, partial
deprivations of sovereignty, territorial integrity or political
independence, coupled with the damage accruing in a military
intervention like Allied Force? 32 3 Factor (5) also requires considering
the political and economic importance of a collective intervention
like Allied Force. What is the likely political "fallout"? What is the
321. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text (noting the conditions under
which intervention based on necessity is acceptable).
322. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, sec. 403(2)(e) (noting that
the economic, political, and legal aspects of a conflict are factors in determining
the reasonability of the exercise of jurisdiction), and THE TANKER WAR, supra
note 9, at 545 (incorporating the analysis of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) with regard
to political, legal, and economic factors to assessing whether humanitarian
intervention by a third party is reasonable). Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra
note 82, sec. 6(2)(a) (noting that interstate and international needs are also relevant
to deciding which law to follow when an express directive is lacking).
323. Cf U.N. CHARTER arts. 1(2), 1(3), 2(1), 2(4); see also supra notes 11,44,
55, 70 and accompanying text.
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economic cost of rebuilding from projected military (and perhaps
other) initiatives? Are there other "costs," e.g., to other facets of the
global system, e.g., religion, ethics, morality? How important are
each of these?324 Due regard, analogous to due regard in the LOS, the
LOAC, and international environmental matters, for others' interests,
must be given. 325
Again, as in assessing Factors (3) and (4), a concrete answer is
difficult to give. However, the record seems clear that NATO
carefully weighed the important policy of protecting the Kosovars'
rights under humanitarian and human rights law against policies
against interfering in a state's sovereignty, political independence
and territorial integrity.326
vi. Consistency With Traditions of the International System
How collective humanitarian intervention under state of necessity
is consistent with traditions of the international system might be a
sixth factor:
(6) The extent to which action through collective humanitarian
intervention under state of necessity is consistent with the traditions of the
international system. 327
324. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, § 403(2)(e) (listing only the
political, legal or economic system) There are many others, hence addition of
"other" in Factor (5). See also supra 99-100 and accompanying text (noting that
the considerations highlighted by § 403(2) of the restatement are not
comprehensive).
325. See supra note 303 and accompanying text (discussing due regard in the
context of character, importance and acceptance).
326. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing the humanitarian
nature, as opposed to self-defense, of Allied Force).
327. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, sec. 403(2)(f) (stating that
reasonableness in asserting jurisdiction should be determined in part by the
"traditions of the international system"), and THE TANKER WAR, supra note 9, at
545 (extending the analysis of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) to the assertion that the
reasonableness of humanitarian intervention should also look at the traditions of
the international system). Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 82, sec. 6(2)(a)
(showing that choice of law principles are also informed by interstate and
international needs and traditions).
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As noted earlier, the traditional rule has been that states have
exclusive competence within their territories to deal with their
nationals.328 Today that rule has been partly eviscerated through
worldwide human rights law standards, which have come to the fore
since World War II with recognition in the Charter, and humanitarian
law, which has centuries of historical antecedents.329 Another
longstanding tradition has been the national sovereignty principle,
which the Charter recognizes. This principle exists alongside other
Charter principles, now in place for over half a century but
representing even older policies, of respect for states' territorial
integrity and political independence.330
Collective humanitarian intervention under state of necessity, in
situations where the equally longstanding rule of the inherent right to
individual and self-defense is not at issue, pits the relatively new
(fifty plus years) trend of human rights law and the more venerable
humanitarian law against the longstanding trends of sovereignty and
respect for states' territorial integrity and political independence.33" ' It
is no wonder that commentators accepting the principle of state of
necessity say its invocation is limited to extraordinary situations.332
This is not to say that three traditions (sovereignty, territorial
integrity, political independence) defeat two traditions (human rights,
humanitarian law), three to two, but that the decision on traditions is
close. Due regard, analogous to due regard in the LOS, the LOAC,
and international environmental matters, for others' interests, must
be given. "I
NATO was aware of this sharp division between competing
policies and gave due regard to SFRY sovereignty, territorial
328. See supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
329. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1(3) (encouraging respect for human rights and
equality); see also supra note 70 and accompanying text.
330. U.N. CHARTER arts. 2(1), 2(4) (denoting respect for the sovereignty of
other nations and discouraging the use of force); see also supra notes 9, 44 and
accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
333. See supra note 303 and accompanying text (discussing due regard in the
context of character, importance and acceptance).
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integrity and political independence in the campaign to vindicate the
Kosovars' human rights and rights under humanitarian law.
334
vii. Interests of Other States and International Organizations
Other states' and international organizations' interests might be a
seventh factor:
(7) The interest that other states, or international organizations, may have
in curtailing, regulating, eliminating or protecting the activity that is the
object of a collective humanitarian intervention under state of
necessity. 335
Factor (7) insists that those considering collective humanitarian
intervention under state of necessity must consider whether other
states, or international organizations, have a genuine interest in the
situation. For example, if the U.N. Security Council, seized of a
matter it deems is a risk to international peace and security, decides
on action, that virtually forecloses U.N. Members' individual or
collective separate action that is inconsistent with the decision,
unless they claim the inherent right to self-defense as to matters not
covered by the decision.336 On the other hand, if the Council is not
seized of a matter, states are freer to act collectively for intervention
under state of necessity.337
If the Council is seized of a matter, and there is no possibility of a
controlling decision because of threat of veto or veto, states must
examine the Council's position on the projected reason for
intervention. If the Council has said nothing, e.g., when the first
resolution on the matter is vetoed, those contemplating collective
334. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing the factors that went
into the consideration to launce Allied Force).
335. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, sec. 403(2)(g) (stating that
the exercise ofjurisdiction may depend in part on the interest another state has on
its regulation), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 82, sec. 6(2)(c) (noting
that the policies of interested states also have a bearing in choice of law situations),
and THE TANKER WAR, supra note 9, at 545 (extending the analysis of the
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) to situations of possible humanitarian intervention).
336. U.N. CHARTER art. 51 (preserving a right to self-defense among U.N.
members); see also supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
337. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
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intervention must look to other sources relating to firm facts (see
Principle A) and how they relate to international law in deciding on
intervention. On the other hand, if the Council would seem to speak,
through prior resolutions, against practices that are the rationale for
collective intervention, that factor plus what international law says
on the matter may be considered for the decision. 38 Due regard,
analogous to due regard in the LOS, the LOAC, and international
environmental matters, for others' interests must be given.339
The same kind of evaluation is appropriate with respect to other
international organizations. If, e.g., the U.N. General Assembly
passes a resolution on a matter, that resolution, although
nonmandatory, is entitled to great respect, particularly if it articulates
customary or conventional international law.340 If the ICJ in a case
before it issues a judgment on a similar issue between different
parties, that decision, although not precedent, is also entitled to great
respect, particularly if it restates customary law. 341 The same might
be said about regional organizations constituted under Articles 52-54
of the Charter3 42 , and other organizations, e.g., the EU.
3 43
Other states' views should also be considered. For example,
pursuant to Article 33344 of the Charter, a third state or an
international organization might initiate mediation to resolve a crisis
in addition to collective intervenor-affected state negotiations; this
338. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (describing the seized Council
before Allied Force).
339. See supra note 303 and accompanying text (discussing due regard in the
context of character, importance, and acceptance).
340. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 10-11, 13-14 (setting forth the advisory role of the
U.N. General Assembly); see also supra note 59 and accompanying text
341. See I.C.J. STATUTE, arts. 38(l), 59 (delineating the standards to be applied
by the I.C.J in adjudicating cases as well as the reach of its decisions);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, secs. 102-03 (noting the traditional sources
of international law and the criteria for determining whether certain evidence
qualifies as such); see also supra notes 13, 23 and accompanying text.
342. U.N. CHARTER arts. 52-54 (recognizing other regional international
organizations).
343. If these organizations' resolutions are mandatory and binding on states
concerned, they must be followed like Council decisions. See supra note 59 and
accompanying text.
344. U.N. CHARTER, art. 33 (establishing a process for third party mediation).
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happened before Allied Force began.3 45 Although these are not direct
interests like those of states' asserting jurisdiction over transnational
litigation, or the Council's decision process, these inputs should be
part of the decision process.
3 46
(8) Likelihood of conflict
Likelihood of conflict with another state's or an international
organization's actions might be an eighth factor:
(8) The likelihood of conflict with another state's or an international
organization's action(s) to curtail, regulate, eliminate or protect the
object of a collective humanitarian intervention under state of
necessity.
347
Factor (7) analysis discusses possible conflicts in law between
certain international organizations' actions that could conflict with
action under a collective intervention under state of necessity. Factor
(8) counsels assessing the risk of action that might come from other
states or international organizations. An example of this from Allied
Force was Russian arrival at Pristina airport, independent of
decisions to end Allied Force and establish civil government for
Kosovo, that could have caused conflict between that force and
organizations being established under the United Nations and
NATO.348 The mini-crisis was resolved by negotiation.349
345. See supra note 247 and accompanying text (describing attempts at peaceful
resolutions by other states prior to Allied Force).
346. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing various dispute
resolution mechanisms contemplated by the Charter).
347. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, sec. 403(2)(h) (stating the
importance of evaluating whether exercising jurisdiction will conflict with
regulation by another state), with THE TANKER WAR, supra note 9, at 545
(extending the analysis of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) to situations of humanitarian
intervention, advising that it must be evaluated whether action will conflict with
that of another state). Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 82, sec. 6(2)(f)
(noting that "uniformity of result" is important to choice of law situations).
348. See Michael Dobbs, Kosovo in Crisis: NATO Occupies Tense Kosovo
Capital; British Troops Confront Russians at Pristina Airport, WASH. POST, June
13, 1999, at A I (describing the conflict between Russia and NATO troops).
349. See supra notes 224-226, 296 and accompanying text.
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Due regard, analogous to due regard in the LOS, the LOAC, and
international environmental matters, for others' interests must be
given. 350
viii. An Obligation to Evaluate
As a final consideration,
When it would not be unreasonable for two or more states or international
organizations or groups, including the intervenor organization or group, to
act in a situation of collective humanitarian intervention under state of
necessity, but the actions of the states or international organizations or
groups are in conflict or are duplicative in action, each state, international
organization or international group has an obligation to evaluate its own,
as well as the others' interests in acting in light of all relevant factors,
including but not limited to those in Factors (1)-(8). A state or
international organization or group should defer to the collective
intervenor, or other state or international organization or group if the
latter's interest is clearly greater.
351
This admonition adapted from the Restatement (Third) does not
account for what a state, international organization or international
group (e.g., a coalition) should do if it has the greater interest and
other states, etc., unreasonably disagree. Nor does it account for a
situation where there is a "tie," in terms of law and policies behind it,
in a humanitarian intervention situation to be claimed under state of
necessity between acting and not acting.352  Under these
350. See supra note 303 and accompanying text (discussing due regard in the
context of character, importance and acceptance).
351. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, sec. 403(3) (encouraging
deference to the state with a greater interest in exercising jurisdiction).
352. Under these circumstances, some commentators have advocate choosing
"the better rule of law" when a competing rule is "anachronistic, behind the times."
See ROBERT A. LEFLAR, LUTHER L. MCDOUGAL, & ROBERT L. FELIX, AMERICAN
CONFLICTS LAW sec. 107 (4th. ed. 1986) (suggesting that judges should not
hesitate to choose a better rule of law when one is "anachronistic" or "behind the
times"); FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE 192-
94 (Martinus Nijhoff ed., 1993) (encouraging judges to apply superior foreign law
norms when appropriate). Several U.S. courts have applied this formula, which
passed U.S. constitutional muster, although not without strong criticism, in Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 320-32 (1981) (Stevens, J. concurring). See
SCOLES ET AL., supra note 85, sec. 2.25. Applying "the better rule of law" in
international humanitarian intervention under state of necessity cases, although
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circumstances the state, organization, or group may act if it chooses
to do so under the circumstances, taking into consideration the
position of the unreasonably disagreeing state or states, etc.353 This
would be an exercise of collective or individual sovereign action354
and might occur if an international organization decides on collective
humanitarian intervention under state of necessity in the face of
unreasonable objections by third states or other international
organizations or groups whose objections the intervening state(s) is
or are not bound to follow.355
Acting under these circumstances invites the same kind of
accusations of self-judging, protection of home-turf values, and
result-oriented decision making that courts and commentators have
made when there is a decision to apply forum law in the face of some
events' occurring elsewhere, or some parties' allegiance
elsewhere.356  Of course, given the extraordinary nature of
humanitarian intervention under state of necessity, if an international
organization considering collective intervention on this basis is
confronted by (an)other actor(s) with clearly greater interests, the
intervening international organization should defer.357 In any of these
situations due regard, analogous to due regard in the LOS, the
appealing to human rights and humanitarian law advocates or those espousing
sovereignty, territorial integrity, etc. principles, invites the same kind of harsh
rhetoric that this and other modem conflict of laws theories have generated. See id.
sec. 2.26; supra notes 84-85, 88 and accompanying text. Earlier conflicts theories,
abandoned in all but a few states of the United States, also generated criticism that
led to their being discarded in favor of newer theories, with most adopting the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 82. See supra notes 86-87, 89-92 and
accompanying text.
353. This approximates the lex fori approach in conflict of laws decisionmaking
some U.S. courts and commentators adopt. See generally SCOLES ET AL., supra
note 85, sees. 2.10-2.11; cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 82, sec. 6(2)(b)
(counseling examining relevant forum policies).
354. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 2(1) (establishing the sovereignty principle); see
also supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing the origins of the
sovereignty principle).
355. E.g., where there is no U.N. Security Council decision. See U.N. CHARTER
arts. 25, 48, 103; supra notes 9, 108 and accompanying text.
356. See supra note 352 and accompanying text (discussing various arguments
for and against the application of a particular rule).
357. See supra notes 351-356 and accompanying text.
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LOAC, and international environmental matters, for others' interests
must be given. 358
D. EVALUATION
Principles A-H attempt to distill the law as it stands in cases of
collective humanitarian intervention under state of necessity.
Principle A requires states considering this action to marshal facts
about a situation so that they will be reasonably well informed about
the situation before deciding to act.359 The Principle reflects
standards in the law of self-defense and the LOAC, which predicate
liability of decision makers on what they know, or reasonably should
know, at the time of decision. The record suggests that NATO
observed Principle A before Allied Force.
3 61
Principle B would require consensus decision making if treaty or
customary practice governing procedure within an international
organization requires it, or if a customary rule would require it of all
such organizations or groups.3 6 The record suggests that NATO
followed Principle B before and during Allied Force.362
Principle C is particularly critical: The situation must be so serious
and so immediate, and there must be no other reasonable alternative
to collective action under state of necessity, before states may
undertake collective humanitarian action under state of necessity.
3 63
Drawn from the law of anticipatory self-defense, Principle C reflects
the relatively narrow availability of collective humanitarian
intervention under state of necessity, where fundamental policies
behind human rights and humanitarian law collide with policies
favoring states' sovereignty, territorial integrity and political
independence, all of which have Charter roots. Anticipatory self-
defense standards and Principle C standards use virtually the same
358. See supra note 303 and accompanying text (discussing due regard in the
context of character, importance and acceptance).
359. See supra, notes 114-134 and accompanying text
360. See id..
361. See supra notes 135-142 and accompanying text.
362. See id.
363. See supra notes 143-157 and accompanying text.
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language, but situations when each can be invoked are different, i.e.,
a state or states in a collective self-defense alliance might be able to
invoke anticipatory self-defense, but not collective humanitarian
intervention under state of necessity, in a given situation, or vice
versa. States that do not admit of a right of anticipatory self-defense
in the Charter era can subscribe to the view Principle C advocates,
since the situations are different. To be sure, relative immediacy,
etc., cited in anticipatory self-defense cases can be used as a guide in
collective humanitarian intervention under state of necessity, but
they are not precedents requiring decision makers to allow or bar
action in humanitarian cases. The record is relatively clear that the
situation in Kosovo before the NATO campaign began was serious
and critical, and it would appear that there was no other reasonable
alternative to Allied Force.364
Principle D requires states to use necessary and proportional
methods and means, terms also used in the law of self-defense and
the LOAC, to effect such a collective intervention.365 What is
necessary or proportional in collective humanitarian intervention
under state of necessity may or may not be necessary or proportional
in self-defense or LOAC situations, and vice versa. Self-defense and
LOAC rules on necessity and proportionality, including rules
involving objects forbidden as targets under the LOAC unless the
enemy uses them, e.g., for warfighting or war-sustaining efforts, are
guides for action and must usually be followed. Collective
intervention decision makers should have extraordinarily strong
reasons for departing from self-defense or LOAC rules on protected
objects. Although there were instances of errant bombing during the
air campaign, the overall record is that NATO employed proportional
methods and means to achieve its limited objective during Allied
Force.366
Principle E recites four situations barring collective humanitarian
intervention under state of necessity.367 Principle E(1), partly derived
from ILC State Responsibility principles, forbids collective
364. See id.
365. See supra notes 158-202 and accompanying text.
366. See id.
367. See supra notes 203-227 and accompanying text.
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intervention when there is an opposing jus cogens norm, as long as
there is no opposing and conflicting jus cogens norm or other
superior rule, e.g., a Council decision under Articles 25 and 48 of the
Charter.3 68  Principle E(2), partly derived from ILC State
Responsibility principles, would forbid intervention if there is a
treaty binding the collective intervenors to the contrary, unless there
are countervailing and superior norms grounded in custom, general
principles, jus cogens, Article 103 of the Charter, binding U.N.
resolutions, or binding rules of other international organizations.369
The first exception elevates a treaty barring intervention to superior
status, presumably in the absence of former custom; the other
exceptions follow the usual rules of construction in the multifactoral
analysis of public international law. Principle E(3), following ILC
State Responsibility principles, bars collective intervention if the
collective intervenors, or their organization, has contributed to
occurrence of the state of necessity.37 ° As comments to Principle E(3)
say, this would not necessarily bar collective intervention if, e.g., one
state within an organization has contributed to the occurrence,
although the organization might choose to take special measures in
those situations.371
Principle E(4), not in the ILC State Responsibility principles, is
another critical rule, owing to intervention's prior history:
States acting collectively under state of necessity in humanitarian
intervention situations may not invoke state of necessity if they also
intend to impair the affected state's sovereignty in any way not reasonably
connected with the goal of intervening for humanitarian reasons, or if they
intend to impair the affected state's territorial integrity or political
independence in any way not reasonably connected with the goal of
intervening for humanitarian reasons.
372
Any intervention involves some derogation on the affected state's
sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence. Principle E(4)





372. See supra notes 203-227 and accompanying text.
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the goal of collective humanitarian intervention. As stated in the
Principle E(4) analysis, collective intervenors would be well advised
to state these goals when they intervene. NATO appears to have
complied with Principle E, insofar as it applied to Allied Force
operations.373
Principle F(1), also taken from the ILC State Responsibility
principles, validates an affected state's otherwise wrongful act if that
state acts in individual or collective self-defense.374 Principle F(1)
adds that all countries involved in the intervention, the affected state
and the intervenors, retain rights of individual and collective self-
defense, subject, e.g., to principles of necessity and
proportionality.375 For collective intervenors, this means that the
affected state is not obliged to, but may choose to, remain passive.
Principle F(2) recites truisms that states involved in a collective
humanitarian intervention, or other states, may act individually or
collectively through legitimate reprisals, retorsions or other lawful
means to compel compliance with international law, e.g.,
humanitarian or human rights law that is the subject of the collective
intervention. Apart from after-action claims of actions in self-
defense, Principle F did not come into play during the NATO
campaign.
376
Principle G recites notice standards.377 Principle G(1) says that in
the usual case collective intervenors should give an affected state
notice of proposed action reasonable under the circumstances, and a
chance to be heard, in all but egregious cases, e.g., where that state
would destroy the object of the proposed intervention, or the need to
act is great and immediate.378 Notice can be given through
negotiations as well as, e.g., unilateral communiques. Principle G(2)
recites similar standards for notice to international organizations or
other states.379 There is no question that all affected participants,
373. See id.
374. See supra notes 228-237 and accompanying text.
375. See id.
376. See id.
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particularly the SFRY, had adequate notice under the
circumstances. 80
Principle H is important in establishing durational time standards:
[I]ntervention... must be undertaken with a view to employing methods
and means .. commensurate with the scope and gravity of the situation
and principles of necessity and proportionality, and principles protecting
the affected state's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political
independence ... to effect the intervention in the minimum time
reasonably necessary to accomplish this goal.38'
Observing Principle H will eliminate the problem of intervention
for entirely worthy goals, e.g., protection against humanitarian or
human rights law violations, that ripens into long term occupation
and claim of sovereignty over time. States considering collective
humanitarian intervention should announce this as a standard.
Although there was no explicit statement of minimum time, NATO
observed Principle H. As soon as SFRY forces departed and civil
government for Kosovo was in place, NATO became a guarantor of
internal security pursuant to the Council's resolution.382
Principle I suggests discretionary factors taken from U.S. conflict
of laws (private international law) analysis that can serve as cross-
checks on, e.g., what is reasonable under Principles A-H.383 This
method of analysis has been criticized; it can be laborious in
operation but perhaps no more so than the military decision process
necessary for successful operations. Like the analogous thought
process behind ROE drafting384 or the McDougal-Lasswell law-
science-policy ("LSP") analysis, 38 5 at the least they may be useful for
380. See id.
381. See supra notes 275-280 and accompanying text.
382. See id.
383. See supra notes 281-358 and accompanying text.
384. See supra note 287 (elaborating on the influence of reasonableness factors
on ROE development).
385. See generally Myres S. McDougal et al., Theories About International
Law: Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence, 8 VA. J. INT'L L. 188 (1968);
John N. Moore, Prolegomenon to the Jurisprudence of Myres S. McDougal and
Harold Lasswell, 54 VA. L. REv. 662 (1968); Eisuke Suzuki, The New Haven
School of International Law: An Invitation to a Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence, I
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thinking through all factors that may affect an informed decision to
collectively intervene on humanitarian law grounds under state of
necessity. In general, the factors recited under Principle I support
NATO's Allied Force operations.386
Given the extraordinary and much-criticized status of intervention
generally, it behooves the most careful thought, not only as to
military means (e.g., air power versus sea power or ground troops) to
effect the goal, but also as to all factors that impact, or may impact,
legal aspects of a collective decision to intervene for humanitarian
reasons under state of necessity.
Did NATO follow the foregoing principles before and during
Allied Force in intervening for humanitarian reasons under state of
necessity? The general conclusion is that it did. We now turn to
several specific issues related to these principles.
III. APPLICATION OF THE LOAC DURING ALLIED
FORCE
State of necessity,387 with conditioning factors of reasonable
information about the crisis, consensus decision making, seriousness
and immediacy of the situation, necessity and proportionality,
limitations such as jus cogens, self-defense, reasonable notice under
the circumstances, and estimated time for the intervention, and
perhaps reasonableness conditioning factors,388 determines whether a
decision to intervene collectively on humanitarian and human rights
grounds is legitimate under international law. Allied Force was a
lawful collective humanitarian intervention under these
circumstances. The further questions are whether the LOAC and the
law of neutrality would have applied to a ship interdiction program
proposed during Allied Force operations against the SFRY, and
whether humanitarian law governing prisoners of war, applied during
YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 1 (1974); George K. Walker, Sea Power and the Law
of the Sea: The Need for a Contextual Approach, 7 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 299
(1979); see also MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 19, (employing LSP in a more
recent analysis), MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 10, (employing LSP in an
earlier analysis).
386. See supra notes 281-358 and accompanying text.
387. See generally supra Part 1.
388. See generally supra Part II.
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Allied Force as among participating and opposing states. Part III
addresses these issues.
A. RELEVANCE OF GENERAL LOAC AND NEUTRALITY LAW TO
ALLIED FORCE
Looking behind the lawfulness of particular NATO attacks, a more
fundamental question is whether the LOAC and the law of neutrality,
which apply during war in the traditional sense, govern during
operations like Allied Force.
A developing view is that military operations pursuant to U.N.
Security Council decisions pursuant to Articles 25 and 48 of the
Charter do not necessarily follow the LOAC. When a Council
decision is contrary to LOAC principles, particularly those in a
treaty, the decision must be followed.38 9 This rule, rooted in Article
103 of the Charter and the obligatory nature of Council decisions,
does not account for contrary customary or general principles norms,
nor does it consider the possibility of a jus cogens norm in the
LOAC.391 If a Council decision does not specify rules of conduct for
conducting military operations that would appear to contradict the
LOAC, and this is the usual case, the LOAC should be followed. If
nonmandatory U.N. resolutions"' are contrary to LOAC rules, the
only established body of law for standards is the LOAC, and it
should be followed. The same is true for Council decisions
authorizing force with unspecified standards; the LOAC should be
followed. Thus, although the LOAC, strictly speaking, does not
govern because a U.N. resolution-authorized operation is not a
conflict between states in the traditional sense of war, the LOAC
should govern in these situations. If U.N. resolution-governed
operations grow in number and complexity and intensity of conflict,
389. See U.N. CHARTER art. 103 (stating the prevailing nature of Charter
obligations on member states).
390. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 25, 48, 103; see also supra notes 9-108 and
accompanying text.
391. Nonmandatory U.N. resolutions include General Assembly resolutions and
Council resolutions recommending action. See supra note 59 and accompanying
text text (providing some nonmandatory U.N. resolutions including General
Assembly resolutions and Council resolutions recommending action). In some
cases these resolutions restate customary, treaty or general principles standards and
therefore strengthen these norms. See id.
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an ultimate result may be a parallel body of law that should be, and
hopefully will be, the same as the LOAC for war.
Humanitarian intervention under Allied Force stood on footing
similar to the latter situations. The campaign was not war in the
classical sense, although there are reports the U.K. prime minister
and maybe others characterized later phases of the NATO campaign
as war.3 92 Participants, whether the collectively intervening states or
the affected state, should have applied the LOAC as in the case of
U.N. resolution-authorized actions. 393 No Council decision governed
the Allied Force situation with respect to humanitarian
intervention.394 Humanitarian law issues covered by, e.g., the 1949
Geneva Conventions, stand in a special place.395
The same principles of applying the LOAC and neutrality law
should govern during collective humanitarian interventions operating
under state of necessity principles discussed in Parts I and II.
Standards of necessity and proportionality in self-defense
situations may be different from LOAC standards of necessity and
proportionality for attacks during traditional armed conflict. What is
necessary or proportional for a self-defense response may not be
necessary or proportional in an armed conflict situation. The reverse
is also true; what is necessary or proportional under the LOAC for
attacks may not be necessary or proportional in a self-defense
context. The same is true for humanitarian intervention pursuant to
state of necessity. What is necessary or proportional for humanitarian
intervention may not be necessary or proportional in a self-defense or
LOAC situation, and what is necessary or proportional in a self-
defense or LOAC situation may not be necessary or proportional in
attacks incident to a particular humanitarian intervention. Depending
on the scope of the intervention and the timing of attacks (immediate
after a decision to intervene is made as distinguished from attacks
392. See generally supra notes 58-61 (discussing the unusual nature behind the
Allied Force operation).
393. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing U.N. resolution-
authorized actions).
394. U.N. CHARTER arts. 25, 48, 103; see also supra notes 9, 59, 108 and
accompanying text.
395. See infra Part III. C (analyzing captured armed forces members'
entitlement to prisoner of war status).
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made well into a campaign), the law of self-defense or the LOAC
may be examined as guides.
396
There are some per se forbidden targets, e.g., cultural property
unless used for military purposes. 391 Under the LOAC, there are
some methods of warfare, e.g., no first use of poison gas,3 98 that are
per se indiscriminate under the LOAC. These targets or methods and
means of warfare, forbidden under the LOAC, should also be
followed in humanitarian intervention operations under state of
necessity.
As in self-defense cases or LOAC situations, the decision maker(s)
should only be held accountable for what is known, or reasonably
should have been known, at the time a decision to attack is made.3 99
Collective action after a decision to intervene raises problems of
consensus on action within a campaign. Even as collective self-
defense situations may raise scope and definitional problems (i.e.,
whether anticipatory self-defense is admissible in the Charter era,
what are proportional and necessary responses), and the same kinds
of issues can surface in the LOAC under collective action situations,
analogous problems will arise during collective humanitarian
intervention under state of necessity. What are proper targets? Is the
proposed attack necessary and proportional? These issues arose with
respect to Phase 3 targets during Allied Force and were resolved, like
the decision to mount the campaign, by consensus. "°0
396. See supra notes 27-29, 158-202 and accompanying text.
397. See generally Hague Cultural Property Convention, supra note 127;
Protocol for Protection of Cultural Property in Event of Armed Conflict, May 14,
1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 358; Second Protocol, supra note 127; Treaty on Protection of
Artistic & Scientific Institutions & Historic Monuments, Apr. 15, 1935, 49 Stat.
3267, 167 L.N.T.S. 290; JIRI TOMAN, THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY
IN THE EVENT OF ARMED CONFLICT (1996); THE TANKER WAR, supra note 9, at
507-11.
398. See Protocol for Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous
or Other Gases, & of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, & U.S.
Reservation, June 17, 1965, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 651965 (prohibiting the
use of certain gases, liquids, materials, devices, and methods in war); see also
NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 10, paras. 10.3-10.4.2 (addressing the use of
poison gas in war).
399. See supra notes 114-134 and accompanying text.
400. See supra notes 135-142 and accompanying text.
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One issue, perhaps for Allied Force and certainly for the future, is
how far consensus decision making should penetrate into operational
matters. To take an extreme example from a hypothetical ground
campaign, must a NATO squad leader seek a necessity and
proportionality determination all the way up the line to take a
particular building, with almost assured damage to it? U.S.
commentators and military commanders have decried the "rudder
orders" approach to military command and control; is there a
collective consensus decision version of it? Should there be one?
How does a rudder orders policy, or the opposite of letting field and
at sea commanders and perhaps lower echelon commanders decide,
affect accountability under international law if things go wrong?
B. NATO's RIGHT TO CONDUCT MARITIME INTERDICTION AS
PART OF ALLIED FORCE
Although the air war for Kosovo has been the principal focus of
analysis elsewhere, it should be noted that NATO deployed
significant naval forces in connection with Allied Force. Their
activities included missile launches against land targets,
communications and electronic warfare support, and patrolling the
Adriatic Sea off the SFRY. NATO also considered but did not
implement visit and search of ships that may have carried goods to
the SFRY through Adriatic ports. Nothing in the law of state of
necessity or the LOAC forbade interdiction operations if NATO had
ordered them.
1. NA TO Naval Assets Available; Naval Operations During Allied
Force
There were no naval engagements at or under the sea connected
with Allied Force, although some apparently had been projected.40'
NATO forces provided defense and logistics support (undoubtedly
including sealift after the campaign) for the alliance forces deployed in
401. Gen. Wesley Clark, while SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander,
Europe), spoke to the Yugoslav Chief of Staff [by telephone] at least once during
the campaign, warning him that if he sent any of his navy out into the Adriatic, it
would be sunk. See CLARK, supra note 142, at 184 (describing his phone
conversation with General Ojdanic); IGNATIEFF, supra note 182, at 137 (discussing
Gen. Clark's communications with the Yugoslav Chief of Staff).
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Italy, Albania, and ... Yugoslavia;... and carried out naval operations in
the Adriatic Sea. The latter included, at one time, aircraft carriers,
submarines, and surface ships from four nations, all operating within the
same confined sea space.
402
These vessels included the U.S. Navy Kitty Hawk and Theodore
Roosevelt battle groups and U.K. Navy units, including a missile-
launching submarine.403 When Allied Force began, the U.S.S.
Enterprise battle group was in the Persian Gulf; there was no other
battle group within bombing range of Serbia.4 °4 In late March 1999,
incident to sponsoring a Security Council resolution condemning
Allied Force and conversations with Yugoslavia, Russia sent several
naval vessels to the Mediterranean where they could enter the
Adriatic. 4°5 This caused tension between NATO and Russia, leading
to worries that the SFRY might get information on NATO flight
operations from these ships. 406 The Roosevelt battle group arrived
402. After-Action Report, supra note 65, at xiv; see Lambeth, supra note 142, at
30 (discussing the role of the U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt in the air war). But see
After-Action Report, supra note 65 at 41 (showing little reliance on sealift).
403. See After-Action Report, supra note 65, at 92 (noting that the missiles
included the Tomahawk and Coventional Air Launched Cruise Missile); DAALDER
& O'HANLON, supra note 65, at 104 (discussing the deployment of the Kitty Hawk
and the Theodore Roosevelt). The Roosevelt battlegroup was in the Adriatic and
was sent to the Persian Gulf in March 1999 when the Kosovo crisis deepened. The
Roosevelt battlegroup had been in the Adriatic; it had been sent to the Persian Gulf
in March 1999 as the Kosovo crisis deepend. CLARK, supra note 142, at 240, 421.
404. See DAALDER & O'HANLON, supra note 65, at 103 (stating that the
Enterprise was briefly sent to the Persian Gulf on March 14 and then sent back
home). General Clark asked for the Enterprise battle group, which the Navy
opposed because of its six-month deployment rule. "In the end, the Enterprise was
made available ... for diversion to the Adriatic . . . , but its air wing was never
tasked..., and it never participated in Allied Force. LAMBETH, supra note 142, at
34.
405. See CLARK, supra note 142, at 212 (indicating that Russians ships were
going to be deployed to the Mediterranean); DAALDER & O'HANLON, supra note
65, at 127, 231 (describing Russia's introduction of a draft resolution on March 26,
1999, that called for the end of NATO's attacks on Yugoslavia).
406. See CLARK, supra note 142, at 212 (describing the threats the Russian naval
presence in the Adriatic would pose on NATO's operations); DAALDER &
O'HANLON, supra note 65, at 127 (highlighting the increasing unease in the
relationship between NATO and Russia and NATO's fears that Serb forces might
receive information on its flight operations).
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April 5, the first in the area since mid-March.4"7 There is no record of
NATO-Russian maritime confrontations. There is also no report of
blue-water NATO-SFRY naval confrontations.4 8
Although NATO land-based aircraft (for the United States, U.S.
Air Force and U.S. Marines shore-based aircraft) predominantly
conducted strike operations, "Navy carrier-based aircraft, Marine ...
sea-based strike aircraft and cruise-missile equipped ships and
submarines played a significant role. '409 Navy electronic warfare
aircraft, operating off the carriers, protected NATO aircraft from
attack by Yugoslav air defenses. These aircraft were the only U.S.
platforms able to use electronic jamming to suppress enemy air
defenses. Naval aircraft also launched air defense suppression
support for strike aircraft. 410 The Navy flew unmanned aerial vehicles
("UAV"s) to identify Yugoslav naval vessels, survey potential
landing areas for Marines if amphibious landings were ordered, and
to target coastal defense radar sites.41 l Navy F-14 aircraft with the
Tactical Air Reconnaissance Pod System identified targets; Navy
maritime patrol aircraft made significant intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance (ISR) collection contributions. 412 Although never
used for at-sea interdiction, these assets were available to contribute
to that effort, besides warships in the Adriatic.
There were differences of opinion at NATO headquarters after the
1999 NATO summit on "the possibility of boarding ships in the
407. See DAALDER & O'HANLON, supra note 65, at 231 (providing a time line
of events including the Roosevelt's arrival in the Adriatic).
408. The SFRY had been warned of the risks. See supra note 401 (referencing a
telephone interview with General Clark).
409. After-Action Report, supra note 65, at 55, 79, 92-93; see LAMBETH, supra
note 142, at 20 (commenting on the commitment of U.S. aircraft in NATO's air
war); William M. Arkin, Operation Allied Force: "The Most Precise Application
ofAir Power in History, "in Bacevich & Cohen, supra note 40, at 1, 21 (discussing
the hardware used to execute Allied Force).
410. See After-Action Report, supra note 65, at 66-67 (specifying the types of
support assets employed to protect NATO strike aircraft).
411. See After-Action Report, supra note 65, at 57-58 (describing the use of
UAVs during Operation Allied Force).
412. See After-Action Report, supra note 65, at 58 (elaborating on the target
production process); LAMBETH, supra note 142, at 30-31, 94-96 (describing the
functions of F-14s in U.S. naval operations).
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Adriatic to enforce the maritime blockade of Yugoslavia . .. ."I" Oil
reached Serbia through Montenegro's port of Bar; the "stop and
search" regime would have aimed to halt this. However, there was
concern over provoking Russia, Serbia's principal oil supplier.1 4
This was reflected at national levels. In the Danish parliament, e.g.,
[a] minor controversy arose over the possible contribution to a naval
blockade and the modes of its implementation. Not only was this
blockade probably a violation of international law; it also [was seen to
entail] risks of a direct confrontation with the Russian Navy. As a
compromise it was decided (by NATO) to enforce the blockade only
with ... countries ... parties to the [prior] sanctions regime, on which
basis Denmark decided ... to participate..15
Denmark promised a corvette from July 1999 onwards, but the
conflict ended first. Later its navy contributed a mine-clearing vessel
and a minelayer to clear NATO munitions dumped in the Adriatic. 6
Poland was not "asked to participate in the maritime blockade
against Yugoslavia. "417
After the Alliance pledged to impose a binding naval embargo in
its April statement, EU foreign ministers met April 26 and proposed
an embargo, to begin April 30, to cut off oil shipments to the SFRY,
coming primarily from Italy and Greece. The EU ministers also
approved economic measures targeting Milosevic and his family and
closing loopholes halting export credits and investment flows to the
SFRY previously agreed in 1998. A statement offered support to
Montenegro and pledged EU upgrade of EU relations with Albania
and Macedonia through association agreements s.4 1  The naval
embargo
413. Butler, supra note 42, at 279; see also Continued NATO Air-Strikes on
Yugoslavia, supra note 142, at 42901 (discussing maritime interdiction
possibilities).
414. See Continued NATO Air-Strikes on Yugoslavia, supra note 142, at 42901
(reporting NATO's concern over upsetting Russia through an oil stoppage).
415. Moller, supra note 67, at 156.
416. Id.
417. Talas & Valki, supra note 67, at 207.
418. They encouraged EU members not to organize sports events with SFRY
participation. DAALDER & O'HANLON, supra note 65, at 146 (describing NATO's
losses in the -war and its views on imposing embargos against Yugoslavia).;
[18:35
HUMANITARIAN INTER VENTION
became a somewhat hollow promise ... when NATO decided it would
not physically enforce [it] through a blockade at Montenegro's two main
ports, Bar and Kotor Bay. But all was not lost. It did go into effect and
was joined by a number of non-EU and non-NATO countries .... [T]he
voluntary "visit and search" scheme at least had the benefit of preventing
profiteers using ships flagged in cooperating countries from shipping oil
into Montenegro.
419
NATO also used its influence and NATO SFOR troops in Bosnia-
Herzegovina to cut off oil coming from there to the SFRY.42 °
2. Proposed NATO Naval Interdiction During Allied Force: A
Lawful Option
There were two principles concerning any projected naval
interdiction during Allied Force. First, would vessel interdiction,
considered with other aspects of Allied Force, i.e., the aerial
bombing campaign, have been a necessary and proportional part of
the campaign when Allied Force's overall goal of collective
humanitarian intervention under state of necessity was taken into
account? 421 If the response is Yes (and the record suggests this422),
the second principle is that under the view that parties to a
humanitarian intervention should follow the LOAC for these
operations, 423 NATO could have imposed vessel interdiction, visit
and search, and capture or diversion, subject to the usual LOAC rules
and limitations.424
Continued NATO Air-Strikes on Yugoslavia, supra note 142, at 42901 (discussing
the EU's pledge).
419. DAALDER & O'HANLON, supra note 65, at 146.
420. See id.
421. See supra notes 26-29, 158-202, 399 and accompanying text.
422. See supra notes 158-202 and accompanying text.
423. See supra notes 389-400 and accompanying text.
424. See generally Second Convention, supra note 33, art. 31; Convention
Concerning Rights & Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War (Hague XIII), Oct.
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2415; Convention Relative to Certain Restrictions with Regard
to Exercise of the Right of Capture in Naval War, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2396
[hereinafter Hague XI]; Convention for Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of
Principles of the Geneva Convention [hereinafter Hague X], Oct. 18, 1907, art. 4,
36 Stat. 2371, 2384; Hague Cultural Property Convention, supra note 127, art.
14(2; Convention on Maritime Neutrality, Feb. 20, 1928, 47 Stat. 1989, 135
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If NATO wanted to establish a blockade, an option discussed
outside NATO circles 425 and probably reflecting confusion between
blockade and interdiction, traditional rules -- notice of start and end,
grace period, area, impartiality, effectiveness, limitation to
belligerents' coasts and ports and other requirements or limitations
42 6
-- would have been required under LOAC standards after an
affirmative answer to the first question on blockade's place in
necessity and proportionality, etc., for Allied Force's overall goals
for intervention. 4 7 Any blockade imposed during Allied Force would
not have been a "pacific blockade," i.e., a blockade imposed on an
adversary's coasts during time of peace, generally thought to be
unlawful under the Charter.428
L.N.T.S. 187; Commission of Jurists, Hague Rules of Air Warfare, Dec. 1922 -
Feb. 1923, arts. 49-50, reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 124, at 207,
215 [hereinafter Hague Air Rules]; Helsinki Principles, supra note 108, Principles
1.4, 2.1-2.4, 5.2.1-5.2.9; Institute of International Law, The Laws of Naval
Warfare Concerning the Relations Between Belligerents, Aug. 9, 1913, art. 41,
reprinted in International Law Association, Report of the Sixty-Eighth Conference
Held at Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China 857, 864 (1998). [hereinafter Oxford
Naval Manual]; NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 10, paras. 7.6-7.6.2, 7.10-
7.10.2; PICTET, supra note 33, at 181-84; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 9, paras.
112-34; THE TANKER WAR, supra note 9, at 357-64.
425. See supra notes 410-413 and accompanying text.
426. See generally Fourth Convention, supra note 50, arts. 55, 58-60; Protocol I,
supra note 27, arts. 69-71; Protocol I1, supra note 27, art. 18; Hague XI, supra note
424, art. 1, 36; Declaration Concerning Maritime Law, Apr. 16, 1856, para 4;
Declaration Concerning Laws of Naval War, Feb. 26, 1909, Annex, arts. 1-21, 208
Consol. T.S. 338, 341, 343-44 [hereinafter Declaration of London], reprinted in
Schindler & Toman, supra note 124, at 843, 846-47 (never in force); Hague Air
Rules, supra note 424, art. 53(i); Helsinki Principles, supra note 108, Principles
5.2.10, 5.3; BOTHE ET AL., supra note 27, at 432-39, 694-97; NWP 1-14M
ANNOTATED, supra note 10, paras. 7.7-7.7.5; Oxford Naval Manual, supra note
424, arts. 30, 53, 92; 4 PICTET, supra note 33, at 309-12, 318-24; PILLOUD ET AL,
supra note 33, at 812-36, 1476-81; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 27, paras. 93-
104; THE TANKER WAR, supra note 9, at 389-94.
427. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (describing Allied Force's
reasons for intervention and NATO's war on Kosovo).
428. See O'CONNELL, supra note 30, at 1157-58, citing U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4);
D'AMATO, supra note 10, at 43-46 (listing rules for permissible blockades); THE
TANKER WAR, supra note 9, at 389; but see COLOMBOS, supra note 33, secs. 484-
88B; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 6, secs. 44-49, 52b-52e, 521; NWIP 10-2, supra
note 35, 632a n.26; see also GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 9, at 314-17; SIMMA,
supra note 9, at 629-36; NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 10, paras. 7.7.2.1
n. 131 (stating correctly that "It is not possible to say whether, or to what extent, a
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C. CAPTURED ARMED FORCES MEMBERS' ENTITLEMENT TO
PRISONER OF WAR (PW) STATUS
SFRY forces took three NATO ground service personnel into
custody during Allied Force, perhaps kidnapping them across the
Macedonia border. The three suffered beatings at the hands of their
captors.429 Two downed NATO pilots risked capture before NATO
rescued them.430 NATO forces later took SFRY army personnel into
custody after moving into Kosovo. On May 16, 1999, President
Clinton authorized releasing two SFRY force members the KLA
captured in April.43 1 Although the record is not clear, it is likely that
the SFRY captured members of the KLA and that the KLA captured
other SFRY armed forces members.
These personnel were entitled to those parts of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, other applicable humanitarian law treaties, and
customary law or general principles of law governing them, absent a
Security Council decision to the contrary.432 (There was none.)
1. NA TO-SFR Y Aspects of Allied Force
First, as between NATO and the SFRY, the 1949 Conventions
applied. Although Allied Force was not a war in the traditional sense,
common Article 2 declares their provisions apply to "other"
international armed conflicts. For example, the Third Convention,
establishing PW treatment standards, provides in part in Article 2:
U.N. blockade would be governed by the traditional rules"); SIMMA, supra note 9
at 632 (providing an example of how a Council decision can trump LOAC treaty
rules); U.N. CHARTER arts. 25, 48, 103; supra notes 9-108 and accompanying text.
429. Rev. Jesse Jackson, President Clinton's friend, was involved in negotiating
their release, amongst fears that the detainees would be held hostage. See CLARK,
supra note 142, at 229, 286-87; DAALDER & O'HANLON, supra note 65, at 119,
146; Continued NATO Air-Strikes Against Yugoslavia, supra note 142, at 42957,
42900; Continued NATO Air-Strikes on Yugoslavia, supra note 142, at 42900.
430. See CLARK, supra note 142, at 214-18, 274 (reporting fears that a NATO
pilot was lost); LAMBETH, supra note 142, at 116-20 (describing the downing of an
F- 117).
431. See DAALDER & O'HANLON, supra note 65, at 146, 233 (remarking on the
release of the U.S. soldiers and the authorization of the release of the Serbian
soldiers).
432. U.N. CHARTER arts. 25, 48, 103; see supra notes 9, 108 and accompanying
text.
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In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peace time,
the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any
other conflict which may arise between two or more of the High
Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of
them.
[It] shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the
territory of a... Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed
resistance.
Although one ... Power ... in the conflict may not be a Party to the...
Convention, the Powers that are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in
their mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the
Convention in relation to the said Power, if the latter accepts and applies
the provisions thereof.
433
The SFRY and all NATO states were parties to the Conventions
before the former Yugoslavia's dissolution.434 Although there was no
official record of the SFRY's having accepted and applied the
Conventions in accordance with Common Article 2 before or during
the NATO campaign, after Allied Force ended, the SFRY accepted
them retroactive to 1992 on October 16, 2001. 431 Nevertheless, treaty
succession principles,436 even if the SFRY and other states had
formal acceptance of the former country's treaties under review,437
may have bound the SFRY during Allied Force. The SFRY was also
bound to the extent the Conventions restated custom or general
433. Third Convention, supra note 50, art. 2; see also First Convention, supra
note 50, art. 2; Second Convention, supra note 33, art. 2; Fourth Convention, supra
note 50, art. 2; supra note 159 and accompanying text.
434. See TIF, supra note 70, at 319, 452-53 (listing the parties to the
Conventions and describing the former Yugoslavia's involvement after the
dissolution).; see also supra note 160 and accompanying text.
435. See supra note 161 and accompanying text (discussing the SFRY's
retroactive acceptance of the Conventions).
436. See Symposium, State Succession, supra note 162 at 255-58 (discussing the
development of the law of succession); Walker, Integration, supra note 9 at 43-54
(addressing how principles of the law of treaty succession applied to newly
independent European states).
437. See TIF, supra note 70, at 319, 452-53 (listing the states that had accepted
the Red Cross Conventions, including Yugoslavia).
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principles of law.438 The general view is that much, but maybe not
all, of the Third Convention restates customary rules or general
principles of law.439 Therefore, it bound the SFRY and NATO to that
extent as custom or general principles. The Third Convention also
has a Martens clause; even denunciation of the Convention "shall in
no way impair the obligations which the Parties to the conflict shall
remain bound to fulfill by virtue of the principles of the law of
nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized
peoples, from the laws of humanity and the dictates of the public
conscience."440 The clause may reflect a general principle of law or
custom. 44' If so, the SFRY was bound to apply principles of
humanity for detainees' treatment, even if not bound by the
Conventions as treaty law.
Not all states party to NATO-SFRY aspects of Allied Force, e.g.,
the United States, were parties to 1977 Protocol I to the 1949
Conventions. The former Yugoslavia was, 42 and the SFRY accepted
the Protocol retroactive to 1992.443 Treaty succession principles and
other considerations may have also bound the SFRY to Protocol 1.444
To the extent the Protocol's terms relating to PW's 445 reflected
438. See supra notes 164-165 and accompanying text.
439. See NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 10, paras. 11.4, 11.7-11.7.4
(restating the customary rules of law as evidence that these principles, which are
addressed in the Third Convention, reiterate customary rules of law); see also
supra note 50 and accompanying text.
440. Third Convention, supra note 50, art. 142, see also supra note 174 and
accompanying text (addressing the presence of a Martens Clause in the two 1907
Hague Conventions, the 1949 Conventions, and Protocol I).
441. See supra note 176 and accompanying text (discussing how general
principles of law or custom bind Parties under international law).
442. See Signatures, supra note 169, at 703 (listing Yugoslavia as an original
party to the signing and ratification of Protocol I before its dissolution).
443. See supra note 435 and accompanying text (acknowledging that after
Allied Force ended, the SFRY accepted the Conventions retroactive to 1992 on
October 16, 2001).
444. See TIF, supra note 70, at 319 (declaring that the former Yugoslavia has
dissolved and explaining the result on multilateral treaties); see also supra note
436 (discussing treaty succession principles as they apply to the SFRY).
445. See Protocol 1, supra note 27, arts. 8-11, 40-45; see also BOTHE ET AL.,
supra note 27, at 82-116, 216-62; see also NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note
10, paras. 11.4, 11.7; see also PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 33, at 107-63, 473-559.
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custom or general principles, 44 6 they bound states involved in Allied
Force, including NATO countries and the SFRY. Protocol I also has
a Martens clause: "In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other
international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the
protection and authority of the principles of international law derived
from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from
the dictates of public conscience. ' '44' The clause may reflect a general
principle of law or custom; 448 if so, like the analysis applied to its
Third Convention counterpart,449 the SFRY was required to treat its
PW's with humanity even if Protocol I did not apply as treaty law.
The same principles apply to the 1907 Hague IV Regulations
relating to prisoners of war, insofar as they reflected custom.
450
Yugoslavia was not a formal party to them, but, e.g., the
Regulations' provision forbidding killing or wounding those who
have laid down arms, or who no longer have means of defense,451
bound the SFRY and NATO states as a customary norm. 452 The
446. See supra notes 12-14, 27, 121-123, 168, 172, 176 and accompanying text
(addressing the treatment of PWs in various contexts).
447. Protocol I, supra note 27, art. 1(2); see also supra note 440 and
accompanying text (describing the Martens Clause in the Third Convention).
448. See supra note 176 and accompanying text (citing to descriptions of what
general principles of international law entail).
449. See supra notes 439-440 and accompanying text (providing the description
of the Martens Clause in the Third Convention).
450. BROWNLIE, supra note 6, at 5; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, sec.
102 cmts. f, i; I OPPENHEIM, supra note 6, sec. 10, at 28, 31; Walker, Anticipatory,
supra note 50; GRUNAWALT, supra note 50 at 391-92.
451. See Hague IV, art. 23(c), (specifying that in addition to the prohibitions
provided by special Conventions, it is especially forbidden to kill or wound an
enemy under these circumstances).
452. See NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 10, 11.4, at 485; see also
Protocol I, supra note 27, arts. 40-41, BOTHE ET AL., supra note 27, at 216-24;
PILLOUD ET AL, supra note 33, at 473-91; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 27, para
47(i), cmt. 47.56; Horace B. Robertson, Jr., The Obligation to Accept Surrender, in
READINGS, supra note 35, ch. 40; supra note 35 and accompanying text. Serbia
was a party, but the Ottoman Empire, predecessor state to modern Turkey, a
NATO member, and some areas within the SFRY, only signed 1899 Hague 11,
supra note 173, Regulations, art. 23(c), identical with Hague IV, supra note 173,
Regulations, art. 23(c); which Montenegro, Serbia and the Empire signed but did
not ratify. Austria-Hungary, a predecessor state to parts of the SFRY and its
successor states and Hungary, a NATO member, were parties to the 1899 and 1907
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Third 1949 Convention and Protocol I are complementary to the
extent that they do not supersede the 1907 Hague IV Regulations.
45 3
Moreover, Hague IV's preamble, and its 1899 predecessor's
preamble include Martens clauses.454 To the extent these clauses
reflect a general principle of law,455 the SFRY was bound to apply
principles of humanity in its custody of PW's whether the Hague
treaties were binding or not.
2. The SFRY-KLA Aspects ofAllied Force
Common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions establishes
minimum criteria for armed conflicts that are not of an international
nature; e.g., the Second Convention relating to prisoners of war says:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in
the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the
conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
Conventions. Turkey, also a NATO member but a successor state to part of the
Ottoman Empire, is a party to the 1899 but not the 1907 Convention. See
Convention of 1899, Convention of 1907: Signatures, Ratifications and
Accessions,in Schindler & Toman, supra note 114, at 94-98; TIF, supra note 70, at
455-57. There is a circuitous argument that the SFRY, constituted as it was in
1999, was bound by treaty succession principles as well as custom and general
principles reflected in these treaties. See generally Symposium, State Succession,
supra note 162; Walker, Integration, supra note 9. The same kind of issues might
affect analysis within NATO because of, e.g., Canada's, the Czech Republic's, or
Iceland's status as NATO members; they are not parties to either Convention.
Canada had dominion status a century ago within the British Empire. The Czech
Republic, part of the former Czechoslovakia created after World War 1, has
territory that was part of the pre-World War I Austro-Hungarian empire, and thus
might be considered, like Canada, as subject to treaty succession principles. See
TIF, supra note 70, at 429 (listing Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain,
United Kingdom, United States as 1899 Hague II or 1907 Hague IV parties). The
list does not include Canada, Czech Republic, Iceland, Montenegro or Serbia as
parties to either Convention but includes Turkey and other NATO members. Id.
453. Third Convention, supra note 50, art. 135; Protocol I, supra note 27, art.
96; PICTET, supra note 33, at 636-40; PILLOUD ET AL, supra note 33, at 1084-92.
454. Hague IV, supra note 173, preamble; 1899 Hague II, supra note 173,
preamble; see also supra notes 204, 450 and accompanying text.
455. See supra notes 176-177 and accompanying text (discussing how general
principles of law are established and who is bound by them).
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(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of
armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de
combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all
circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction
founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other
similar criteria. To this end the following acts are and shall remain
prohibited at any time and in any place ... with respect to the above-
mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds,
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity; in particular, humiliating and
degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording
all the judicial guarantees ... recognized as indispensable by civilized
peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
... Parties to the conflict should further endeavor to bring into force, by
means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of
[this] ... Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal
status of the Parties to the conflict. 456
If Allied Force was not an international armed conflict with
respect to KLA-SFRY confrontations but would be within the Article
3 definition, its standards applied to those taken into custody, e.g.,
456. Third Convention, supra note 50, art. 3; see also First Convention, supra
note 50, art. 3; Second Convention, supra note 33, art. 3; Fourth Convention, supra
note 50, art. 3.
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KLA members the SFRY captured, or SFRY armed forces members
the KLA captured.
It is doubtful whether the SFRY and the KLA negotiated Article 3
special arrangements. Article 3 recites minimum standards; other
provisions of the Third Convention reciting customary law may also
have applied to these persons. Protocol II, applying to non-
international conflicts as a supplement to the Third Convention,457
lists additional protections. 458 The former Yugoslavia was a Protocol
II party subject to a declaration, 45 9 and the SFRY accepted its
principles retroactive to 1992.460 The SFRY may also have been
bound under treaty succession principles and other considerations.461
To the extent Protocol II standards recited custom, 462 the SFRY and
the KLA were bound. The SFRY and the KLA were also bound by
the Martens clause principle ("in cases not covered by the law in
force, the human person remains under the protection of the
principles of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience")
stated in Protocol 11,463 even if they were not bound under Protocol II
or other formal treaty rules.
457. Protocol II, supra note 27, art. 1; see also BOTHE ET AL., supra note 27, at
604-08, 623-29; PILLOUD ET AL, supra note 33, at 1319-36, 1343-46.
458. Protocol II, supra note 27, arts. 4-11; see also BOTHE ET AL., supra note 27,
at 640-64; PILLOUD ETAL, supra note 33, at 1368-1436.
459. See Signatures, supra note 169, at 703, 718 (identifying Yugoslavia as a
Protocol 11 signatory).
460. See supra note 435 and accompanying text (discussing the SFRY's
retroactive acceptance of the Conventions).
461. See TIF, supra note 70, at 319; see generally Symposium, State Succession,
supra note 162; Walker, Integration, supra note 9.
462. See supra notes 175-177 and accompanying text (declaring that
international law binds states to general principles or customs of international law).
463. See Protocol II, supra note 27, pmbl. (containing no "established custom,"
as in other Martens clauses). The absence of this clause is due to the relative
newness of law applying to nonintemational armed conflicts, some, although, may
aruged that since 1977 it is time for including that norm as well; see also BOTHE ET
AL., supra note 27, at 44, 620; PILLOUD ET AL, supra note 33, at 1341-42; supra
notes 175-177 and accompanying text.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
Allied Force's legitimacy under international law is, as U.S. sports
commentators would say, a close call. Because of its history,
intervention, like war, is a loaded word for many states or
commentators and in many contexts. Today, in the Charter era,
intervention in some contexts may be less lawful than it was before
1945, given Charter provisions on sovereignty, territorial integrity
and political independence of states. On the other hand, the growing
body of the law of human rights, also recognized in the Charter, and
humanitarian law, recognized by U.N. organizations' resolutions,
within the world arena must be considered. Under the perhaps (and
hopefully) unique circumstances of Kosovo, the NATO campaign
was legitimate under principles of collective humanitarian
intervention under state of necessity. Principles and factors advanced
in Parts I and II for collective humanitarian intervention under state
of necessity, based on ILC State Responsibility principles that restate
customary and general principles norms, demonstrate that NATO
acted within the bounds of international law in conducting Allied
Force.464 To be sure, commentary in the 2001 version of the
International Law Commission State Responsibility principles says
that "The question whether measures of forcible humanitarian
intervention, not sanctioned pursuant to Chapters VII or VIII of the
Charter... , may be lawful under modern international law is not
covered by article 25[, which declares state of necessity
principles].'4 65 However, the Commission principles also afford an
opportunity for states to act collectively to end, though lawful means,
serious breaches of a state's obligations under peremptory norms of
international law,466 which is precisely what NATO attempted to do
in acting to end SFRY repressions in Kosovo. Moreover, whether the
ILC chose to cover this situation or not, this Article's Parts I and II
demonstrate that the general principle of state of necessity is a
customary norm, and that application of this norm in the Allied Force
context demonstrates that NATO acted within the principles of
464. See supra Parts I-II.
465. See 2001 ILC Report, supra note 3, at 205.
466. Id. arts. 40-41, at 277-92; see also supra notes 3, 135-142 and
accompanying text.
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international law in conducting a collective humanitarian
intervention campaign in Kosovo in 1999. Parts I and II offer a more
detailed, refined analysis than the ILC standards. NATO appears to
have met these criteria as well.
Part III demonstrates that NATO could have conducted a ship
interdiction campaign as part of Allied Force; NATO would have
been obliged to follow state of necessity principles for the general
operation and LOAC rules for interdiction operations.467
Part III also says that as an operation involving use of force and
armed conflict conducted under state of necessity principles and
factors, NATO force personnel, SFRY force personnel, and KLA
fighters were entitled to PW status. These detained personnel were
subject to slightly different rules, owing to the NATO-SFRY
conflict's international nature and the SFRY-KLA conflict's non-
international nature.
468
Part II's principle and factor analysis is not the final chapter for
collective humanitarian intervention under state of necessity.
Commentators suggest other principles, e.g., a reasonable chance of
success for the mission,46 9 negotiation before intervention,47 ° or that
indigenous peoples in an affected state must welcome the collective
action.47' My analysis subsumes success under necessity and
proportionality principles, 472 and negotiation under the notice
requirement, which would not require negotiation in egregious
situations.473 Requiring a welcome from indigenous peoples involves
problems of those peoples' knowledge of their rights, perhaps
concealed from them by an oppressive affected state, and, more
importantly, those peoples' ability to communicate their desires
effectively, if an affected state has total control of communications.
Future collective interventions under state of necessity may establish
467. See supra Parts I-II1.B.
468. See supra Part II.C.
469. Brown, supra note 55, at 286; Coil, supra note 55, at 138.
470. MURPHY, supra note 5, at 322-23.
471. TESON, supra note 39, at 126-29.
472. See Coll, supra note 55, at 141-47 (listing necessity and proportionality as a
separate criterion); supra notes 158-202 and accompanying text.
473. See supra notes 238-274 and accompanying text.
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emerging custom or general principles, to support these or other
principles and factors, and modifying those advanced in this Article.
There are other species within the genus of humanitarian
intervention: intervention with an affected state's consent;
intervention pursuant to Security Council or General Assembly
resolution; intervention by a regional organization organized under
Article 52 of the Charter; collective intervention by an ad hoc
coalition; unilateral intervention; intervention under all of the
foregoing circumstances where the intervenor(s) seek(s) to succor
same-state nationals, same-state nationals and an affected state's
indigenous nationals, same-state nationals and nationals of other
states that may or may not have asked the intervenor(s) to act in their
behalf, or same-state nationals and nationals of other states that may
or may not have asked the intervenor(s) to act in their behalf, and
indigenous nationals of the affected state. These may invoke other
principles and factors with results that are different, in terms of
international law, from the relatively narrow issue this Article
analyzes.
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